Hassan Ahmad

Six organizations brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal from an order dismissing the certification of a proposed class action regarding the overrepresentation of Indigenous children in the child welfare system.

The motion judge granted leave to intervene to the Anishinabek Nation, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, the Chiefs of Ontario, and the Nishnawbe Aski Nation, finding they would provide useful and unique perspectives on the issues raised on appeal.

The motions by the Hiawatha First Nation and Nigig Nibi Ki-win Gamik were dismissed because their proposed submissions would improperly expand the scope of the appeal and the evidentiary record.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interim decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which held it lacked jurisdiction to hear a stand-alone Charter challenge regarding a Ministry of Transportation policy.

Before the judicial review was heard, the applicant succeeded on his Human Rights Code claim, obtained his driver's licence, and the Ministry revised the impugned policy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review on the basis of mootness, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case as there was no longer an adversarial context and the issue was not evasive of review.

The respondent moved to dismiss the applicant's application for judicial review on the basis of mootness.

The underlying dispute regarding a discriminatory driver's licensing policy had been resolved in the applicant's favour by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, and the policy was subsequently amended.

However, the court dismissed the motion to dismiss, finding that the underlying legal issue—whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide a standalone Charter claim—is an important issue that may be evasive of appellate review.

The mootness issue was left to be decided by the full panel hearing the application on the merits.

The applicant filed an Application alleging discrimination regarding the Ministry of Transportation's policy on exemptions from the one-year waiting period for a driver's license.

The applicant requested to expedite the Application, arguing it would become moot if not heard before the waiting period expired.

The Tribunal denied the request to expedite, noting that the Application would not necessarily become moot under the Tribunal's case law, and offered the parties an expedited mediation.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the action for delay pursuant to Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff opposed the motion and requested an extension of time to restore the action to the trial list.

The court found that the delay was neither intentional nor contumelious, noting that much of the delay was caused by the plaintiff's former counsel withdrawing due to conflicts of interest.

The court also found no prejudice to the defendant, as all witnesses and documents were available.

The defendant's motion was dismissed, the plaintiff's request for an extension was granted, and costs of $20,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

The applicant sought various statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The applicant failed to attend the arbitration hearing and presented no evidence to support his claims.

The arbitrator proceeded in the applicant's absence pursuant to Rule 37.7 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code.

The applicant's claims were dismissed for failing to meet the burden of proof.

The insurer was awarded $1,500 in expenses due to the applicant's conduct prolonging the proceeding.

The applicant applied for statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The applicant failed to attend the arbitration hearing.

The arbitrator proceeded in her absence pursuant to Rule 37.7 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code.

As the applicant presented no evidence, she failed to meet her burden of proof, and her claims were dismissed.

The applicant was ordered to pay the insurer's expenses fixed at $1,500.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages arising from a 2009 fire.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as statute-barred because the statement of claim was issued in September 2013, outside the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the discoverability principle did not assist the appellant as he was aware of his psychological difficulties by July 2011.