Christopher D.J. Hacio

Appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim against Lloyd's of London on the basis that the action was barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action arose from a 2000 Greyhound bus accident where a passenger grabbed the steering wheel, causing the bus to roll.

The appellants obtained a judgment against the passenger at trial in 2012 but did not pursue recovery from Lloyd's of London until 2016, claiming Lloyd's was the insurer for the passenger.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the limitation period commenced from the trial judgment date and had expired before the action was commenced.

The plaintiff, J.I.L.M. Enterprises & Investments Limited, sought costs following a successful trial where it was awarded damages for breach of an insurance contract and punitive damages against INTACT Insurance.

The plaintiff requested substantial indemnity costs of approximately $350,000 for fees and $124,000 for disbursements.

The defendant, INTACT, argued for partial indemnity costs, a reduction for secretarial time, improper claims, and a 25% discount for divided success.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixing fees at $210,000 plus HST, and disbursements and taxes on disbursements at $115,000, after considering the complexity, importance of issues, and a modest reduction for divided success on certain claims.

The defendant was successful on a motion for summary judgment and sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $73,904.88, or alternatively $58,976.58 on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs argued the amount was excessive and suggested $20,000.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs as there was no offer to settle or reprehensible conduct.

Finding overlap and excessive hours in the defendant's bill of costs, the court awarded the defendant $25,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements on a partial indemnity scale.

The Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the Defendants' counterclaim and set-off defence, was dismissed.

This decision addresses the Defendants' claim for costs.

The court, applying Rule 57.01, found the Defendants' claimed costs of over $67,000 to be excessive, noting the motion's complexity was not as high as claimed and much of the work could be used at trial.

The court awarded the Defendants partial indemnity costs of $35,000.00 plus HST and disbursements of $600.00 plus HST, representing a 35% reduction from full indemnity.

The defendant, Intact Insurance, brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to comply with undertakings and answer refusals from her examination for discovery in a personal injury action.

By the time of the hearing, the undertakings had been answered, leaving only the refusals and costs in dispute.

The court ordered the plaintiff to answer questions regarding prior injuries and to produce academic records from an incomplete bookkeeping course relevant to her loss of income claim.

The request for un-redacted counsellor records was deemed premature.

Costs were awarded to the defendant.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the defendants' counterclaim and set-off claims, arguing that the two-year limitation period had expired, the issues were res judicata, and the claims constituted an abuse of process.

The dispute arose from a long-standing business relationship involving bank loan guarantees and a life insurance policy.

The court applied the Hryniak framework and found that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, including evidentiary gaps regarding the limitation period, potential waiver or estoppel, and the applicability of equitable set-off.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the matter was ordered to proceed to trial.

The plaintiff's motel/restaurant complex was partially destroyed by fire, leading to an insurance claim with INTACT.

The insurer delayed payment for nearly three years, driven by an unsubstantiated arson investigation and adversarial conduct, including misleading Crime Stoppers ads.

The plaintiff sued for breach of contract, replacement cost, lost profits, and punitive damages for bad faith.

The court found INTACT breached its duty of good faith by prolonging the investigation without reasonable grounds and delaying payment.

The plaintiff was awarded an increased replacement cost (conditional on rebuilding), lost profits for the period of delay, and significant punitive damages for the insurer's high-handed conduct.

This decision addresses a motion for the appointment of a case management judge to oversee two complex and intertwined files (an application and an action) involving numerous parties and pending motions.

The court found that the litigation had become unmanageable and would benefit from a single judge providing directions and making procedural orders to expedite the proceedings.

Justice Pierce, already familiar with the matters, was appointed as the case management judge under Rules 37.15 and 50.13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, with all future motions to be heard by her.

The applicants, Gina Gustafson and Juanita Curle, sought an order to wind up two corporations, Norall Group Inc. and Norall Group Contracting Inc., and a declaration of share ownership.

The respondents, Bruce Johnson and Allan Curle, opposed the winding up and claimed that the applicants held their shares in trust for their husbands.

The court found that the shares were validly gifted to the wives, rejecting claims of estoppel by convention, resulting trust, and constructive trust.

The court determined that the corporations had become dysfunctional due to management disputes, tax evasion convictions of the directors, and cessation of business, which prejudiced the shareholders.

Consequently, the court ruled it was just and equitable to wind up the corporations.

The plaintiffs moved under Rules 53.03 and 53.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to abridge the time for service of multiple expert reports and to obtain leave to tender expert opinion evidence shortly before trial.

The defendants opposed the late service, arguing prejudice due to the cumulative effect of numerous expert reports served days before the scheduled six‑week trial.

The court held that the late service undermined the purpose of Rule 53.03, which is to facilitate orderly trial preparation through adequate notice of expert opinion evidence.

While the evidence was relevant and probative to significant damages claims arising from a traumatic brain injury, the defendants required a fair opportunity to respond.

Leave was granted to admit the expert evidence, but the trial was adjourned and the defendants were given time to prepare responding expert reports.

The applicant co-operative sought a writ of possession to evict the respondent, a member with a physical disability, for failing to keep her unit clean, damaging the unit, and allowing an unauthorized person to reside there.

The respondent argued the eviction violated her rights under the Human Rights Code and that the co-operative failed to accommodate her disability.

The court found no prima facie case of discrimination, noting the cleanliness issues stemmed from the respondent's choice to keep pets, not her disability.

The court upheld the eviction but adjourned the final order to allow the respondent time to find suitable alternative housing, imposing interim conditions including the removal of her pets.

The moving defendants sought an equitable set-off between interim costs orders arising from two unrelated proceedings: a shareholder oppression action under the Ontario Business Corporations Act and separate matrimonial litigation.

They argued that costs they owed to five plaintiffs in the corporate dispute should be offset against costs owed by one plaintiff to one defendant in the matrimonial matter.

The court held that equitable set-off requires a close connection between the claims and generally mutuality of parties.

Because the debts arose from entirely different proceedings involving different parties, and lacked any sufficient nexus, the test from Holt v. Telford was not satisfied.

The court also found no procedural authority under the Rules of Civil Procedure to grant such relief on an interim motion.

Following a lengthy civil trial involving multiple plaintiffs arising from a motor vehicle incident, the plaintiffs’ claims against several defendants—including a transportation company, police officers, and the provincial Crown—were dismissed.

The successful defendants sought substantial costs after a 56‑day trial and extensive pre‑trial litigation.

The court applied s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rules 49 and 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing fairness and reasonableness in fixing costs rather than a strict accounting exercise.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis up to the defendants’ settlement offers and on a substantial indemnity basis thereafter, with adjustments made for excessive claims and unnecessary attendance of junior counsel.

The court also held the plaintiffs jointly and severally liable for the liability portion of the defendants’ costs, while allocating damages‑related costs severally among individual plaintiffs.

Requests for a Sanderson order and third‑party costs were denied.

The moving defendants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and for containing allegedly scandalous or vexatious material.

The court applied the leave test under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

While the moving parties argued that the motion judge misapplied established pleading principles, the court held that the issues raised were confined to the interests of the parties and did not involve matters of broader importance warranting appellate review.

The court concluded that the case concerned a routine pleadings determination and that the second requirement for leave—matters of sufficient importance—was not met.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

A costs decision arising from a multi‑plaintiff bus accident action where one plaintiff settled prior to trial.

The settling plaintiff sought costs based on a proportional share of a collective liability account and individual damages account maintained for all plaintiffs.

The defendants disputed various docketed entries, including costs relating to unrelated proceedings, unsuccessful motions, and non‑taxable disbursements.

Applying the discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court emphasized proportionality between the settlement value and the requested costs.

The court rejected the full amount sought and instead fixed a global costs award considered fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

Following the dismissal of a motion by certain defendants to strike the statement of claim, the court addressed the plaintiffs’ entitlement to costs.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs based on a rejected settlement offer made prior to the motion.

The court held that while the plaintiffs were entitled to costs as the successful parties, the complexity of the case and the reasonableness of bringing the pleadings motion did not justify substantial indemnity.

Considering the scope of the motion materials and the time required for the hearing, the court reduced the claimed amount.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $5,000 inclusive of HST, payable forthwith by the moving defendants.

The plaintiffs moved to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing their action for delay under rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure after failing to set the action down for trial by a deadline established at a status hearing.

Applying the contextual approach articulated in Court of Appeal jurisprudence, the court considered factors including the explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing the deadline, promptness in bringing the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

Although the affidavit evidence explaining the delay was limited, the record demonstrated the action had progressed through discoveries and expert reports and that counsel’s failure to meet the deadline was inadvertent rather than deliberate.

The defendants filed no evidence of prejudice and other related actions arising from the same accident remained active.

Balancing the relevant considerations and the principle favouring determination on the merits, the court set aside the registrar’s dismissal order but declined to award costs due to the plaintiffs’ responsibility for the missed deadline.

The plaintiffs were passengers on a Greyhound bus who were injured when another passenger, Davis, suddenly grabbed the steering wheel, causing the bus to crash.

Prior to boarding, Davis had exhibited signs of mild paranoia and had interacted with OPP officers, who concluded he was not a danger to himself or others.

The plaintiffs sued the OPP, the officers, Greyhound, and the bus driver for negligence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action against all defendants except Davis, finding that the police officers acted reasonably and had no legal grounds to apprehend or detain Davis under the Mental Health Act or common law.

The court also found that the bus driver and Greyhound met the high standard of care expected of a common carrier, as the sudden attack was not reasonably foreseeable and the driver's actions were reasonable in the circumstances.

The court proceeded to assess the hypothetical damages for each plaintiff.

The applicant housing co‑operative sought termination of a member’s membership and occupancy rights following complaints regarding smoking in hallways and smoke affecting other tenants.

The co‑operative’s board had previously warned the member that eviction could follow further complaints but later voted to terminate membership at a meeting held without providing the statutory notice required under s. 178(2)3 of the Co‑Operative Corporations Act.

The court held that the earlier warning letter did not constitute adequate notice of the later board meeting nearly three years later.

It also rejected the argument that the member had agreed to voluntarily relinquish her membership and tenancy during settlement negotiations.

The application to enforce the eviction and termination of membership was dismissed.