John W. Findlay

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action for civil conspiracy, defamation, and intentional infliction of mental distress against the defendants for distributing alleged hate speech pamphlets at a Pride Parade.

The lead defendant moved to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions and as an abuse of process, and alternatively to strike the claim.

The plaintiffs moved for a Norwich Order to identify the anonymous co-defendants.

The court held that the defendant was estopped from denying the pamphlets were hate speech based on a prior Supreme Court decision, and thus the anti-SLAPP motion failed.

However, the court struck the class action because the torts pleaded are individual in nature and cannot be brought on behalf of a collective group.

The court granted leave to amend the claim to an opt-in joinder action and granted the Norwich Order on terms.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a further and better list of documents from the Crown in an action alleging wrongful arrest, defamation, and Charter breaches arising from protests in Caledonia.

The court first ruled that a police complaint report was inadmissible on the motion under the Police Services Act.

Applying principles of proportionality and relevance based on the pleadings, the court ordered the Crown to produce documents related to specific prior demonstrations relied upon in its defence and documents concerning a specific court attendance where harassment was alleged.

The court dismissed requests for broad categories of documents, including all communications from senior OPP officers referencing the plaintiff, finding them overbroad, speculative, and not proportional to the issues in dispute.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion for summary judgment for repayment of a $500,000 loan.

The motion judge found that claims based on the 2003 and 2005 promissory notes were statute-barred, and that a purported 2008 replacement note was a forgery based on uncontradicted expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the forgery issue was properly determined on the summary judgment record and that the appellant's reliance on a forged note disentitled him to any equitable relief.

The plaintiff sought leave to further amend his statement of claim to include allegations of conspiracy against the police and Crown attorneys regarding his arrests during a native protest.

The defendant opposed the amendments, arguing they were statute-barred.

The court found that while the proposed amendments met the test for particularity, they attempted to resurrect previously struck allegations from December 2006 and were therefore statute-barred.

The court struck the conspiracy paragraphs without leave to amend, but allowed other unchallenged amendments.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment to recover funds allegedly loaned or invested in the defendant corporation and evidenced by promissory notes.

The defendant opposed the motion and sought summary judgment dismissing the claim on the basis that it was statute‑barred.

The court held that the limitation period under the Limitations Act expired in February 2008 following a demand for payment in 2006 and that no valid acknowledgment occurred before the expiry of the limitation period.

A purported later promissory note relied upon by the plaintiff was found to be a forgery and therefore could not revive the claim or constitute an acknowledgment of debt.

The plaintiff’s claim, whether framed as enforcement of the promissory notes or as a loan, was statute‑barred and equitable relief was unavailable due to the plaintiff’s lack of clean hands.

Following the dismissal of a motion to amend a statement of claim to add an oppression claim under s.248 of the Business Corporations Act, the successful defendant sought costs of the motion.

The defendant requested partial indemnity costs based on 50.4 hours of counsel time.

The court found the claimed hours excessive for a routine motion that took less than half a day and concluded that 20 hours would have been reasonable at the claimed hourly rate under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

However, considering the broader circumstances of the dispute, including that the defendant retained $500,000 advanced by the plaintiff while denying liability, the court exercised its discretion to decline awarding costs.

No costs were ordered.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend his Statement of Claim to add personal defendants and an alternative claim for an oppression remedy.

The original claim was based on a promissory note, which the defendant alleged was a forgery.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the original pleading contained no facts to support an oppression remedy, and the proposed amendment constituted a new cause of action for which the limitation period had expired.

The applicant, a minority shareholder, brought a motion to remove the respondents' lawyer of record in an oppression application.

The lawyer had actively participated in key meetings leading to the applicant's termination and had jointly represented both the corporation and the majority shareholders.

The court granted the motion, finding that the lawyer was a material witness to critical events and that his joint representation of the corporation and the majority shareholders constituted an impermissible conflict of interest.

Tobacco producers commenced a proposed class action alleging that federal and provincial governments failed to enforce tobacco taxation and excise legislation, allowing contraband tobacco markets to flourish and causing economic losses to lawful producers.

The plaintiffs advanced claims in misfeasance in public office and negligence, asserting that public officials deliberately failed to enforce statutory regimes to placate certain communities.

The defendants moved under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the amended statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the pleading failed to allege the essential elements of misfeasance in public office, including deliberate unlawful conduct and bad faith by specific officials.

It further concluded that the statutory schemes governing tobacco regulation did not create a private law duty of care owed to tobacco producers and that recognizing such a duty would improperly subject government policy decisions to tort liability.

The amended statement of claim was struck and the action dismissed.

The appellant brought a proposed class action alleging oppression.

The motion judge found that the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA) did not apply because the corporation in question, Birch Mountain, was an Alberta corporation and the appellant was not a complainant under the OBCA.

The motion judge also found that Alberta was the convenient forum.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that the action concerned an Alberta corporation, Alberta law applied, and the Alberta courts were already supervising the corporation's bankruptcy and asset sale.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant's pleading wholly failed to plead any particulars of the claims alleged.

Costs of $6,250 were awarded to each of the respondents.

The appellants appealed an order striking out their proposed class action statements of claim for oppression against the respondents.

The claims alleged that a recapitalization plan was oppressive to minority shareholders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the claims failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action because the prospectus explicitly warned of the financial risks, the recapitalization plan benefited the company by preventing immediate collapse, and the appellants failed to plead any specific loss or damage.

The appellants sought to recover $15,380 in overpayments made to the respondent bookkeeper, who had increased his hourly rate from $20 to $30 following the death of the appellant's principal.

The trial judge found no agreement for the increase but denied restitutionary relief, citing the appellant's carelessness in paying the invoices.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law, as carelessness is irrelevant to the recovery of money paid under an honest mistake of fact.

The court ordered the return of the overpayment plus costs.

The defendants appealed an order directing that a certification motion in a class proceeding be heard in Hamilton based on the balance of convenience.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that rule 37.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure applies to determine the venue of a certification motion and that section 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 does not oust that rule.

The court further held that the balance of convenience is not the proper test for granting leave under rule 37.03(4) to hear a motion elsewhere.

In a defamation appeal arising from newspaper reports about an incident at a municipal sewage treatment plant, the court upheld the trial judge’s findings that several individual defendants defamed the plaintiffs by falsely implying criminal threats or assault.

The court also upheld the striking of the jury notice, given the statutory bar to jury trials on factual issues and damages in claims against a municipality and the inextricable overlap of issues.

However, the court allowed the municipality’s appeal, holding that s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act required independent written notice to all defendants, including a non-media municipal defendant alleged to be vicariously liable.

Because no timely notice was given and the limitation period had expired, the claim against the municipality was barred.