Charles Haworth

The respondent Minister brought motions to strike portions of the appellant's amended notice of appeal and portions of a supporting affidavit.

The Minister argued the appeal was moot because the underlying objection had been allowed in full, granting the requested tax relief.

The appellant argued the appeal should continue because the Minister's position on the exempt status of a life insurance policy was inconsistent with positions taken in related appeals.

The Tax Court granted the motion to strike the pleadings without leave to amend, finding no live controversy and no basis to exercise discretion to hear a moot appeal.

The Court also struck portions of the affidavit that improperly contained legal arguments, opinions, and conclusions, with leave to amend.

The appellants, trustees of an estate and related corporations, appealed and sought to set aside an arbitral award granting the respondent $275,000 as an oppression remedy and ordering occupation rent.

The respondent, a 94-year-old widow, had been pushed out of the family business by her late husband and the trustees.

The court dismissed the application to set aside the award, finding no breach of natural justice or procedural fairness under s. 46 of the Arbitration Act.

The court also dismissed the appeal, holding that the arbitrator made no palpable and overriding error in finding oppression and that the equitable remedy awarded was entitled to significant deference.

The applicant-tenant sought to invalidate a Notice of Termination issued by the respondent-landlord.

The landlord relied on a 30-day termination clause that had been added to the commercial lease in 1997 and modified in 1998.

The tenant argued the clause did not apply to the current lease and relied on principles of commercial lease interpretation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the termination clause was clear, unambiguous, and had never been expressly removed in subsequent lease extensions.

Furthermore, the tenant had signed an estoppel certificate acknowledging the lease documents containing the termination right.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a Superior Court of Justice decision dated June 24, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

This endorsement addresses costs following a successful motion by the defendants (Smiths) to set aside a noting in default.

Both the defendants, who were successful on the underlying motion, and the plaintiff sought costs.

The court clarified that there is no general rule precluding a party seeking an indulgence from being awarded costs, emphasizing that costs decisions are discretionary.

Despite the Smiths' success on the underlying motion, the court found their lack of diligence, failure to comply with court orders, and deficient materials weighed against a costs award.

Similarly, the plaintiff was denied costs due to their lack of diligence in pursuing the action and contributing to the delay.

Ultimately, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs for the motion.

The defendants, Shane Smith and Nadine Smith, successfully moved to set aside a noting in default.

The plaintiff, Norman Wong, had initiated the action alleging fraudulent conveyance.

The Smiths were noted in default after failing to file a Statement of Defence, despite having served an affidavit of documents.

The court found that the delay was excusable due to confusion and previous counsel's health issues, that the plaintiff would not suffer non-compensable prejudice, and that the Smiths had an arguable defence with an "air of reality" regarding the fraudulent conveyance allegations.

The decision emphasized the strong preference for deciding civil actions on their merits.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment dismissing claims related to the validity of a 2002 estate freeze of a family business (Master Steaks) and an oppression remedy concerning the distribution of funds from a vendor takeback mortgage (VTB) related to other family businesses (Truckers Haven).

The Master Steaks estate freeze excluded the appellant daughter, benefiting her brothers.

The motion judge found the estate freeze was validly implemented in 2002, or alternatively, regularized in 2013.

The motion judge also found that the distribution of VTB proceeds was not oppressive, applying the business judgment rule to the directors' decisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, deferring to his factual and credibility assessments, particularly his adverse findings against the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Liquid Capital Exchange Corp., sought damages for fraud against multiple defendants, including two individuals (Cook and Daoust) who created false invoices, and an Enbridge employee (Zito) and Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc., alleging their involvement or vicarious liability.

The court found that Liquid Capital failed to prove Mr. Zito's participation in the fraud on a balance of probabilities, noting the plaintiff's significant lack of due diligence due to an misplaced trust in one of the fraudsters.

The court also determined that even if Mr. Zito had been involved, Enbridge would not be vicariously liable as Mr. Zito acted outside the scope of his employment and lacked the authority to approve such contracts or invoices.

The action against the defendants was dismissed.

The respondent law firm moved to set aside an assessment order obtained by the applicants, arguing it was statute-barred, and sought payment of outstanding legal fees.

The applicants cross-moved for an assessment of all 32 accounts rendered over a four-and-a-half-year retainer.

The central issue was whether the accounts were "interim" or "final" for the purpose of limitation periods under the Solicitors Act.

The court found that the accounts were final, based on the parties' intention, regular payment without complaint, and the nature of the billing.

The court concluded that the assessment order was statute-barred and ordered the applicants to pay the outstanding legal fees.

The Plaintiffs sought costs after the Defendants abandoned a motion they had brought seeking various reliefs, including an injunction and declarations regarding a mortgage loan.

The court found that the Defendants' motion was deemed abandoned under Rule 37.09(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, entitling the Plaintiffs to costs forthwith.

The court rejected the Defendants' argument that these were "interim costs" or should be "costs in the cause" distinguishing them from the extraordinary circumstances for interim costs.

While the Defendants' abandoned motion included a request for a declaration that could have disposed of the entire action (akin to a summary judgment), the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs under Rule 20.06, finding that the Defendants did not act unreasonably or in bad faith in bringing or abandoning the motion, as they were genuinely attempting to secure alternative financing.

The Plaintiffs were awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant purchased a new townhouse and applied for the Ontario portion of the GST/HST New Housing Rebate.

The Minister denied the rebate on the basis that the appellant did not intend to or actually occupy the property as her primary residence.

The Tax Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant's actions, including setting up utilities and furnishing the home, demonstrated her intention to use the townhouse as her primary residence at the time of purchase and that she was the first to occupy it.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Dunphy J. dated May 13, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed in the amount of $5,000.

The plaintiff sought damages for unjust enrichment, claiming he never received income tax refund cheques for the 2005 and 2006 taxation years.

The Canada Revenue Agency moved for summary judgment.

The Federal Court granted the motion, holding that the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 because the plaintiff ought to have known of the loss by July 2015 when his agent received a statement of account.

The Court further held there was no genuine issue for trial on the merits, as the Agency's evidence established the cheques were issued, mailed, and negotiated, meaning the Crown was not enriched.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion for possession of a residence after the mortgagor defaulted.

The mortgagor brought a cross-motion in a related oppression action seeking an injunction to restrain the mortgage enforcement and an order for interim funding to pursue the oppression claim.

The court found that the mortgagor did not establish a strong prima facie case of oppression or show that he would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted.

The court also found that the mortgagor did not meet the test for interim funding.

The motion for possession was granted, and the cross-motion for an injunction and interim funding was dismissed.

The Minister of National Revenue brought an application under section 174 of the Income Tax Act to determine a common question regarding a tax shelter, naming several taxpayers.

The Minister subsequently withdrew the application.

The named taxpayers sought costs.

The Court held that costs for the application should be determined and awarded immediately, rather than waiting for the conclusion of the taxpayers' individual appeals, because the application was a separate proceeding.

The Court awarded varying amounts of costs to the taxpayers based on their individual circumstances and representation.

The appellant appealed an assessment under subsection 325(1) of the Excise Tax Act related to the transfer of her husband's half-interest in their matrimonial home to her.

At the time of the transfer, the husband had an outstanding tax debt.

The Minister assessed the appellant on the basis that she provided no consideration for the transfer.

The Tax Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant provided consideration by assuming sole responsibility for a business line of credit that was previously the responsibility of her husband's company and her husband.

The matter was referred back to the Minister for reassessment to reflect the reduced shortfall in consideration.

The applicant obtained ex-parte Mareva and Norwich orders against his brother and sister-in-law, alleging they mismanaged a jointly owned corporation and breached an oral trust agreement.

The respondents moved to set aside the orders, arguing material non-disclosure and failure to meet the evidentiary threshold.

The court agreed, finding the applicant failed to disclose relevant correspondence and that contradictory evidence precluded a strong prima facie case.

However, given evidence of potential misappropriation, the court ordered a forensic accounting and froze the respondents' real property pending the investigation.

The moving party defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, which was dismissed as meritless.

The responding party plaintiff sought costs of the motion.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim had none of the indicia of a SLAPP and there was no public interest in protecting the impugned expression.

The presumption against awarding costs to a successful respondent under s. 137.1(8) was rebutted, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff in the amount of $44,320.57.

Mary Aquino brought a motion for a garnishment hearing under Rule 60.08(16) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to vary garnishment letters issued by the Minister of Finance.

The Minister had assessed Aquino for her common law spouse's pre-existing unpaid tax debt under the Retail Sales Tax Act (RSTA) and subsequently issued garnishment letters against her commissions and wages.

The court dismissed Aquino's motion, holding that Rule 60.08(16) does not apply to the Minister's garnishment letters issued under section 36 of the RSTA, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss a defamation action initiated by the plaintiff, Canadian Standards Association (CSA Group).

The court found that while the defendants' expressions related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff demonstrated substantial merit to its defamation claim.

The court further determined that the defendants had no valid defences (truth, fair comment, qualified privilege, public interest responsible communication) due to a lack of verification, unsubstantiated allegations, and evidence of malice.

The court concluded that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression.

Consequently, the motion to dismiss was denied, and the matter was ordered to proceed to trial.