Laura M. McKeen

The applicants sought to rescind a conditional foundation building permit issued by the City of London to the respondent numbered company and Mr. Lavie, arguing non-compliance with applicable law regarding site plan approval and zero-metre setbacks.

The court dismissed the application, finding that site plan approval was not a prerequisite for a conditional permit issued under s. 8(3) of the Building Code Act, unlike a regular permit under s. 8(2).

The court also determined that the zero-metre setback complied with the City's Downtown Area (DA) zoning bylaw, specifically for the DA2 zone.

The decision emphasized that a Chief Building Official's decision, when compliant with statutory requirements, is entitled to deference and should not be influenced by broader land use planning or public policy considerations.

The plaintiff, London Medical and Dental Building Limited (LMDB), brought an action against Middlesex Condominium Corporation No. 83 (MCC 83) and Gannon Medicine Professional Corporation (Gannon) for trespass, nuisance, breach of contract, negligence, and unjust enrichment.

The dispute arose from access through LMDB's building (450 Central Avenue) to an elevator in an adjacent condominium building (440 Central Avenue), which was crucial for persons with mobility devices.

MCC 83 and Gannon brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss LMDB's action and, for MCC 83, to obtain declaratory relief on its counterclaim regarding access rights.

The court dismissed LMDB's action against MCC 83 entirely and dismissed most of LMDB's claims against Gannon, allowing only the unjust enrichment claim against Gannon to proceed.

The court found that the 1999 Agreement granted access rights to owners, occupants, and guests of the condominium, including patients of the commercial unit, and LMDB's purported termination of this agreement was ineffective.

The Corporation of the City of Sarnia brought a motion seeking to set aside or vary a previous decision, declare an equitable right to indemnity, and obtain an interim mandatory order against Bluewater Health regarding the maintenance of the Mitton site.

The core issue was whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the motion under Rule 59.06, given that the City was attempting to introduce new causes of action (tort claims) that were not pleaded in the original application, which was premised on a trust relationship.

The court found that it lacked jurisdiction, emphasizing the principle of finality in litigation and that re-opening a case for new arguments would foster litigation in stages, thus dismissing the motion.

The City of Sarnia applied for a declaration that it held legal title to the "Mitton site" properties in trust for Bluewater Health, either as a bare trust or a constructive trust, and sought an equitable right to indemnity for ongoing maintenance costs.

The court dismissed the application, finding no certainty of intention to establish a bare trust from the relevant statutes (1920 Act and 1989 Act) or the parties' conduct.

Furthermore, the court found no basis for a constructive trust, as the City was seeking to impose a burden (decommissioning costs) rather than remedy an unjust enrichment or condemn a wrongful act by Bluewater.

The court emphasized that constructive trusts are typically used to provide a proprietary remedy for a party's loss or to prevent wrongful gain, not to transfer liabilities.

Following a successful appeal regarding the operation of a homeless shelter, the appellant church sought full indemnity costs of $163,479.54, arguing it was a public interest litigant.

The respondent municipality argued no costs should be awarded as it was also acting in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments, finding the case did not meet the exceptional threshold for full indemnity costs under Carter, nor did the municipality's enforcement of its by-law exempt it from the normal costs rules.

Costs were awarded to the appellant on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $90,000.

The appellant church operated a homeless shelter in its basement.

The respondent municipality sought an injunction to stop the shelter, arguing it violated the local zoning by-law which permitted 'church' uses but prohibited soup kitchens and food banks.

The application judge granted the injunction.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in his interpretation of the by-law.

The Court found that the homeless shelter fell within the by-law's definition of 'church-sponsored community activities and projects'.

The appeal was allowed and the injunction was dismissed.

A municipality sought an injunction preventing a church from operating a homeless men’s shelter in the basement of its church building in contravention of a zoning by-law enacted under the Planning Act.

The respondent argued the shelter constituted a church-sponsored activity or accessory use and alternatively claimed enforcement infringed its freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter.

The court held the shelter constituted an “emergency shelter” use not permitted within the zoning designation and not an accessory church use.

Enforcement of the zoning by-law did not substantially interfere with religious freedom because the restriction concerned the location of the shelter rather than the ability to operate one.

A declaration and permanent injunction were granted prohibiting continued operation of the shelter at the property.