Mavis J. Butkus

The applicant father sought to rectify a Declaration of Trust concerning a 100-acre farm, arguing that he and his deceased son were mistakenly reversed as 'Trustee' and 'Beneficiary' by the drafting lawyer.

The respondent widow, acting as estate trustee, brought a cross-application to uphold a severance of the joint tenancy she executed under a power of attorney before the son's death.

The court applied the Fairmont Hotels test and found a mutual mistake, rectifying the Declaration of Trust to show the father as the beneficiary.

Consequently, the court set aside the severance of the joint tenancy and ordered the land registry rectified to show the father as the sole owner by right of survivorship.

The third party, Eaton Industries (Canada) Company, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the third party claim of the London Transit Commission (LTC) on the basis that it was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The LTC's third party claim alleged environmental contamination caused by Eaton's predecessors.

The court found that the LTC had actual or ought to have had knowledge of its claim against Eaton by May 22, 2013, when it was served with the plaintiff's statement of claim, and failed to rebut the presumptive limitation period.

The court dismissed the LTC's arguments for a separate limitation period for other damages, concluding all claims were statute-barred.

The appellants appealed a trial decision finding they acted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the respondent, a minority shareholder, contrary to s. 248 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The dispute centered on the appellants operating a jointly-owned gravel pit for the benefit of their own separate company at a highly favourable rate, disregarding the respondent's interest in a reasonable return.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's determination of the respondent's reasonable expectations, and held that the business judgment rule did not protect decisions made without considering fairness to the minority shareholder.

The plaintiffs sought an order to prevent the dismissal of their action for delay under Rule 48.14 and to establish a new timetable for trial.

The action, commenced in 2014, faced dismissal after five years.

The court applied the two-part test from Faris v. Eftimovski, requiring an acceptable explanation for delay and no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

The court found that some delay was attributable to a co-defendant's dilatory conduct and reasonable settlement discussions, though the plaintiffs were not entirely diligent.

Crucially, no non-compensable prejudice was found, as principal witnesses were available, and the defendants retained avenues to obtain evidence from the settled co-defendant.

The motion was granted, a revised timetable was set, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff corporation brought an action for solicitor negligence against the defendant lawyer and his firm, alleging they owed and breached duties to the plaintiff in relation to a 2010 real estate transaction, causing the plaintiff to lose financing it had extended.

The transaction involved mortgage fraud perpetrated by the purchaser and his partner.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the defendant lawyer did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, either through a solicitor-client relationship or as an exceptional duty to a non-client third party, as there was no retainer, no instructions, and no reasonable reliance by the plaintiff on the lawyer.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the action for delay pursuant to Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff opposed the motion and requested an extension of time to restore the action to the trial list.

The court found that the delay was neither intentional nor contumelious, noting that much of the delay was caused by the plaintiff's former counsel withdrawing due to conflicts of interest.

The court also found no prejudice to the defendant, as all witnesses and documents were available.

The defendant's motion was dismissed, the plaintiff's request for an extension was granted, and costs of $20,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

The vendor appealed a trial judgment finding that an Agreement of Purchase and Sale terminated on its own terms, entitling the purchasers to a return of their deposit.

The vendor argued the trial judge erred in finding time was not of the essence and in placing the onus on the vendor to set a new closing date.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the original agreement lacked a time of the essence clause and the vendor failed to provide a revised occupancy statement or address the purchasers' concerns as promised.

The vendor was estopped from claiming the agreement was not at an end.

The plaintiff, London Medical and Dental Building Limited (LMDB), brought an action against Middlesex Condominium Corporation No. 83 (MCC 83) and Gannon Medicine Professional Corporation (Gannon) for trespass, nuisance, breach of contract, negligence, and unjust enrichment.

The dispute arose from access through LMDB's building (450 Central Avenue) to an elevator in an adjacent condominium building (440 Central Avenue), which was crucial for persons with mobility devices.

MCC 83 and Gannon brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss LMDB's action and, for MCC 83, to obtain declaratory relief on its counterclaim regarding access rights.

The court dismissed LMDB's action against MCC 83 entirely and dismissed most of LMDB's claims against Gannon, allowing only the unjust enrichment claim against Gannon to proceed.

The court found that the 1999 Agreement granted access rights to owners, occupants, and guests of the condominium, including patients of the commercial unit, and LMDB's purported termination of this agreement was ineffective.

This costs ruling followed a trial where the plaintiff's modest claim was partially successful, but the defendants' $175,000 counterclaim was entirely unsuccessful.

The defendants failed to deliver a costs outline as directed and sought a 50% reduction in the plaintiff's costs, arguing the plaintiff's claim was arbitrarily reduced by the court.

The court declined to reduce the plaintiff's costs, fixing them at $33,462.36, emphasizing that the case was primarily about the misguided counterclaim and that the costs ruling was not an opportunity to revise the arithmetic of the main claim.

The plaintiff, Pylon Paving (1996) Inc., initiated a lien action for an unpaid balance of $20,200.85 for asphalt paving work.

The defendants, Arrow Lofts Inc. et al., counterclaimed for $175,000, alleging breach of contract and express warranty due to the plaintiff's failure to install 50 mm of asphalt and seeking full replacement.

The court found that the specified asphalt thickness could not be achieved due to underlying design flaws and the defendants' prior knowledge of these issues.

The defendants' counterclaim was dismissed as statute-barred and for failure to prove damages or present reasonable repair alternatives.

The plaintiff's claim was reduced by $10,000 due to its failure to document its concerns about the underlying deficiencies in writing, resulting in a judgment for $10,200.65.

Purchasers of a hotel condominium unit sought return of a $228,250 deposit after the transaction failed to close by the contractual deadline.

The developer argued the purchasers breached the agreement by failing to close and forfeited the deposit.

The court found the developer’s solicitor had effectively extended the closing date through assurances that the parties need not close while concerns about increased common expenses were addressed.

No revised disclosure statement or statutory notice under the Condominium Act, 1998 was delivered despite a significant increase in common expenses.

Because the transaction failed to close through no fault of the purchasers, the agreement was terminated and the purchasers were entitled to the return of their deposits with prejudgment interest.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their third party claim against a law firm and its partner, as well as the associated costs order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the pleadings did not properly allege conspiracy against the respondents and that the respondents owed no duty of care to the appellants, who were non-clients and opponents in litigation.

However, the Court allowed the costs appeal in part, finding the motion judge erred in principle by awarding partial indemnity costs equal to the full amount of actual costs paid, and reduced the costs award by one third.

On a summary judgment motion, a law firm and solicitor sought dismissal of a third party claim alleging breach of authority, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, conspiracy, and interference with contractual relations in the context of a long‑running family shareholder dispute involving a commercial property and related mortgage financing.

The responding parties alleged that the solicitor improperly influenced a shareholders’ meeting, interfered with financing negotiations with a credit union, and failed to accept a proposed mortgage extension, ultimately contributing to losses following power of sale proceedings.

The court held that the pleadings did not properly allege conspiracy against the solicitor and that, as a matter of law, a lawyer generally owes no duty of care or fiduciary duty to non‑clients who are adverse parties in litigation.

The evidence showed no reasonable reliance by the responding parties, no disclosure of privileged information, and no causal link between the solicitor’s conduct and the alleged losses.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against the solicitor and his firm.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a Registrar’s order dismissing the action for delay under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court applied the contextual approach and the Reid factors, considering explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing the deadline, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

The plaintiff failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for lengthy litigation delay, including significant gaps in evidence regarding counsel’s reminder system and delay in bringing the motion.

The court also found prejudice to the defendants arising from missing documentary evidence and corporate changes undertaken in reliance on the dismissal order.

Balancing the interests of justice and the principle of finality, the court declined to set aside the Registrar’s order.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing a motion related to a pending summary judgment motion in complex multi-party litigation.

The challenged order refused leave to file supplementary affidavit evidence after cross-examination, declined to order that the assigned motions judge not hear the summary judgment motion, and addressed issues regarding further cross-examination and privilege.

Applying Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that the applicants failed to demonstrate either a conflicting decision or good reason to doubt the correctness of the order on matters of public importance.

The motions judge had properly applied established authorities governing supplementary affidavit evidence and the administration of motions under Rule 37.15.

The court concluded the issues raised concerned only the interests of the parties and did not justify appellate intervention.

The applicant, a minority shareholder, brought a motion to remove the respondents' lawyer of record in an oppression application.

The lawyer had actively participated in key meetings leading to the applicant's termination and had jointly represented both the corporation and the majority shareholders.

The court granted the motion, finding that the lawyer was a material witness to critical events and that his joint representation of the corporation and the majority shareholders constituted an impermissible conflict of interest.

The appellants, commercial fishers on Lake Erie, challenged the regulatory regime under which the provincial Minister of Natural Resources imposed catch quotas for walleye and yellow perch on their licences.

They argued that the federal Fisheries Act and regulations did not validly delegate this authority to the provincial Minister, and that the Minister fettered her discretion and acted unreasonably by adopting the catch recommendations of the international Lake Erie Committee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Governor in Council validly sub-delegated the authority to the provincial Minister, and that the Minister's reliance on the Committee's recommendations was both reasonable and not a fettering of discretion.

The applicants sought judicial review of the provincial Minister of Natural Resources' decisions imposing quotas on yellow perch and walleye for their 2007 and 2008 commercial fishing licences.

They argued the statutory framework was an unlawful delegation of federal authority and that the Minister unreasonably fettered his discretion by adopting the Lake Erie Committee's recommendations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the delegation lawful under established precedent and concluding the Minister's reliance on the international committee's expertise was reasonable and did not constitute an abdication of responsibility.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of Natural Resources' decisions imposing quotas on yellow perch and walleye for their 2007 and 2008 commercial fishing licences.

They argued the delegation of power to the Minister was unlawful and unconstitutional, and that the Minister unreasonably fettered his discretion by adopting the recommendations of the Lake Erie Committee.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the delegation lawful under established jurisprudence.

The court also held that the Minister did not abdicate his responsibility and that his reliance on the international committee's expertise and recommendations was reasonable given the shared nature of the Lake Erie fishery.