Chris Tonks

The plaintiff purchased three industrial units from the defendant, which were undergoing a delayed conversion into a condominium.

The plaintiff occupied the units under a one-year lease with zero base rent, which expired before the conversion was completed.

The defendant sought base rent for the overholding period from July 2017 to April 2022.

The court found no enforceable agreement for the $8,000 monthly base rent proposed by the defendant but awarded the defendant occupation rent based on unjust enrichment.

The court reduced the entitlement to 35 months due to the defendant's failure to issue invoices or notices, awarding $316,400 inclusive of HST.

The appellant appealed a condition imposed by the Committee of Adjustment requiring a Metrolinx Environmental Easement to be registered on title for a residential redevelopment.

The Tribunal found that the requested variances met the four tests under the Planning Act.

The Tribunal removed the easement condition, finding it was an unreasonable burden without planning justification, especially given the absence of Metrolinx at the hearing.

The appellant appealed a condition imposed by the Committee of Adjustment regarding an environmental easement.

The appellant's planner initially filed an Expert Witness Statement addressing only the appealed condition.

Upon learning that a TLAB hearing is a de novo hearing of the entire application, the appellant brought a motion for an extension of time to file a revised Expert Witness Statement addressing all requested variances.

The TLAB granted the motion, finding no prejudice as there were no other parties, and scheduled a new hearing date.

The court issued a costs endorsement for two consolidated applications concerning beneficial ownership of a property.

The initial applications sought declarations of 100% ownership by each party.

The court found a 75.2% interest for Gandhi and 24.8% for Fajebe, ordering the property sold.

Neither party's offers to settle triggered Rule 49.10 costs consequences as they contained non-ordered terms or were not easily comparable to the judgment.

Considering Rule 57.01 factors, including delays and abandoned claims, the court found both parties largely failed to meet their onuses.

Despite Gandhi being "less unsuccessful" the court ordered no costs, finding divided success and no operative offer to settle.

This consolidated trial addressed the ownership of a property, with both parties seeking declarations of ownership.

Fajebe claimed Gandhi held the property in trust for him after a sale, while Gandhi asserted an outright sale with a lease-back arrangement.

The court rejected the express trust claim but found an implied trust based on Fajebe's initial equity contribution.

The property was ordered to be sold, with net proceeds divided 75.2% to Gandhi and 24.8% to Fajebe, reflecting their proven contributions.

The court also found the lease unenforceable and ordered Fajebe to make monthly payments from the trial start until the property's sale.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment dismissing claims related to the validity of a 2002 estate freeze of a family business (Master Steaks) and an oppression remedy concerning the distribution of funds from a vendor takeback mortgage (VTB) related to other family businesses (Truckers Haven).

The Master Steaks estate freeze excluded the appellant daughter, benefiting her brothers.

The motion judge found the estate freeze was validly implemented in 2002, or alternatively, regularized in 2013.

The motion judge also found that the distribution of VTB proceeds was not oppressive, applying the business judgment rule to the directors' decisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, deferring to his factual and credibility assessments, particularly his adverse findings against the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants (grandchildren) sought occupation rent and damages from the respondent (son) for his exclusive occupation of a co-owned home and for property damage/removed items following the death of their grandparents.

The parties had previously settled the ownership and possession issues.

The court found the respondent unjustly enriched by his exclusive occupation and awarded occupation rent for a 15-month period, along with damages for specific property damage (hardwood floor) and improperly removed fixtures (chandeliers).

Other damage claims related to the general condition of the home were denied, as they were deemed to have been factored into the property's valuation during the buy-out.

The court also addressed the admissibility of expert evidence regarding market rent.

Following a summary judgment decision where the plaintiff was declared the beneficial owner of a disputed property, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought full or substantial indemnity costs, while the defendant argued for partial indemnity costs apportioned against the plaintiff due to divided success.

The court found the plaintiff was substantially more successful, having achieved his primary goals of retaining the family home and avoiding capital gains tax indemnification.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $25,988, discounted slightly for his unsuccessful punitive damages claim.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dated January 9, 2019.

On consent of both parties, the appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent in the amount of $3,250, inclusive of all fees, disbursements, and applicable taxes.

The costs were to be paid in accordance with the directions provided by the trial judge in the original judgment.

This case involves a dispute between two brothers, Ronald (plaintiff) and Richard (defendant), over beneficial ownership of a residential property.

Ronald asserted beneficial ownership through a resulting trust, while Richard, the registered owner, disputed its existence and counterclaimed for damages and reimbursement.

The court granted Ronald's motion for partial summary judgment, finding that Richard held legal title in trust for Ronald's benefit.

Richard was found to have breached his fiduciary duties by extracting equity and improperly treating the property as an investment for tax purposes, but his conduct did not warrant punitive damages.

The court ordered Richard to transfer title to Ronald upon Ronald securing mortgage release and reimbursing Richard for properly incurred expenses, with an offset for equity removed by Richard.

If Ronald fails to secure financing, the property is to be sold.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his action for delay.

The delay was caused by the plaintiff's former counsel, who suffered from severe depression and complicated grief following the death of his daughter, leading him to inadvertently neglect the file.

The court applied the contextual approach and the four Reid factors, finding that the plaintiff always intended to proceed, the delay was adequately explained by the solicitor's mental health issues, the motion was brought promptly once new counsel was appointed, and the defendant suffered no significant prejudice.

The motion was granted and the dismissal order was set aside.

The defendant brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's counsel of record, alleging a conflict of interest arising from a pre-litigation telephone conversation.

The defendant claimed she provided confidential information to the lawyer and that he would likely be called as a witness at trial.

The court found that no solicitor-client relationship was established during the call, as the defendant knew she was speaking to the plaintiff's lawyer and did not seek legal advice.

The court also held that it was premature to remove counsel on the basis that he might be a witness, as that determination should be made after examinations for discovery.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant, Sheila Di Florio, sought to claim contribution from her brothers-in-law, Tony and Frank Di Florio, for a joint and several judgment debt she alleged to have satisfied on behalf of her separated spouse, Sandy Di Florio, who had declared bankruptcy.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Sheila failed to provide evidence that she personally made any payment towards the debt.

Furthermore, the court held that any right of contribution arising from payments made by or on behalf of Sandy's bankrupt estate vested solely in Sandy's trustee in bankruptcy, not in Sandy personally after his bankruptcy, and therefore could not be assigned to Sheila.

The defendant employer moved for summary judgment dismissing employees’ claims for willful infliction of mental distress arising from alleged workplace sexual harassment and assault by a co‑worker.

The employer argued the claims were barred by full and final releases signed upon termination.

The employees contended the releases were unconscionable and signed under duress, asserting they did not understand that the releases extended beyond severance issues to claims relating to the co‑worker’s criminal conduct and the employer’s alleged failure to protect them.

The court held that material facts were disputed regarding the scope of the releases, the circumstances surrounding their execution, and the employees’ understanding of their legal rights.

Applying the principles in Hryniak and related cases, the court concluded that the record did not permit fair adjudication on summary judgment and that credibility issues required a full trial.

The respondent requested an adjournment of a scheduled hearing on the basis that it had retained new counsel who was unavailable due to a previous commitment.

The Tribunal denied the request, noting that adjournments are not automatically granted and require exceptional circumstances.

The Tribunal found that the respondent was not diligent in retaining counsel and ensuring their availability for the hearing, which had been scheduled for several months.

A short extension was granted for the respondent to file its hearing materials.

The respondent Ministry brought a Request for an Order During Proceedings to strike allegations regarding the complainant's suspension and failure to obtain work with a private service provider, arguing they were not part of the original human rights complaint.

The Tribunal found that the allegations were encompassed by the complaint as referred, given the Commission's investigation process.

Alternatively, the Tribunal exercised its discretion to allow an amendment to the complaint, finding no actual prejudice to the respondents and that it would be unfair not to allow the amendment.