Cynthia Verconich

The court considered a motion by Royal Protective Services Inc. to compel Daniella and Shawn Leis to attend examinations for discovery before other parties in a complex, multi-party action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The court found that Daniella and her father were the only parties with direct knowledge of the essential facts and ordered that they be examined first, rejecting the Leis defendants' reliance on the technical order of examinations under Rule 31.04(3).

Costs were awarded to the moving party on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff, injured while a passenger on a bus, brought a motion to strike the jury notice due to COVID-19 delays and to permit witnesses to testify virtually.

The defendants brought a cross-motion to amend their Statement of Defence to allege contributory negligence and failure to mitigate.

The court granted the defendants' motion to amend, finding the proposed amendments legally tenable.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion to strike the jury notice at this time, noting the availability of jury trial facilities in Toronto and the substantive right to a jury, but adjourned the trial.

The court granted the request to allow witnesses to testify by video conference, subject to notice requirements.

The plaintiff sued her property insurer and broker after her home was destroyed in a fire.

She brought a motion to amend her statement of claim to increase her claim for punitive damages against the insurer to $100 million, and for directions to have a reference determine the value of the lost contents.

The court granted the amendment, finding that while the amount claimed was preposterous, it was not unmeritorious on its face and caused no prejudice not compensable by costs.

The court dismissed the request for a reference, holding that Rule 54.02(1) does not permit a reference without consent when a jury notice has been served, and that a reference would be inappropriate given the credibility issues involved in proving the loss.

An insurance company appealed a decision denying its application for a declaration that it was not obligated to defend or indemnify a policyholder in a negligence action arising from a dirt bike accident.

The insurer had appointed counsel and defended the action for approximately 10 months before denying coverage based on policy exemptions for unregistered vehicles and vehicles used without consent.

The application judge found the insurer was estopped from denying coverage and refusing to defend.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no error in the application judge's finding of detrimental reliance and estoppel based on the insurer's conduct in defending the action without securing a non-waiver agreement or reservation of rights letter.

An appeal concerning reasonable apprehension of bias and adjudicative independence in administrative tribunal decision-making.

The applicant sought a determination that her motor vehicle accident injuries met the statutory threshold for catastrophic impairment under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal adjudicator initially determined the threshold was not met.

An anonymous letter subsequently revealed that the executive chair of the tribunal cluster had reviewed and altered the adjudicator's draft decision before release.

The Divisional Court found a reasonable apprehension of lack of adjudicative independence due to the imposed consultation process lacking procedural safeguards.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding, emphasizing that consultation cannot be imposed by a superior level of authority without the adjudicator's consent and that robust procedural protections are required to safeguard independence.

This decision addresses the costs arising from an application where The Commonwell Mutual Assurance Group (CMAG) sought to cease funding Shayne Campbell's defence, and a parallel application where Campbell sought coverage from The Guarantee Company of North America.

Campbell was the successful respondent in CMAG's application.

The court determined that CMAG must substantially indemnify Campbell for his costs and pay The Guarantee Company of North America's costs on a partial indemnity scale, justifying a "Sanderson order" due to CMAG's initial application inducing Campbell's action against Guarantee.

The Commonwell Mutual Assurance Group (CMAG) sought a declaration that it was not obliged to defend or indemnify Shayne Campbell in a personal injury action.

The accident involved an off-road vehicle operated by Campbell, which Guarantee Company of North America (Guarantee) had already denied coverage for under Campbell's automobile policy.

The court found that Guarantee was within its rights to deny coverage due to policy exclusions related to employer-owned vehicles and policy breaches (unlicensed driver, unregistered vehicle).

However, CMAG, having defended Campbell for an extended period (since 2015) without a non-waiver agreement or reservation of rights, was estopped from denying coverage.

The court emphasized that an insurer must be clear about its position and not leave an insured with a false belief of protection.

CMAG's application was dismissed, and Campbell's parallel application against Guarantee was also dismissed.

The moving party sought to set aside an administrative dismissal by the Registrar of a motion for leave to appeal from a Divisional Court decision.

The Divisional Court had dismissed an appeal from a Small Claims Court judgment in favour of the respondent insurance company on a defendant's claim.

The motion judge found that the moving party had failed to provide adequate explanation for not completing leave to appeal materials despite multiple extensions and judicial prompting over nearly four years.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding delay, lack of confidence in future compliance, prejudice to the respondent, and weak merits.

During a case conference in a long-standing civil proceeding, the court addressed procedural delays relating to pending appellate proceedings and non-compliance with orders from the Court of Appeal.

Acting as case management judge, the court fixed a timetable for a motion by an insurer to strike the statement of claim.

The court scheduled the motion hearing and a further case conference to address procedural issues potentially affecting the hearing date.

Directions were also provided concerning the procedure and deadline should the self-represented plaintiff pursue a motion for judicial recusal.

The plaintiff moved under Rules 5.04(2) and 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to amend a statement of claim to substitute identified drivers and an owner for previously named John Doe defendants following a multi‑vehicle collision.

The court accepted that the pleading satisfied the initial test for misnomer because the statement of claim clearly described the accident such that a reasonable person would recognize that it referred to them.

However, the court exercised its residual discretion under Rule 5.04(2) to refuse the amendment.

The proposed defendants had no notice of the claim until nearly five years after the accident and almost three years after the presumptive limitation period expired, creating potential non‑compensable prejudice.

The court also emphasized the plaintiff’s significant unexplained delay in pursuing the amendment and the policy rationale underlying limitation periods.