Mavis J. Butkus

The applicant father sought to rectify a Declaration of Trust concerning a 100-acre farm, arguing that he and his deceased son were mistakenly reversed as 'Trustee' and 'Beneficiary' by the drafting lawyer.

The respondent widow, acting as estate trustee, brought a cross-application to uphold a severance of the joint tenancy she executed under a power of attorney before the son's death.

The court applied the Fairmont Hotels test and found a mutual mistake, rectifying the Declaration of Trust to show the father as the beneficiary.

Consequently, the court set aside the severance of the joint tenancy and ordered the land registry rectified to show the father as the sole owner by right of survivorship.

The plaintiffs sought an order to prevent the dismissal of their action for delay under Rule 48.14 and to establish a new timetable for trial.

The action, commenced in 2014, faced dismissal after five years.

The court applied the two-part test from Faris v. Eftimovski, requiring an acceptable explanation for delay and no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

The court found that some delay was attributable to a co-defendant's dilatory conduct and reasonable settlement discussions, though the plaintiffs were not entirely diligent.

Crucially, no non-compensable prejudice was found, as principal witnesses were available, and the defendants retained avenues to obtain evidence from the settled co-defendant.

The motion was granted, a revised timetable was set, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff corporation brought an action for solicitor negligence against the defendant lawyer and his firm, alleging they owed and breached duties to the plaintiff in relation to a 2010 real estate transaction, causing the plaintiff to lose financing it had extended.

The transaction involved mortgage fraud perpetrated by the purchaser and his partner.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the defendant lawyer did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, either through a solicitor-client relationship or as an exceptional duty to a non-client third party, as there was no retainer, no instructions, and no reasonable reliance by the plaintiff on the lawyer.

The plaintiff, London Medical and Dental Building Limited (LMDB), brought an action against Middlesex Condominium Corporation No. 83 (MCC 83) and Gannon Medicine Professional Corporation (Gannon) for trespass, nuisance, breach of contract, negligence, and unjust enrichment.

The dispute arose from access through LMDB's building (450 Central Avenue) to an elevator in an adjacent condominium building (440 Central Avenue), which was crucial for persons with mobility devices.

MCC 83 and Gannon brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss LMDB's action and, for MCC 83, to obtain declaratory relief on its counterclaim regarding access rights.

The court dismissed LMDB's action against MCC 83 entirely and dismissed most of LMDB's claims against Gannon, allowing only the unjust enrichment claim against Gannon to proceed.

The court found that the 1999 Agreement granted access rights to owners, occupants, and guests of the condominium, including patients of the commercial unit, and LMDB's purported termination of this agreement was ineffective.

On a summary judgment motion, a law firm and solicitor sought dismissal of a third party claim alleging breach of authority, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, conspiracy, and interference with contractual relations in the context of a long‑running family shareholder dispute involving a commercial property and related mortgage financing.

The responding parties alleged that the solicitor improperly influenced a shareholders’ meeting, interfered with financing negotiations with a credit union, and failed to accept a proposed mortgage extension, ultimately contributing to losses following power of sale proceedings.

The court held that the pleadings did not properly allege conspiracy against the solicitor and that, as a matter of law, a lawyer generally owes no duty of care or fiduciary duty to non‑clients who are adverse parties in litigation.

The evidence showed no reasonable reliance by the responding parties, no disclosure of privileged information, and no causal link between the solicitor’s conduct and the alleged losses.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against the solicitor and his firm.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing a motion related to a pending summary judgment motion in complex multi-party litigation.

The challenged order refused leave to file supplementary affidavit evidence after cross-examination, declined to order that the assigned motions judge not hear the summary judgment motion, and addressed issues regarding further cross-examination and privilege.

Applying Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that the applicants failed to demonstrate either a conflicting decision or good reason to doubt the correctness of the order on matters of public importance.

The motions judge had properly applied established authorities governing supplementary affidavit evidence and the administration of motions under Rule 37.15.

The court concluded the issues raised concerned only the interests of the parties and did not justify appellate intervention.

The applicant, a minority shareholder, brought a motion to remove the respondents' lawyer of record in an oppression application.

The lawyer had actively participated in key meetings leading to the applicant's termination and had jointly represented both the corporation and the majority shareholders.

The court granted the motion, finding that the lawyer was a material witness to critical events and that his joint representation of the corporation and the majority shareholders constituted an impermissible conflict of interest.