Michael D. Smitiuch

A Hamilton jury awarded the plaintiff over $1 million in damages for serious injuries from a motor vehicle accident.

The jury award exceeded both the plaintiff's and defendants' offers to settle.

This decision addresses the plaintiff's application for costs, prejudgment interest, and post-judgment interest.

The court applied Rule 49.10, entitling the plaintiff to partial indemnity costs up to the date of their offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court also exercised its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act to fix prejudgment interest at 3% and post-judgment interest at 7%.

The total award for costs and interest was $1,104,557.50.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion to conditionally strike the jury notice for a trial scheduled to commence on January 17, 2022, due to COVID-19 pandemic developments suspending jury selections.

The defendants opposed the motion.

The court considered factors such as court resources, local pandemic impact, prejudice to parties (especially the plaintiff due to financial implications and case age), and history of adjournments.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, ordering that the trial proceed without a jury if juries are not being impaneled, and awarded costs to the plaintiff.

The appellants sought to overturn a jury verdict finding them negligent for a fatal fire and challenging the quantum of damages awarded for loss of care, guidance, companionship, mental distress, and future costs of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the jury's findings of negligence based on fire safety violations and affirming the damages awards, finding they did not "shock the conscience of the court" despite being high.

The court also clarified that Section 76 of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act does not immunize landlords from negligence related to fire safety precautions, even if the fire's origin is accidental.

The court issued an endorsement on costs and the deductibility of a prior settlement following a jury trial.

The plaintiffs were awarded damages and punitive damages against the defendants.

The court ruled that a settlement received by one plaintiff from the City of Brampton, explicitly labeled as general damages, was not deductible from the jury's award for loss of income, rejecting the defendants' claim of double recovery.

Regarding costs, the court found the defendants' Rule 49 offer to be improper due to its non-severable nature for multiple plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs' net award exceeded the offer.

Considering the complexity, importance of issues, and the defendants' aggressive litigation tactics, the court awarded the plaintiffs partial indemnity costs, fixing the total at $445,000, which included fees, disbursements, and costs thrown away due to an adjournment.

This endorsement addresses costs arising from two summary judgment motions.

The Plaintiff successfully defended Halton's motion to dismiss claims against it, and also successfully defended against Mervyn White and Carters PC's motion to dismiss claims against them, though White and Carters PC obtained a declaration regarding the limitation period.

The court found the Plaintiff entirely successful in defending both motions and entitled to costs.

It also found it reasonable to join the defendants and applied the Moore v. Wienecke framework for a Bullock order, requiring Halton to pay a majority of White and Carters PC's costs due to Halton's motion effectively shifting responsibility and prompting White and Carters PC's companion motion.

The defendants, The Corporation of the Regional Municipality of Halton and the plaintiff's former lawyers (Mervyn F. White and Carters Professional Corporation), brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for long-term disability (LTD) benefits.

Halton argued the LTD application was late, the plaintiff's employment was terminated, and the claim was statute-barred.

The former lawyers sought dismissal if the claims against Halton were time-barred.

The court granted the plaintiff relief from forfeiture for the late LTD application, finding Halton's misleading information and failure to assist contributed to the delay.

It also determined that the termination of employment did not preclude the claim and that the two-year statutory limitation period applied, which had not expired.

Both defendants' motions for summary judgment were dismissed.

The court issued a corrigendum to correct and add the names of counsel for the plaintiffs and defendants in the original Reasons for Judgment issued on December 7, 2016.

All other contents of the original judgment remain unchanged.

The plaintiff was rendered a quadriplegic after the minivan he was a passenger in was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant Ellis at an intersection.

Ellis had stopped at a stop sign rather than the faded stop line, resulting in poor sightlines, and pulled into the intersection when it was unsafe.

The court found the City of Hamilton 50% liable for failing to maintain the stop line, which created an unreasonable risk of harm.

Ellis was found 50% liable for failing to ensure it was safe to proceed.

Claims against the driver of the minivan were dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought costs following a 22-day product liability trial where the jury awarded them $1,157,850 in damages but found the plaintiff 25% contributorily negligent.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, rejecting the plaintiffs' request for substantial indemnity costs and a cost premium.

The court also declined the defendants' request to reduce the costs award by 25% to reflect the contributory negligence finding, noting that the plaintiff's negligence did not materially affect the prospects for settlement.

The plaintiffs were awarded $387,140 in fees, plus HST and disbursements.

During a product liability jury trial, the defendants requested that the jury be charged on the doctrine of spoliation because the plaintiffs discarded the broken pieces of the cookware that allegedly caused the injury.

The court declined to charge the jury on spoliation, finding no evidence that the plaintiffs intentionally destroyed the evidence to affect ongoing or contemplated litigation.

The plaintiffs discarded the broken pieces shortly after the accident without contemplating a lawsuit.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking court approval of a proposed infant settlement arising from a motor vehicle accident in which a minor sustained a fractured femur and facial fractures.

The proposed settlement totalled $85,000 and included damages, interest, legal fees, HST, and disbursements pursuant to a contingency fee agreement entered into by the litigation guardian.

The court found the evidentiary record insufficient regarding the facial injury and raised concerns about whether the contingency fee agreement complied with the Solicitors' Act.

Applying the fairness and reasonableness framework articulated by the Court of Appeal, the court held that the materials were inadequate to determine whether the settlement and fee arrangement were appropriate.

The matter was referred to the Office of the Children's Lawyer to investigate and report on the settlement and the enforceability and reasonableness of the contingency fee agreement.