Todd L. Archibald

The applicant sought an interlocutory injunction to extend the voting period in the respondent political party's leadership contest, alleging that he and others had not received the necessary verification numbers to vote electronically.

The court dismissed the application on two grounds.

First, the applicant failed to exhaust the internal dispute resolution mechanisms provided in the party's election rules before seeking court intervention.

Second, applying the tripartite test for an interlocutory injunction, the court found that the balance of convenience heavily favoured the respondents, as extending the voting period at the eleventh hour would prejudice the tens of thousands of members who had already voted and disrupt the scheduled leadership convention.

The applicant university brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the respondent sports organization from releasing a tribunal decision regarding a football player's eligibility.

The applicant argued that the parties had previously reached a settlement agreement wherein the respondent agreed not to pursue the eligibility complaint.

The court found it had jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement under contract law.

Applying the RJR MacDonald test, the court found a strong prima facie case of a binding settlement, irreparable harm to the players and the university's reputation if the injunction was denied, and the balance of convenience favoured the applicant.

The interlocutory injunction was granted.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to have the defendant found in contempt of court for failing to comply with multiple court orders, including orders to provide an accounting and attend judgment debtor examinations.

The defendant admitted to eight counts of civil contempt, including egregiously lying to the court about his father's death to avoid a court appearance.

The court found the defendant in contempt beyond a reasonable doubt and sentenced him to a 76-day intermittent custodial sentence, emphasizing the need for specific and general deterrence and denunciation.

The defendant was also ordered to pay $50,000 in costs.

The plaintiff brought a tort action for a motor vehicle collision.

After a jury awarded nominal general damages (less than the statutory deductible) and past loss of income (reduced to zero by collateral benefits), the defendant brought a threshold motion to declare the plaintiff not entitled to non-pecuniary damages.

The court determined the threshold issue was not moot, despite the net zero award, for costs purposes.

The court found the plaintiff failed to establish a permanent serious impairment of an an important physical, mental, or psychological function, largely due to the plaintiff's exaggeration of symptoms and the expert witness's lack of impartiality.

Consequently, the defendant's threshold motion was granted, and the plaintiff's total damages were reduced to zero.

The defendant was deemed the successful party and awarded costs and disbursements.

The appellant appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO) and a finding of incapacity regarding antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued the appeal was moot due to the CTO's expiration, but the court found an ongoing dispute because the CTO had been renewed.

The court held that the Board reasonably concluded the appellant would likely suffer substantial deterioration without the CTO and that she lacked the capacity to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of her treatment decisions due to her schizoaffective disorder.

The appeal was dismissed.

This judgment concerns a motion to appoint a litigation guardian for the plaintiff, Ms. Huang, in a complex personal injury action that originated from a 2000 motor vehicle accident.

The court considered medical assessments and Ms. Huang's demonstrated inability to understand legal proceedings, settlement offers, and to effectively instruct counsel or represent herself.

Despite Ms. Huang's opposition, the court found her to be a person under disability, mentally incapable of representing herself in the litigation due to a Major Depressive Disorder.

Consequently, the motion was granted, and the Public Guardian and Trustee was appointed as her litigation guardian.

The defendant, Anciento M. Braga, brought a motion for a capacity assessment of the plaintiff, She He Huang, under s. 16(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.

The court considered Ms. Huang's history of dismissing multiple counsel, rejecting significant settlement offers, and demonstrating a rudimentary understanding of trial proceedings despite a prior assessment finding capacity.

Citing concerns about her fluctuating mental state and inability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of her litigation decisions, the court ordered Ms. Huang to undergo a new capacity assessment.

The costs of the assessment and interpreter services were to be borne by Ms. Huang from her income replacement benefits.

The litigation guardian for a plaintiff previously declared a person under disability brought a motion under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking court approval of a settlement dismissing the action without costs.

The plaintiff opposed the settlement and sought removal of the litigation guardian, asserting he was no longer under disability.

The court reviewed psychiatric evidence and the plaintiff’s conduct during the proceedings and found he remained incapable of appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of litigation decisions.

The court further concluded the proposed settlement was in the plaintiff’s best interests given limitation issues, weak evidentiary support, and significant litigation risk.

The motion to remove the litigation guardian was denied and the settlement was approved.

Employee wrongful dismissal action arising from post-disability return-to-work restructuring, disciplinary measures, and subsequent long-term disability leave.

The court found the employee was constructively dismissed when the employer unilaterally demoted him, altered his reporting structure, removed supervisory and budgetary responsibilities, and reduced his role to a more clerical function.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court awarded 18 months' notice, less ESA minimums already paid, and rejected claims for moral damages, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and punitive damages.

The court also rejected the employer's frustration and proportional reduction defences, and held the constructive dismissal claim was not statute-barred.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike an action commenced by a corporate religious entity seeking declarations regarding the removal of a bishop and a church council member from ecclesiastical positions.

The court considered whether the corporate plaintiff had private law standing to seek declaratory relief concerning religious appointments and governance within the church.

It held that the corporation’s objects did not give it a legal interest in determining who held ecclesiastical offices or church administrative roles.

Because the dispute concerned the personal rights of individuals within a religious organization rather than the corporation’s legal rights or property interests, the corporation lacked standing.

The statement of claim was struck for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

A former employee of a digital cinema company misappropriated proprietary 2D to 3D conversion software and confidential information while still employed and used it to establish competing businesses in China.

The court found breaches of the duty of good faith and fidelity, misuse of confidential information and trade secrets, misappropriation of a corporate opportunity, and the tort of conversion.

The defendants, most of whom were noted in default, used the stolen technology to win a theatre project and compete in the digital cinema market.

The court awarded damages reflecting the minimum cost of developing the stolen technology, disgorgement of profits from the misappropriated project, punitive damages, and substantial costs.

The offender was convicted after trial of possession of cocaine, methamphetamine, and MDMA for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to traffic cocaine under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The case arose from a large-scale police investigation into multi‑kilogram drug trafficking in the Toronto area, during which the offender negotiated the sale of three kilograms of cocaine and was later found in possession of additional multi‑kilogram quantities of methamphetamine and thousands of MDMA pills.

The court characterized the offender as a high‑level commercial trafficker and emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as the dominant sentencing principles for large‑scale drug trafficking.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of criminal record, strong family and community support, and evidence of rehabilitation potential.

A global sentence of nine years’ imprisonment was imposed, with concurrent sentences on all counts.

The applicant brought a motion to stay the discipline proceedings currently before the Hearing Panel of the Law Society of Upper Canada pending the disposition of her application for judicial review.

The hearing was virtually complete, with only final submissions remaining.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the application was premature and that the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay, as she had a full right of appeal from the Panel's final decision.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's decision to certify a class action against them regarding the manufacture and distribution of the anti-psychotic drug Zyprexa.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence and claimed restitutionary relief based on waiver of tort.

The defendants argued that proof of the amount of wrongful gain could not be a common issue and that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that given the uncertain state of the law regarding waiver of tort, a full evidentiary record was necessary, and the motion judge did not err in certifying the common issues or finding a class action to be the preferable procedure.

The moving party brought a motion to a panel of the Divisional Court to set aside a previous decision refusing leave to intervene as a friend of the Court in an application for judicial review.

The underlying application involved certificates of approval granted under the Environmental Bill of Rights.

The Court treated the motion as a hearing de novo due to the moving party refining his position.

Finding that the case engaged matters of public concern and that the moving party had special knowledge and expertise regarding the statement of environmental values, the Court granted leave to intervene.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision regarding a conditional sales contract for a car loan.

The central issue was the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court to admit hearsay evidence.

The Divisional Court noted a potential conflict between section 27 of the Courts of Justice Act and section 2 of the Evidence Act regarding the admissibility of hearsay.

As neither party addressed this issue in their factums, the court adjourned the appeal to allow the parties to amend their factums.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing their claim and granting the defendants' counterclaim.

The Divisional Court raised the issue of the adequacy of the Deputy Judge's reasons, noting that neither party had addressed it.

The court adjourned the appeal to allow the parties to amend their factums to address whether the reasons met the minimum threshold for adequacy.

The appellant brought a motion to the Divisional Court to appeal a Master's decision striking out certain particulars of a negligence claim against the respondent.

The court determined that the Master's decision was interlocutory, not final, and therefore the proper appeal route was to a single judge of the Superior Court of Justice under s. 17(a) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court also ruled that the appellant's counsel was not precluded from arguing the subsequent appeal despite having sworn an uncontested affidavit in the proceedings below.

Costs of the day were fixed at $3,000 to be borne by the ultimate losing party.

The appellants brought an appeal of an order by Master Haberman to the Divisional Court.

The court determined that the Master's order was interlocutory and, pursuant to section 17(a) of the Courts of Justice Act, the appeal properly lies to the Superior Court of Justice, not the Divisional Court.

Costs for the appearance were fixed at $3,000, payable by the ultimate losing party on the appeal.

The tenants appealed a decision regarding their tenancy with Greenrock Investments Ltd. The Ontario Divisional Court issued an order on consent in the attached terms as amended, resolving the appeal.