Thomas J. Gorsky

The plaintiff's motion to set aside a settlement agreement based on unproven allegations of fraud and misrepresentation was dismissed.

The defendants sought costs of $49,146.53 on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the plaintiff's conduct was egregious.

The plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, argued no costs should be awarded.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the plaintiff's conduct did not reach the level of reprehensibility required, but awarded the defendants costs of $24,000 on a partial indemnity basis, noting the hours claimed by the defendants were excessive.

The defendants' counsel notified the court that paragraph 6 of the Reasons for Decision released on October 24, 2025 incorrectly stated that two costs orders made against the plaintiff remained unpaid.

The court issued an erratum replacing paragraph 6 with corrected language detailing two costs orders totalling $12,200 against the plaintiff arising from an unsuccessful appeal and a successful defence motion for leave to amend.

A self-represented plaintiff sought to set aside a settlement agreement dated March 14, 2024, whereby the defendants agreed to pay $100,000 to settle her wrongful dismissal and tort claims.

The plaintiff argued the settlement should be rescinded on grounds of lack of legal counsel, coercion, fraud and misrepresentation, breach by the defendants, and discretionary grounds.

The court found the settlement was valid and binding, that the plaintiff had adequate opportunity to seek legal advice, that no duress or illegitimate pressure was exerted, that alleged misrepresentations were not material or relied upon, and that any alleged breaches were de minimis.

The court also found the plaintiff's motion was brought with unreasonable delay.

The motion was dismissed.

The defendant employer brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a settlement agreement and dismiss the plaintiff employee's action for wrongful dismissal and related damages.

The plaintiff was terminated without cause after relocating from Winnipeg to Ottawa at the employer's request.

Settlement negotiations ensued regarding severance, benefits, legal fees, and relocation costs, including the plaintiff's concerns about mortgage financing for a home purchase.

The court found that the parties had agreed on all essential terms of the settlement through their correspondence, despite the plaintiff's later attempts to introduce new conditions regarding the house purchase.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding the settlement was binding and covered all claims arising from the employment termination and relocation.

The court considered whether the respondents were required to indemnify the applicants for legal costs incurred in proceedings before the Ontario Labour Relations Board, following a dispute over the sale of business and union obligations.

The application was dismissed, with the court finding that the indemnity provision in the parties’ settlement did not extend to the costs in question, based on contractual interpretation, the parties’ intentions, and public policy.

The plaintiff, Fransic Battiston, sought costs of $162,504.90 after successfully obtaining judgment against Microsoft Canada Inc. for wrongful dismissal.

The defendant argued for a reduction in costs, claiming partial success on some issues and questioning the reasonableness of the hours billed.

The court found the plaintiff to be the successful party, rejecting the defendant's argument of divided success.

However, the court denied the plaintiff's request for substantial indemnity costs due to the plaintiff's failure to be forthright in disclosing the amount of costs when asked during Rule 49 settlement offer negotiations.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $120,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The plaintiff, a long-term employee, was terminated without cause.

The trial addressed the appropriate notice period, entitlement to cash bonuses and merit increases (both for the fiscal year of termination and during the notice period), entitlement to vesting of unvested stock awards, and the defendant's claim of failure to mitigate damages.

The court awarded a 23.75-month notice period, damages for lost bonus and merit increases during the notice period, and damages for unvested stock awards, finding the termination provisions in the stock agreements unenforceable due to lack of proper notice.

The claim for a bonus for the fiscal year of termination was dismissed, and the defendant failed to prove a failure to mitigate.

This costs endorsement addresses the costs arising from a motion by the City of Mississauga to amend its Statement of Defence and cross-motions by the plaintiff, Amanda Martin.

The City was entirely successful on its motion and substantially successful against the plaintiff's cross-motions.

The court considered the principles governing costs awards, including the five purposes of costs rules and the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Despite the plaintiff's arguments for divided success and an offer to settle, the court found the City largely successful and awarded partial indemnity costs.

The court reduced the City's claimed costs, fixing them at $9,000, payable by the plaintiff within 90 days, noting the plaintiff's conduct contributed to the length and costs of the proceedings.

In a wrongful dismissal action, the City of Mississauga sought leave to amend its Statement of Defence to withdraw an allegation of just cause termination.

The Plaintiff opposed, arguing this constituted a withdrawal of admissions under Rule 51.05, and brought a cross-motion to compel production of an investigation report and permit discovery on the cause allegation.

The court granted the City's motion, finding that withdrawing a just cause allegation was an amendment under Rule 26.01, not a withdrawal of an admission.

The Plaintiff's cross-motion to compel production and discovery was largely dismissed as premature, but the City was ordered to provide its position on the report's production within 7 days and serve its Affidavit of Documents within 45 days.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment based on mental health by the respondent Police Services Board.

The respondent requested to defer the application pending the conclusion of ongoing proceedings under the Police Services Act (PSA) involving the applicant.

The Tribunal found significant factual and legal overlap between the two proceedings and noted the PSA matter was at a more advanced stage.

The Tribunal granted the request and deferred the application pending the conclusion of the PSA matter.

The defendant employer moved for summary judgment dismissing employees’ claims for willful infliction of mental distress arising from alleged workplace sexual harassment and assault by a co‑worker.

The employer argued the claims were barred by full and final releases signed upon termination.

The employees contended the releases were unconscionable and signed under duress, asserting they did not understand that the releases extended beyond severance issues to claims relating to the co‑worker’s criminal conduct and the employer’s alleged failure to protect them.

The court held that material facts were disputed regarding the scope of the releases, the circumstances surrounding their execution, and the employees’ understanding of their legal rights.

Applying the principles in Hryniak and related cases, the court concluded that the record did not permit fair adjudication on summary judgment and that credibility issues required a full trial.

The appellant challenged an order refusing to set aside a Registrar’s administrative dismissal of the action for delay.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge applied the correct legal test and that no palpable and overriding error was shown in the exercise of discretion.

The court also found the explanation for the very significant delay in bringing the motion after the administrative dismissal to be unsatisfactory.

The appeal was dismissed with fixed costs to the respondents.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a Registrar’s order dismissing the action for delay under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court applied the contextual approach and the Reid factors, considering explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing the deadline, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

The plaintiff failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for lengthy litigation delay, including significant gaps in evidence regarding counsel’s reminder system and delay in bringing the motion.

The court also found prejudice to the defendants arising from missing documentary evidence and corporate changes undertaken in reliance on the dismissal order.

Balancing the interests of justice and the principle of finality, the court declined to set aside the Registrar’s order.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel the individual defendant to attend an examination for discovery on his own behalf and on behalf of the corporate defendant in a wrongful dismissal action.

The defendants argued the examination should be delayed until outstanding production issues regarding the plaintiff’s medical records were resolved.

The court held that while discovery may be delayed in certain circumstances where significant production issues remain, the plaintiff had made some medical production and the defendants had not shown that further records were necessary prior to the examination.

The court also found that by agreeing in a discovery plan that the defendant would be examined in Toronto, the defendants had waived objections related to service requirements for out-of-province witnesses.

The motion was granted and the examination ordered to proceed before the defendants’ production motion.

In a wrongful dismissal action brought by a former general counsel, the plaintiff moved to set aside a sealing order previously obtained by the defendant without notice.

The defendant had sought the sealing order on the basis that the draft statement of claim disclosed confidential solicitor-client communications.

The parties later agreed that the sealing order should be set aside after the defendant acknowledged that similar allegations had already been made in other unsealed pleadings forming part of the public record.

The court found that the defendant ought not to have brought the original sealing motion given the existence of those pleadings.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking the court’s determination of which competing discovery plan should govern the litigation.

The defendants argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to impose a discovery plan or that the request was premature given the absence of a sufficient evidentiary record.

The court held that determining issues such as relevance, proportionality, and unity of interests in the discovery process required a more developed evidentiary foundation and that mediating disputes between competing plans without such evidence would be inappropriate.

The court emphasized that discovery planning is a dynamic process and that parties may later seek directions if disagreements affecting the conduct of the action arise.

The motion was effectively declined, with the court encouraging further negotiation and leaving open the possibility of future procedural directions.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code alleging discrimination in employment.

During the hearing, after presenting his evidence-in-chief, the applicant requested to withdraw the application against the remaining respondent.

The respondent did not oppose the request.

The Tribunal granted the request and the application was withdrawn with leave.

The appellants, commissioned sales representatives, were presented with a new employment contract by their employer, LICC, which reduced commissions and introduced minimum production levels.

When the appellants refused to sign the new agreement, LICC terminated their employment.

The trial judge dismissed their wrongful dismissal action, finding they breached their contract by refusing to acknowledge LICC's managerial authority to change the commission plan.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appellants were employees, not independent contractors, and were entitled to reasonable notice of termination.

The Court found that the appellants had no obligation to accept the new agreement or acknowledge the employer's right to make unilateral changes, and their refusal did not constitute just cause for dismissal.

The Court also held that the employer failed to meet its burden of proving the appellants failed to mitigate their damages.

The respondent, a federal employee working in Saskatchewan, brought a constructive dismissal action in Ontario after experiencing workplace harassment in Saskatchewan and resigning due to a delayed response to his grievance from Ottawa.

The Crown appealed the motions judge's finding that Ontario had jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under s. 21(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, the claim arose in Saskatchewan where the employment and harassment occurred, not in Ontario where the delayed response originated.

The applicant moved to strike an affidavit and attachments filed by the respondent on an application for judicial review.

The materials were not before the Commissioner.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, holding that the record on judicial review should essentially be the material before the decision-maker, and the affidavit improperly sought to expand the record regarding the applicant's conduct rather than addressing jurisdictional error.