Vanessa A. Tanner

The plaintiff was struck from behind by an unidentified vehicle in a Starbucks drive-through.

Unaware she had suffered a concussion, she did not obtain the other driver's information before he left.

She reported the accident to her broker the next day but did not notify police within 24 hours or provide written notice to her insurer within 30 days.

In a special case trial, the court held the plaintiff could not have ascertained the driver's identity with reasonable due diligence due to her injuries.

The court found no irreparable prejudice to the insurer from the delayed reporting and granted relief from forfeiture.

The court also found sufficient corroborating evidence of the unidentified vehicle's involvement.

This costs endorsement addresses the appropriate quantum of costs following a motor vehicle accident trial in which the plaintiff was awarded damages by the jury, but the award was reduced to zero by operation of the Insurance Act.

The defendant sought $269,264.87 in costs, later reducing the request to $230,000.

The plaintiff argued for a much lower award, citing financial hardship and litigation conduct.

The court fixed costs at $185,000, finding the defendant entitled to costs but reducing the amount for duplication, lack of particulars, and proportionality.

This is a costs endorsement following a 12-day jury trial in a motor vehicle accident case.

The Plaintiff, Kyriaki Moustakis, was awarded $55,252.61 in net damages and sought substantial indemnity costs, having beaten her Rule 49 offer to settle.

The Defendant, Reynaldo Agbuya, opposed the quantum of costs and sought costs thrown away due to a late amendment by the Plaintiff.

The court awarded the Plaintiff $378,000 in costs (partial indemnity to the offer date, substantial thereafter) and $3,252.79 in prejudgment interest.

The Defendant was awarded $10,000 in full indemnity costs for the costs thrown away.

The court found the Plaintiff's choice of ordinary procedure reasonable, rejected arguments of "trial by ambush" and ATE insurance influence, and disallowed costs for focus groups.

The defendant brought a motion seeking to compel the plaintiff to attend a second psychiatric medical examination and to extend the time for serving the expert report.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a change in counsel and dissatisfaction with a previously retained expert's communication style at a prior trial were not sufficient reasons to order a further examination.

The court emphasized that trial fairness did not require a new examination, especially given the potential for delay to the impending trial date.

The plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident.

Liability was admitted, and a jury awarded damages for pain and suffering, past income loss, and future income loss.

The court then heard the defendant's threshold motion, which argued the plaintiff's injuries did not meet the statutory threshold for non-pecuniary loss.

The court denied the defendant's motion, finding that the plaintiff had sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important mental or psychological function, thus allowing her claim for non-pecuniary damages to proceed.

The plaintiff, a prominent human rights lawyer, was struck by the defendant's motor vehicle while riding her bicycle.

The defendant failed to discharge the reverse onus under the Highway Traffic Act and was found wholly liable.

The court accepted expert medical evidence that the plaintiff suffered a permanent mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI) and chronic migraines, which effectively ended her legal career.

The court dismissed the defendants' threshold motion, finding the plaintiff sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important function, and awarded substantial damages including $250,000 in general damages, past and future income loss, and future care costs.

This case involves an application and cross-application concerning the entitlement to $100,000 in proceeds from an after-the-event (ATE) legal protection insurance policy.

The primary applicant, Peter B. Cozzi Professional Corporation, sought a declaration that the proceeds belonged to the client, Quoc Nguyen, and were assignable to Cozzi for disbursements.

The cross-applicant, Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, sought a declaration that it was entitled to the proceeds to satisfy an adverse costs order against Nguyen.

The court found that the contingency fee agreement (CFA) between Cozzi and Nguyen was unenforceable due to Nguyen's disability and lack of proper court approval or litigation guardian involvement.

Consequently, Cozzi was not entitled to apply the proceeds to his disbursements.

The court also found that Aviva had no entitlement to the proceeds under the ATE policy due to lack of privity of contract.

Both applications were dismissed, and the proceeds were ordered to remain in trust pending a determination of who should act on behalf of Mr. Nguyen for their disposition.

The plaintiff brought a tort action for a motor vehicle collision.

After a jury awarded nominal general damages (less than the statutory deductible) and past loss of income (reduced to zero by collateral benefits), the defendant brought a threshold motion to declare the plaintiff not entitled to non-pecuniary damages.

The court determined the threshold issue was not moot, despite the net zero award, for costs purposes.

The court found the plaintiff failed to establish a permanent serious impairment of an an important physical, mental, or psychological function, largely due to the plaintiff's exaggeration of symptoms and the expert witness's lack of impartiality.

Consequently, the defendant's threshold motion was granted, and the plaintiff's total damages were reduced to zero.

The defendant was deemed the successful party and awarded costs and disbursements.

The defendants moved for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that the plaintiff, a former inmate who alleged severe injuries from an assault by other inmates, was ordinarily resident outside Ontario following deportation to the United States.

The court found that the plaintiff was indeed not ordinarily resident in Ontario, thereby meeting the threshold requirement of the rule.

However, the plaintiff had provided limited evidence regarding financial circumstances, and the evidentiary record concerning the merits of the negligence claim against correctional authorities remained incomplete at the early stage of proceedings.

The court held that assessing the merits required disclosure of institutional procedures and security measures primarily within the defendants’ control.

In balancing access to justice against protection of defendants from meritless claims, the court concluded that requiring security for costs at this stage would be unjust and premature.

The applicant sought income replacement benefits and housekeeping benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer denied the claims, relying on surveillance evidence showing the applicant working at her family's dry cleaning business and performing physical tasks without apparent difficulty.

The arbitrator found the applicant and her husband lacked credibility, noting numerous contradictions in their testimony.

The arbitrator preferred the medical evidence of the insurer's experts, who concluded the applicant could perform her pre-accident work and housekeeping tasks, over the applicant's experts, who were unaware she had returned to work.

The application for benefits, interest, and a special award was dismissed.

The appellant insurance company appealed a decision dismissing its motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the respondent homeowners.

The respondents had sued for damages following unsatisfactory home repairs after a flood.

The appellant failed to file a statement of defence despite multiple extensions, and delayed several months before moving to set aside the default judgment.

The Divisional Court found that while the motions judge erred in concluding there was no arguable defence on the merits, she correctly found the appellant failed to explain the default or move promptly.

Weighing all factors, the court exercised its discretion to dismiss the appeal, finding the justice of the case required denying relief due to the appellant's unexplained delay.