Anastasia Semenova

The moving party defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, which was dismissed as meritless.

The responding party plaintiff sought costs of the motion.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim had none of the indicia of a SLAPP and there was no public interest in protecting the impugned expression.

The presumption against awarding costs to a successful respondent under s. 137.1(8) was rebutted, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff in the amount of $44,320.57.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss a defamation action initiated by the plaintiff, Canadian Standards Association (CSA Group).

The court found that while the defendants' expressions related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff demonstrated substantial merit to its defamation claim.

The court further determined that the defendants had no valid defences (truth, fair comment, qualified privilege, public interest responsible communication) due to a lack of verification, unsubstantiated allegations, and evidence of malice.

The court concluded that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression.

Consequently, the motion to dismiss was denied, and the matter was ordered to proceed to trial.

The defendant, a Trustee in Bankruptcy, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss an action brought by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs claimed the Trustee breached a confidentiality agreement by publicly disseminating an arbitration decision that found against them on several bankruptcy-related claims.

The Trustee argued the confidentiality agreement did not extend to the decision itself and that it had an obligation to inform other creditors.

The court found that genuine issues requiring a trial existed, particularly regarding the interpretation of the confidentiality clause in the Mini-Trial Agreement, the scope of the Trustee's obligations, and the assessment of damages.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motion to stay a defamation action pending the completion of a related Federal Court action, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that the plaintiff had not justified a substantial indemnity award, as the defendants simply lost a motion they were entitled to bring.

The court rejected the defendants' argument that costs should be in the cause, noting that the unsuccessful motion caused unnecessary expense.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $21,500.

The defendants moved for a temporary stay of a defamation action in the Superior Court of Justice until the completion of a parallel copyright infringement and statutory claims action in the Federal Court.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendants failed to meet the heavy onus of showing that continuing the Ontario action would cause them prejudice or injustice, or that a stay would not prejudice the plaintiff.

The court noted that the defamation action involved different substantive elements and remedies not available in the Federal Court.

In a defamation action arising from statements published online about a law professor’s review of a university report on systemic racism, the court was required to determine on a voir dire whether certain impugned statements were capable of bearing defamatory meanings.

Applying established defamation principles, including the test from WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, the court assessed whether the words could reasonably lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person.

The court concluded that eight impugned statements were capable of conveying meanings that impugned the plaintiff’s integrity, independence, and professionalism in conducting and authoring the report.

However, the court rejected additional alleged meanings suggesting betrayal of Black people or support for racism, finding those meanings did not naturally arise from the words.

Only the identified defamatory meanings would proceed to the jury.

Following dismissal of a motion for leave to appeal concerning the defendant’s discovery of the plaintiff, the plaintiff sought costs.

The court applied the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found the defendant’s motion lacked merit and should not have been brought.

The plaintiff had served a written offer of settlement proposing discontinuance without costs, which the defendant refused.

Because the result exceeded the offer, the court awarded partial indemnity costs until the offer date and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Costs of $4,500 inclusive of disbursements and tax were ordered payable by the defendant.

The court determined the appropriate costs following a motion in which the defendant sought leave to appeal rulings made during the cross-examination of a witness.

The plaintiff sought costs of approximately $14,000 to $19,000, while the defendant opposed and requested costs against the plaintiff.

The court found that the plaintiff was largely successful because the defendant’s motion for leave to appeal was effectively dismissed after it was determined that litigation privilege did not apply to the witness affidavit in question.

Applying Rule 57 factors, the court held that costs should be awarded on a partial indemnity scale but significantly reduced due to concerns about the utility and importance of the pre‑trial examination issue.

The defendant was ordered to pay reduced costs of $5,600 to the plaintiff.

In a defamation action, the defendant sought leave to appeal two interlocutory decisions concerning cross‑examination on an affidavit and a discovery motion.

The court reviewed the scope of permissible cross‑examination on affidavits, including questions relating to credibility, bias, and matters raised in the affidavit.

It held that the motion judge correctly allowed many questions aimed at testing independence and credibility of the deponent but protected certain communications between the defendant and the deponent under litigation privilege.

Leave to appeal was largely denied, with limited conditional leave relating to questions implicating litigation privilege and the drafting of the affidavit.

The defendant’s separate motion for leave to appeal a discovery decision was dismissed after the defendant failed to file a factum or comply with court directions.

The defendant brought a motion to stay or dismiss a defamation action as an abuse of process, alleging that the plaintiff’s employer funding her legal costs constituted maintenance and champerty.

The court excluded supplemental affidavits filed after cross‑examinations as irrelevant and inadmissible under the Rules of Civil Procedure and prior case management rulings.

It held that the employer’s decision to fund the plaintiff’s legal fees was justified because the alleged defamatory statements related to work performed in the course of her employment and the plaintiff had independently decided to commence the action.

The court found no evidence of an improper motive, profit‑sharing arrangement, or trafficking in litigation.

Accordingly, the motion alleging champerty and maintenance was dismissed.

Following dismissal of three motions for leave to appeal interlocutory decisions in ongoing civil litigation, the court addressed costs.

The responding parties sought substantial indemnity costs on the basis that the self‑represented defendant had engaged in vexatious litigation and judge‑shopping through numerous unmeritorious motions.

The court accepted that the volume of motions suggested abuse of process but concluded that some of the issues raised were novel and not entirely devoid of merit.

Substantial indemnity costs were therefore not warranted.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded with a 15 percent reduction to reflect limited success by the defendant on certain procedural points and some duplication in the responding parties’ work.

The defendant sought leave to appeal three interlocutory decisions arising from a defamation action, including a ruling dismissing a refusals motion, a case management judge’s refusal to schedule a motion to set aside that ruling, and a subsequent decision dismissing a further refusals motion.

The court granted an extension of time to bring the leave applications but found that none met the stringent requirements under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendant alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias against a prior judge based on the existence of a scholarship memorializing the judge’s son at the University involved in the litigation and a boardroom named after him by the University’s law firm.

The court held that these circumstances could not reasonably give rise to an apprehension of bias and emphasized the strong presumption of judicial impartiality.

Leave to appeal each interlocutory decision was therefore refused.

The defendant sought leave to appeal three interlocutory rulings in a defamation action, including decisions dismissing a refusals motion and a case management decision declining to schedule a motion alleging judicial bias.

The court granted an extension of time to seek leave but held that the defendant failed to meet the stringent requirements under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Allegations of reasonable apprehension of bias arising from a memorial scholarship and law firm tribute connected to the judge’s deceased son were rejected as untenable and incapable of grounding an objective concern of partiality.

The court also held that the case management judge properly declined to schedule a motion seeking to set aside another Superior Court judge’s decision.

Leave to appeal all impugned interlocutory decisions was refused.