Domenico Polla

The defendant, Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario (HMQ), brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' statements of claim in two actions arising from a fire that destroyed a school.

The plaintiffs alleged that the Office of the Fire Marshal (OFM) was negligent in failing to ensure a proper fire watch was in place after the initial fire was extinguished, leading to a rekindling that caused extensive damage.

The court found that the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997 does not impose a duty on the OFM to post a fire watch or suppress fires, as those duties belong to municipal fire departments.

The court struck the negligence and nuisance claims against HMQ but granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings to properly allege a duty of care based on specific interactions or assumption of control, provided the alleged duty does not exceed the OFM's statutory powers.

The applicant sought sanctions for civil contempt against the respondent church and its pastors for repeatedly breaching a restraining order that enforced COVID-19 public health gathering limits.

The court found the respondents in contempt for holding large indoor religious services in defiance of the order.

Applying the factors for civil contempt sentencing, the court imposed fines of $35,000 on the church, $10,000 on the lead pastor, and $3,000 on the assistant pastor.

The court also ordered the church doors to be locked until gathering limits were eased to permit 30 percent capacity, and awarded $69,000 in partial indemnity costs to the applicant.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal as frivolous and vexatious.

The appellants failed to respond to the respondents' requests for costs.

The court reviewed the submissions and found the partial indemnity costs sought by The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, Mary McConville, Janice Robinson, Rena Knox, and The Hospital for Sick Children to be reasonable.

The appellants were ordered to pay costs to these respondents.

The appellants, parents whose children were made Crown wards, appealed the dismissal of their action against multiple defendants involved in the child protection proceedings.

The action was dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous and vexatious, being an impermissible attempt to relitigate issues already decided.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the lower court's decision that the action constituted an abuse of process.

The Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (ACTO) and the Federation of Rental Housing Providers of Ontario (FRPO) sought representation orders under Rule 10.01(1)(f) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to represent unknown tenants and landlords, respectively, in a motion to set aside an order suspending residential evictions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court dismissed the requests, finding that the case did not fall within the enumerated types of proceedings for a Rule 10 order and that the balance of convenience did not favour granting one, as each tenant facing eviction has unique circumstances.

Furthermore, the court held that ACTO, as an advocacy group without a direct interest or shared cause of action, was not an appropriate representative.

The Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (ACTO) and two residential tenants moved for an urgent stay of an order by Chief Justice Morawetz, which had varied a previous order to end a moratorium on residential evictions in Ontario.

The applicants sought to reinstate the moratorium, arguing that lifting it was premature due to ongoing COVID-19 risks, especially for vulnerable tenants.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the applicants failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, as the Chief Justice's original order was an exercise of inherent jurisdiction to control court processes, not a policy decision on the pandemic.

The court emphasized that the issues raised by tenants were policy matters for the government, not legal issues for the court.

The appellant, a former ward of the Children's Aid Society (CAS), appealed the dismissal of her action for damages and a contempt motion.

Her action alleged negligence, defamation, breach of privacy, and wrongful disclosure of her youth criminal proceedings and a pre-disposition report by the CAS to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the contempt appeal, finding no court orders were disobeyed.

However, it partially allowed the summary judgment appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in dismissing the claim regarding the wrongful disclosure of youth criminal proceedings records under the Young Offenders Act and Youth Criminal Justice Act, stating that a legislative offence does not preclude a civil action for damages.

The issue of the Society's liability for damages related to this disclosure was remitted for further proceedings.

The plaintiffs in two related civil actions arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident following a police pursuit brought motions under Rule 30.10 for the production of the complete investigative file of the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), a non-party.

The SIU had produced parts of its file but opposed producing witness statements without consent and other administrative or derivative documents.

The court granted the motion in part, ordering the production of the civilian and police officer witness statements, finding them highly relevant to the issue of liability and that it would be unfair to require the plaintiffs to proceed to trial without them.

The court dismissed the motion regarding the balance of the file, as the plaintiffs failed to establish relevance.

The self-represented plaintiffs brought a civil action against police officers, the Toronto Police Services Board, a Crown Attorney, and the Attorney General of Ontario, alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and negligent investigation arising from child abuse charges that were ultimately withdrawn.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the defendants' motions, finding that the claims against the police were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and that both the police and the Crown had reasonable and probable grounds for their actions.

The plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a former Crown ward, brought an action against the Children's Aid Society of Toronto and the Crown, alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, defamation, and breach of privacy regarding her time in care and the contents and disclosure of her child-in-care file.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motions and dismissed the action, finding no evidence to support the plaintiff's claims of wrongful diagnosis or failure to act on abuse complaints.

The court also held that the society's record-keeping was mandated by law, protected by qualified privilege, and that the Crown owed no fiduciary or non-delegable duty regarding the society's day-to-day care or record-keeping.

An appeal concerning reasonable apprehension of bias and adjudicative independence in administrative tribunal decision-making.

The applicant sought a determination that her motor vehicle accident injuries met the statutory threshold for catastrophic impairment under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal adjudicator initially determined the threshold was not met.

An anonymous letter subsequently revealed that the executive chair of the tribunal cluster had reviewed and altered the adjudicator's draft decision before release.

The Divisional Court found a reasonable apprehension of lack of adjudicative independence due to the imposed consultation process lacking procedural safeguards.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding, emphasizing that consultation cannot be imposed by a superior level of authority without the adjudicator's consent and that robust procedural protections are required to safeguard independence.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice declaring her a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant sought an adjournment claiming she did not receive the respondent's materials.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjournment request, noting the appellant's history of making similar claims and that materials were properly served.

The court found no merit in the appeal, holding that the vexatious litigant order was fully justified by the appellant's lengthy history of vexatious proceedings and that the order did not deny actual justice or fairness.

The Attorney General for Ontario applied under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act to declare Althea Reyes a vexatious litigant and to prevent her from instituting or continuing proceedings without leave.

Reyes had a history of approximately 20 civil proceedings and several criminal proceedings between 1995 and 2017, including actions found to contravene a previous vexatious litigant order.

The court found ample evidence that Reyes persistently instituted vexatious proceedings, conducted litigation vexatiously, failed to pay costs, and abused court processes.

The application was granted, declaring Reyes a vexatious litigant and imposing a leave requirement for future proceedings.

This costs endorsement followed a successful motion to strike brought by the defendant.

The defendant, Meghan Scott, sought costs, which the plaintiff, Althea Reyes, failed to provide submissions for despite an extension.

The court, considering Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the serious allegations made against the defendant's professional integrity, awarded costs to the defendant on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendant, a Crown Attorney, moved to strike the plaintiff's defamation claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the defendant was immune from personal suit under s. 8 of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act, as her actions were performed in the course of her duties.

Furthermore, the action against the Attorney General (who would be the proper defendant) was a nullity due to the plaintiff's failure to provide proper notice under s. 7 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act and s. 8(5) of the MAG Act.

Leave to amend the statement of claim was denied as the defects were incurable.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a further and better list of documents from the Crown in an action alleging wrongful arrest, defamation, and Charter breaches arising from protests in Caledonia.

The court first ruled that a police complaint report was inadmissible on the motion under the Police Services Act.

Applying principles of proportionality and relevance based on the pleadings, the court ordered the Crown to produce documents related to specific prior demonstrations relied upon in its defence and documents concerning a specific court attendance where harassment was alleged.

The court dismissed requests for broad categories of documents, including all communications from senior OPP officers referencing the plaintiff, finding them overbroad, speculative, and not proportional to the issues in dispute.

The respondent brought a motion seeking various declarations and judicial notice of facts, raising constitutional arguments as a defence to pending vexatious litigant applications under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent argued his motion should be heard immediately, prior to the scheduled applications.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that previous scheduling orders intended for the constitutional issues to be heard by the Applications Judge alongside the main applications, and that hearing them separately would be against the interests of justice.

The defendants were entirely successful on their motion to set aside a noting in default and in opposing the plaintiffs' motion for an adjournment.

The court determined the costs payable to the defendants.

The self-represented plaintiffs sought costs for their cross-examinations, but the court denied this request as they failed to demonstrate an opportunity cost or that they performed work ordinarily done by a lawyer.

The court fixed the costs payable by the plaintiffs to the defendants at $7,000, considering the factors under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the unreasonableness of the plaintiffs' settlement offers.

An agricultural industry association sought a stay of a provincial regulation restricting the use of neonicotinoid‑treated seeds pending further compliance time, arguing farmers would suffer economic harm due to regulatory timing requirements.

The province opposed and brought a cross‑motion to strike the application for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that injunctive relief against the Crown is highly restricted and unavailable absent circumstances such as deliberate flouting of the law, which were not present.

Even if relief were available, the applicant failed to meet the RJR‑MacDonald test for an interlocutory stay because the alleged harm was speculative and compensable in damages and the balance of convenience favoured environmental protection.

The court also held the application improperly sought to rewrite or delay the operation of a regulation rather than determine legal rights and therefore disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

Multiple tobacco manufacturer defendants sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $300,000 after withdrawing previously scheduled motions to strike the Crown’s statement of claim in a health care cost recovery action under the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act.

The defendants argued they were the successful parties because their motions prompted extensive amendments to the pleading and that the Crown delayed notifying them of its intention to amend.

The court held that the amendments addressed only some of the alleged deficiencies and that significant legal issues remained unresolved when the defendants chose to withdraw the motions.

As a result, success on the motions was considered divided.

Exercising discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court ordered that each side bear its own costs.