Dr. Lloyd

The defendant brought a motion seeking an order requiring the plaintiff to attend a further defence medical examination by a neurologist regarding Bell’s Palsy allegedly arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff opposed the request, arguing that a second defence medical was unnecessary and would delay the scheduled pre-trial and trial.

The court considered the governing principles under Rule 33 and the Courts of Justice Act concerning further medical examinations and emphasized fairness and the need for each party to present appropriate expert evidence.

The court found that the defendant had no prior notice that Bell’s Palsy would be advanced as a causally related injury until a late-served medical report.

In the circumstances, fairness required permitting the defence an opportunity to assess the condition through a further examination.

The plaintiffs sued their insurer for terminating statutory accident benefits based on reports from health care professionals retained by the insurer under s. 42 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

On discovery, the plaintiffs sought to ask questions that amounted to cross-examining these experts.

The motion judge held that the experts were not 'experts' within the meaning of Rule 31.06(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and thus the prohibition against cross-examination did not apply.

The Divisional Court allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the clear wording of Rule 31.06(3) covers experts engaged by a party for a purpose other than litigation, including s. 42 assessors.

The appellant tripped and fell on a ramp while exiting the respondent's store, sustaining injuries including a torn rotator cuff.

At trial, the judge awarded $13,598 in damages after finding the appellant 50% contributorily negligent and concluding her shoulder injury was not caused by the fall.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors by ignoring medical and lay evidence regarding causation and misapplying the principles of causation and apportionment.

The Court reduced the appellant's contributory negligence to 15% and reassessed damages, awarding a total of $104,044.41.

The appellants appealed a jury award of over $1.6 million in damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.

They argued the trial judge improperly interfered with cross-examination, erred in admitting a medical report during a life-care planner's testimony, and that the damages awarded were inordinately high.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the trial judge's conduct and evidentiary rulings, finding no unwarranted interference and a proper exercise of discretion.

The court upheld the general damages and housekeeping awards, but reduced the future income loss award by $140,000 on consent to account for the respondent's mandatory retirement age from the military reserve.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing his personal injury action following a jury verdict.

The jury found that the motor vehicle accident did not cause or materially contribute to any of the appellant's injuries, despite assessing damages at $25,000 for pain and suffering.

The appellant argued the verdict was perverse and that the trial judge erred in evidentiary rulings regarding expert witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury's verdict was reasonable given the central issue of the appellant's credibility and the defendants' position at trial.

The court also found no reversible error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings.