Tala Khoury

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The appellants achieved substantial success on the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants $15,000 in costs of the appeal including taxes and disbursements.

The trial judge's costs order was set aside and the issue of trial costs was remitted to the trial judge for fresh assessment after damages on the mainstream agreement have been determined.

The appellant displayed a sign reading "Trump is right.

Fuck China.

Fuck Mexico" in Grand View Plaza within Niagara Parks.

The Niagara Parks Police issued a summons for violations of section 2(9)(a) of Ontario Regulation 829 under the Niagara Parks Act, which prohibits abusive or insulting language that interferes with the use and enjoyment of the parks.

The appellant was also issued an oral trespass notice.

The application judge dismissed the constitutional challenge.

On appeal, the court held that while section 2(9)(a) does limit freedom of expression under the Charter, the limitation is justified under section 1.

However, the court found that the trespass notice was unconstitutional as applied to the appellant's political expression.

The appellants, Cana International Distributing Inc. and Micheline Ciolli, appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim for breach of an exclusive distribution agreement with Standard Innovation Corporation for the distribution of the We-Vibe product.

The appellants claimed separate agreements existed for both the mainstream retail market and the adult industry market.

The trial judge found no binding agreements existed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that a binding mainstream agreement was reached when the parties signed a term sheet in counterpart in August-September 2009, and that the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact and an extricable error of law in finding otherwise.

The Court upheld the trial judge's finding that no adult industry agreement was reached.

The Court also dismissed the appellants' arguments regarding quantum meruit and qualified privilege defences.

The appellant was convicted of agreeing to offer a bribe to foreign public officials contrary to section 3(1)(b) of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.

As an agent of Cryptometrics Canada, the appellant agreed with other employees to bribe Indian officials to secure a multi-million dollar Air India contract.

The appeal raised three main grounds: lack of territorial jurisdiction, misinterpretation of the word "agree" in the statute, and misapplication of the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The applicants, who were candidates or official agents in the 42nd Federal General Election, applied for an extension of time to file their election returns under s. 477.68 of the Canada Elections Act.

The returns were filed late due to various reasons including health issues, delays by auditors, and the demands of the campaign.

The court found that the failure to file the returns on time was not deliberate, nor was it the result of a failure to exercise due diligence.

The court granted the requested extensions of time for all applicants.

The defendant, a Trustee in Bankruptcy, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss an action brought by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs claimed the Trustee breached a confidentiality agreement by publicly disseminating an arbitration decision that found against them on several bankruptcy-related claims.

The Trustee argued the confidentiality agreement did not extend to the decision itself and that it had an obligation to inform other creditors.

The court found that genuine issues requiring a trial existed, particularly regarding the interpretation of the confidentiality clause in the Mini-Trial Agreement, the scope of the Trustee's obligations, and the assessment of damages.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The accused, a former senior political advisor with connections to federal officials, was charged under s. 121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code with fraud on the government for seeking a benefit for his partner in connection with promoting water treatment systems to First Nations communities.

The Crown argued that the accused used his government influence to advance a supplier in a three‑way business relationship involving the federal government and First Nations bands.

The court held that the evidence established the accused attempted to influence government officials but that any potential sales of point‑of‑use water treatment systems were decisions made autonomously by individual First Nations communities.

Because the government did not procure or approve those systems, there was no “transaction of business with or any matter of business relating to the government” within the meaning of s. 121(1)(d).

The court concluded the essential element of government business was absent.