Jonathan Davis-Sydor

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a multi-million dollar action and seeking judgment on two promissory notes totalling $1.25 million.

The court held that a broadly worded release executed in November 2009 barred most of the plaintiffs’ claims, particularly in light of admissions that the parties had a “clean slate.” However, the enforceability of the two promissory notes raised genuine issues requiring a trial because the surrounding documentation was inconsistent and some documents were admittedly fabricated.

After conducting a mini‑trial under Rule 20.04(2.2), the court concluded that a full appreciation of the evidence regarding the promissory notes could not be achieved on a summary judgment record.

Most of the plaintiffs’ action was dismissed, but the counterclaim relating to the promissory notes was directed to trial.

A not‑for‑profit campus radio corporation sought a winding‑up order under the Winding Up and Restructuring Act after losing its broadcast licence, premises, and funding.

The opposing party argued the court lacked jurisdiction, that the members’ resolution was invalid because it referred to “dissolution” rather than “winding up,” and that potential derivative claims should proceed.

The court held that the distinction between “dissolve” and “wind up” was immaterial in the circumstances and that the corporation had no meaningful assets or operational purpose.

The court rejected the argument that speculative derivative claims justified preserving the corporation’s existence.

A winding‑up order was granted and the opposition dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision that ordered the production of an insurance policy under Rule 30.02(3).

The motion judge had originally refused production, finding the policy was sought for a collateral purpose and that uncontradicted evidence showed the deductible exceeded the claim amount.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge did not make a palpable and overriding error by relying on uncontradicted affidavit evidence without reading the policy itself.

The Divisional Court's order for production was set aside and the motion judge's decision was restored.

The application judge failed to provide any reasons for his decision, making appellate review impossible.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to a different judge of the Superior Court.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's refusal to allow them to amend their statement of defence to include a counterclaim, her refusal to stay a summary judgment granted on a defaulted mortgage, and her refusal to enjoin the respondent from exercising its power of sale.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the proposed counterclaim regarding an improvident sale was no longer viable because the sale did not occur.

The court also held that the appellants could not rely on the delay in enforcement due to forbearance agreements to invalidate the notice of sale.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing its breach of contract and warranty claim against an American respondent for lack of jurisdiction.

The motion judge found no real and substantial connection between the respondent and Ontario.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge failed to properly weigh the factors from Muscutt v. Courelles and conflated a choice of law clause with a choice of jurisdiction clause.

The matter was remitted for re-hearing before a different judge.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Environmental Review Tribunal granting several respondents leave to appeal the Ministry of the Environment's issuance of Certificates of Approval for the use of alternative fuels, including tires, at a cement plant.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal's decision to grant leave was reasonable.

The Tribunal correctly interpreted the test for leave under s. 41 of the Environmental Bill of Rights as requiring a standard of proof lower than a balance of probabilities.

Furthermore, it was reasonable for the Tribunal to conclude that the Ministry Directors should have considered the Statement of Environmental Values, common law rights, and environmental consistency, and that the project could result in significant harm to the environment.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion to a panel of the Divisional Court to set aside a previous decision refusing leave to intervene as a friend of the Court in an application for judicial review.

The underlying application involved certificates of approval granted under the Environmental Bill of Rights.

The Court treated the motion as a hearing de novo due to the moving party refining his position.

Finding that the case engaged matters of public concern and that the moving party had special knowledge and expertise regarding the statement of environmental values, the Court granted leave to intervene.

The Industry Coalition for Environmental Fairness Inc. (ICEF) and the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario brought motions for leave to intervene in a judicial review of an Environmental Review Tribunal decision.

The underlying judicial review concerned the test for leave to appeal under the Environmental Bill of Rights regarding certificates of approval issued to a cement company.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that ICEF lacked a direct interest and would not make a useful contribution without causing delay, and that the Environmental Commissioner's proposed intervention would not provide a different perspective from the existing parties and would likely prejudice them.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision allowing an action to proceed in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by ignoring a British Columbia forum selection clause in the parties' contract and by failing to apply the real and substantial connection test.

Applying the test, the Court found the contract was made, performed, and breached in British Columbia, and there was no real and substantial connection to Ontario.

The action was stayed.

The appellants appealed an order lifting a stay and dismissing a motion to amend a counterclaim.

The appellants abandoned the appeal against the order lifting the stay.

The Court of Appeal denied the appellants' request for an adjournment, noting they had been warned repeatedly to retain new counsel.

The Court found the record did not support the motion judge's finding of an agreement to abandon the counterclaim.

However, because the appellants failed to provide a draft counterclaim, the Court could not find the motion judge erred in dismissing the motion to amend.

The appeal was dismissed without prejudice to a renewed motion on proper material.