John W. Findlay

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action for civil conspiracy, defamation, and intentional infliction of mental distress against the defendants for distributing alleged hate speech pamphlets at a Pride Parade.

The lead defendant moved to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions and as an abuse of process, and alternatively to strike the claim.

The plaintiffs moved for a Norwich Order to identify the anonymous co-defendants.

The court held that the defendant was estopped from denying the pamphlets were hate speech based on a prior Supreme Court decision, and thus the anti-SLAPP motion failed.

However, the court struck the class action because the torts pleaded are individual in nature and cannot be brought on behalf of a collective group.

The court granted leave to amend the claim to an opt-in joinder action and granted the Norwich Order on terms.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a further and better list of documents from the Crown in an action alleging wrongful arrest, defamation, and Charter breaches arising from protests in Caledonia.

The court first ruled that a police complaint report was inadmissible on the motion under the Police Services Act.

Applying principles of proportionality and relevance based on the pleadings, the court ordered the Crown to produce documents related to specific prior demonstrations relied upon in its defence and documents concerning a specific court attendance where harassment was alleged.

The court dismissed requests for broad categories of documents, including all communications from senior OPP officers referencing the plaintiff, finding them overbroad, speculative, and not proportional to the issues in dispute.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment to recover funds allegedly loaned or invested in the defendant corporation and evidenced by promissory notes.

The defendant opposed the motion and sought summary judgment dismissing the claim on the basis that it was statute‑barred.

The court held that the limitation period under the Limitations Act expired in February 2008 following a demand for payment in 2006 and that no valid acknowledgment occurred before the expiry of the limitation period.

A purported later promissory note relied upon by the plaintiff was found to be a forgery and therefore could not revive the claim or constitute an acknowledgment of debt.

The plaintiff’s claim, whether framed as enforcement of the promissory notes or as a loan, was statute‑barred and equitable relief was unavailable due to the plaintiff’s lack of clean hands.

Following the dismissal of a motion to amend a statement of claim to add an oppression claim under s.248 of the Business Corporations Act, the successful defendant sought costs of the motion.

The defendant requested partial indemnity costs based on 50.4 hours of counsel time.

The court found the claimed hours excessive for a routine motion that took less than half a day and concluded that 20 hours would have been reasonable at the claimed hourly rate under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

However, considering the broader circumstances of the dispute, including that the defendant retained $500,000 advanced by the plaintiff while denying liability, the court exercised its discretion to decline awarding costs.

No costs were ordered.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend his Statement of Claim to add personal defendants and an alternative claim for an oppression remedy.

The original claim was based on a promissory note, which the defendant alleged was a forgery.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the original pleading contained no facts to support an oppression remedy, and the proposed amendment constituted a new cause of action for which the limitation period had expired.

The applicant, a minority shareholder, brought a motion to remove the respondents' lawyer of record in an oppression application.

The lawyer had actively participated in key meetings leading to the applicant's termination and had jointly represented both the corporation and the majority shareholders.

The court granted the motion, finding that the lawyer was a material witness to critical events and that his joint representation of the corporation and the majority shareholders constituted an impermissible conflict of interest.

Tobacco producers commenced a proposed class action alleging that federal and provincial governments failed to enforce tobacco taxation and excise legislation, allowing contraband tobacco markets to flourish and causing economic losses to lawful producers.

The plaintiffs advanced claims in misfeasance in public office and negligence, asserting that public officials deliberately failed to enforce statutory regimes to placate certain communities.

The defendants moved under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the amended statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the pleading failed to allege the essential elements of misfeasance in public office, including deliberate unlawful conduct and bad faith by specific officials.

It further concluded that the statutory schemes governing tobacco regulation did not create a private law duty of care owed to tobacco producers and that recognizing such a duty would improperly subject government policy decisions to tort liability.

The amended statement of claim was struck and the action dismissed.