Alexander Walter Demeo

The decision addresses a motion by Pamela Adderley for standing in an application brought by Bridgepoint Financial Services Limited Partnership I against Rudolf Steinberg.

The application concerns entitlement to settlement funds arising from accident benefits and the priority of claims to those funds.

The court considers whether Adderley should be joined as a party under Rule 5.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure or permitted to participate under section 67 of the Personal Property Security Act.

The court concludes that while Adderley is not a necessary party for joinder, her interests are engaged under the PPSA and she is permitted to participate in the application, subject to limits on her evidence and submissions.

The defendant, Seargeant Picard Incorporated (SP), moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs', Scott and Rachel Saxberg (the Saxbergs), action on the grounds that the claim was barred by the Limitations Act, having not been commenced within two years of discovery.

SP argued the claim was discoverable in October 2012 when they refused to perform certain recommended "repairs" at their cost.

The Saxbergs contended the issues were "upgrades" and the true extent of damage was not discovered until June 2015, when extensive water damage was uncovered during subsequent work.

The court dismissed SP's motion, finding that the Saxbergs' claim was discovered in June 2015, and therefore, the action commenced on July 25, 2016, was within the two-year limitation period.

The appellant appealed an order finding him in contempt and dismissing his action for persistently refusing to attend court-ordered medical examinations in Toronto.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by not treating contempt as a last resort and by failing to accept his legitimate excuse for non-compliance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision to find the appellant in contempt and to dismiss the action, emphasizing the appellant's deliberate non-compliance and the futility of further opportunities to comply.

The plaintiff moved to set aside an order requiring in-person defence medical examinations, citing COVID-19 concerns and relying on Rule 59.06.

The defendant brought a cross-motion to vary the order due to changes in expert availability and location.

The court found the plaintiff's evidence, largely hearsay from counsel's associate, insufficient to justify setting aside the order and drew an adverse inference from the lack of direct evidence from the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion but granted the defendant's request to amend the order to reflect the new experts and examination locations, finding the plaintiff's refusal to consent unreasonable.

The appellant was injured as a passenger in a vehicle owned by his spouse and driven by an uninsured driver without the spouse's consent.

The vehicle was insured by Jevco.

The appellant claimed coverage under uninsured automobile coverage, but Jevco denied the claim on the basis that the vehicle was not an "uninsured automobile" because it was owned by the insured's spouse.

The motion judge agreed with Jevco and dismissed the claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the statutory and contractual definitions of "uninsured automobile" unambiguously exclude vehicles owned by the insured or their spouse, regardless of whether the vehicle was taken without consent.

The defendant Jevco Insurance Company brought a motion under Rule 21.01 for a determination of a question of law: whether an automobile owned by the plaintiff's spouse, driven without consent by an uninsured driver, constitutes an "uninsured automobile" under the Insurance Act and the relevant insurance policy.

The court found that the statutory and contractual language explicitly excludes such a vehicle from the definition of "uninsured automobile" when it is owned by the insured or their spouse, even if the result may seem unfair.

Consequently, the plaintiff was not entitled to uninsured automobile coverage from Jevco.

The Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the Defendants' counterclaim and set-off defence, was dismissed.

This decision addresses the Defendants' claim for costs.

The court, applying Rule 57.01, found the Defendants' claimed costs of over $67,000 to be excessive, noting the motion's complexity was not as high as claimed and much of the work could be used at trial.

The court awarded the Defendants partial indemnity costs of $35,000.00 plus HST and disbursements of $600.00 plus HST, representing a 35% reduction from full indemnity.

The defendants moved for an order requiring the plaintiffs to provide a sworn and certified further and better supplementary affidavit of documents and to produce the proposed deponent for cross‑examination.

The action concerned alleged environmental contamination from a fuel spill on reserve lands.

The court held that although certain environmental consulting documents were in the plaintiffs’ possession, they were subject to a restriction imposed by the consultant and therefore not within the plaintiffs’ control for production without permission.

The plaintiffs were ordered to serve a sworn supplementary affidavit of documents listing such restricted documents in Schedule B if permission for disclosure was not obtained.

The request to compel cross‑examination of the deponent was refused on proportionality grounds, given the remote location of the First Nation and the limited utility of such an examination.

The defendant brought a motion in Small Claims Court seeking to stay the plaintiff’s action or alternatively transfer the proceeding from Thunder Bay to the Toronto Small Claims Court.

The dispute concerned the alleged failure to return an insurance deposit under a contract following the termination of a franchise relationship.

The court considered Rule 6 of the Rules of the Small Claims Court and the governing principle in Rule 1.03 emphasizing the just, most expeditious, and least expensive determination of proceedings.

The judge concluded the dispute primarily involved interpretation of a single written agreement, likely requiring minimal witness evidence.

The defendant failed to establish that the balance of convenience substantially favoured a transfer of venue, particularly given concerns about access to justice and the advanced stage of the proceeding in Thunder Bay.