12 total
Plaintiffs permitted to reopen case mid-trial to call former hospital staff regarding spoliation and records.
During a bifurcated trial on liability regarding TMJ implant surgeries, three mid-trial motions were brought concerning the calling of witnesses.
The defendant's motion to call Dr. Wyant was granted on consent.
The plaintiffs moved to reopen their case to call a former hospital records director regarding a spoliation claim, and to call the former chief of staff as an adverse witness.
The court allowed the plaintiffs to reopen their case to call the records director, finding no prejudice to the defendant.
The court also put the defendant to its election under Rule 53.07(1) regarding the former chief of staff, allowing the plaintiffs to call him if the defendant chose not to.
Mid-trial motion to introduce discovery transcripts of deceased witness from other actions denied due to prejudice.
In a complex medical malpractice trial, the defendant hospital brought a mid-trial motion seeking leave under Rule 31.11(6) to introduce discovery transcripts of a deceased doctor from other actions.
The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing they did not have the transcripts when prior Pierringer orders were made and would be irreparably prejudiced because their experts had not reviewed them.
The court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiffs did not have the transcripts prior to trial and that admitting them now would cause irreparable prejudice that could not be compensated by costs or an adjournment.
Summary judgment dismissed negligent investigation and malicious prosecution claims.
On a summary judgment motion in an action arising from criminal breach of trust charges against a police officer responsible for sex offender registry administration, the court dismissed the claims for negligent investigation and malicious prosecution.
Applying the modern summary judgment framework and the elements of negligent investigation, the court held the moving parties did not initiate the criminal proceedings and, in any event, there were reasonable and probable grounds for the charges based in part on findings made in the prior criminal reasons.
The evidentiary record was found insufficient to support the pleaded conspiracy and Charter damages claims, but the court declined to dismiss them outright and granted leave to file a further fresh as amended pleading limited to those causes of action.
Claims against the police service as a non-entity were also dismissed.
Successful police defendants awarded $154,623.78 in partial indemnity costs after dismissal of civil claim.
Following dismissal of a civil action alleging assault, unlawful arrest and detention, and breaches of Charter rights against several police-related defendants, the successful defendants sought costs of a ten‑day trial.
The plaintiff opposed the amount, arguing the bill of costs was excessive, that some issues were not fully successful, and that personal financial hardship should mitigate the award.
The court reviewed the lengthy procedural history, the defendants’ partial indemnity rates, the existence of a prior offer to settle, and the defendants’ complete success on the core liability issues.
Finding the bill of costs reasonable and modest given the complexity and duration of the proceeding, and noting the absence of evidence supporting impecuniosity, the court awarded the defendants their costs on a partial indemnity scale.
Appeal allowed; motion judge correctly refused production of insurance policy sought for a collateral purpose.
The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision that ordered the production of an insurance policy under Rule 30.02(3).
The motion judge had originally refused production, finding the policy was sought for a collateral purpose and that uncontradicted evidence showed the deductible exceeded the claim amount.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge did not make a palpable and overriding error by relying on uncontradicted affidavit evidence without reading the policy itself.
The Divisional Court's order for production was set aside and the motion judge's decision was restored.
Employer's negligence in administering group life insurance plan not governed by collective agreement; tort action allowed.
The appellants, executors of the estate of a deceased nurse, sued her former employer for negligence in administering a group life insurance plan, resulting in the denial of enhanced benefits.
The trial judge found the employer negligent but dismissed the action, concluding the dispute was governed by the collective agreement and thus subject to arbitration.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the essential character of the dispute did not arise from the collective agreement, which only required the employer to pay premiums and provide an information booklet.
Judgment was granted in favour of the appellants for the value of the enhanced benefits.
Trial judge lacked jurisdiction to order appellate costs be assessed on a risk plus premium basis.
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed an appeal and restored the trial judge's judgment with costs throughout.
The trial judge subsequently ordered that the costs of the appellate proceedings be assessed on a 'risk plus premium' basis.
The appellant appealed this costs order.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to order costs of appellate proceedings on a particular basis, as section 47 of the Supreme Court Act gives the Supreme Court express authority to award costs of the appeal.
Appeal dismissed; trial judge made no errors in fact or law.
The appellant appealed a trial judgment.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were exemplary and that there was no error in the appreciation of the facts or the law.
Costs were awarded to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis.
Supreme Court restores trial judgment finding plaintiff lacked mental capacity to provide statutory notice to municipality.
The appellant was injured after falling on a municipal sidewalk and successfully sued the municipality for gross negligence at trial, despite failing to provide written notice within the required seven days.
The trial judge found she was physically and mentally incapable of complying due to hospitalization and medication.
The Court of Appeal overturned this decision.
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that 'unsound mind' in s. 47 of the Limitations Act includes a lack of mental capacity from any source to perform the requisite steps.
The Court found the Court of Appeal wrongly interfered with the trial judge's factual findings, which did not amount to a palpable and overriding error.
Jury's apportionment of liability and trial judge's costs premium upheld on appeal.
The appellants appealed a jury verdict apportioning liability for a motor vehicle accident involving a child on a rock slide, and the trial judge's award of a $25,500 costs premium to the plaintiffs.
The Court of Appeal upheld the jury's finding that the driver was only 10% responsible, noting the high threshold for interfering with a jury's apportionment.
The court also upheld the costs premium but allowed an amendment to reduce the judgment by $10,921.44 based on recent case law.
Slip-and-fall appeal dismissed; maintenance findings were supported by the evidence.
The appellants challenged a trial judgment arising from a slip and fall in a hospital parking lot during winter conditions.
The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial judge materially misapprehended the facts in finding that the respondent hospital had a reasonable maintenance system for plowing, salting and sanding.
The court reviewed the evidentiary record, including photographs and a video entered by the plaintiffs, and held that the findings that the area had been sanded and salted the previous day were supported by the record.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Treatment centre designated as a hospital under HLDAA; bargaining units combined.
The employer applied to combine three bargaining units, while the union initiated a ministerial reference to determine if the employer's residential care program and the institution as a whole fell within the definition of a 'hospital' under the Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act (HLDAA).
The Board advised the Minister that both the residential care program and the entire treatment centre met the definition of a hospital, as they provided observation, care, and treatment to persons with physical and mental illnesses or disabilities.
Consequently, the Board directed that the three bargaining units be combined into a single unit.