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ER physicians responding to pages are not exempt from distracted driving laws.
The appellant, David Kazdan, appealed a conviction for driving while using a handheld communication device, contrary to s. 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.
He argued that as an emergency room physician responding to a page, his actions fell under the emergency services exceptions in s. 78.1(4) and (5).
The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial justice's finding that the appellant was not responding to an actual emergency, was not driving an emergency vehicle, and ER physicians are not enumerated in the exempted classes.
The court emphasized a narrow interpretation of the exemptions, consistent with the legislative intent of promoting road safety by restricting cellphone use while driving.
The limitation period for a claim against an unidentified motorist insurer begins when the insurer fails to satisfy a demand for indemnification.
The Court of Appeal considered when the limitation period for a claim against an unidentified motorist insurer (under s. 265 of the Insurance Act) begins to run, specifically under ss. 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002.
The motion judge and Divisional Court held that the limitation period does not begin until the insured makes an indemnification claim that the insurer fails to satisfy.
The Court of Appeal affirmed this, holding that a claim against the insurer is "discovered" under s. 5(1)(a)(iii) of the Limitations Act only when the insured knows or ought to know that the insurer's act or omission (failure to indemnify) caused their loss.
The appeal was dismissed, confirming that the plaintiff's claim against TTC Insurance was not statute-barred.
Limitation period for uninsured motorist coverage begins when an indemnification demand is unsatisfied, not upon accident discovery.
The appellants appealed an order granting the plaintiff leave to amend her Statement of Claim to add the TTC Insurance Company Limited as a defendant.
The appellants argued the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.
The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motions judge that the limitation period for an indemnification claim does not begin to run until a demand is made and the insurer fails to satisfy it, following the Markel line of authorities.
Distracted driving conviction overturned and new trial ordered due to trial judge's failure to apply W.(D.) framework.
The appellant appealed his conviction for driving while holding a hand-held wireless communication device contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.
At trial, the police officer testified to seeing the appellant holding a cell phone, while the appellant testified he was holding the gearshift of his manual transmission vehicle.
The trial justice convicted the appellant after simply stating she accepted the officer's evidence.
The appeal court found the trial justice erred in law by failing to apply the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility.
The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.
The limitation period for an unidentified motorist coverage claim begins the day after an indemnification demand is made and not satisfied.
The plaintiff was allegedly injured in a bus accident involving an unidentified motorist.
She sought to amend her statement of claim to add TTC Insurance Company Limited (TTCICL) as a defendant for unidentified motorist coverage under s. 265 of the Insurance Act.
TTCICL argued the claim was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.
The court held that the limitation period for a claim against an insurer for unidentified motorist coverage begins to run on the day after the plaintiff makes an indemnification demand which the insurer fails to satisfy.
As the plaintiff brought her motion to add TTCICL as a defendant before making such a demand that TTCICL failed to satisfy, the limitation period had not expired.
The motion to amend was granted.
Convictions for failing to surrender vehicle documents quashed as the offences are strict liability and the driver exercised due diligence.
The appellant appealed his convictions for speeding, failing to surrender his motor vehicle permit, and failing to surrender his insurance card.
The court allowed the appeal regarding the permit and insurance card convictions, finding that the appellant had surrendered the documents within a reasonable time and had exercised due diligence.
The court classified these offences as strict liability offences and found that the appellant's conduct met the due diligence defence, particularly considering his concerns about personal safety during the police interaction.
The appeal regarding the speeding conviction was dismissed as the evidence supported the conviction.
An officer's viva voce evidence of testing a laser speed-measuring device is sufficient for a speeding conviction even if testing times were omitted from their notebook.
The defendant was charged with speeding 62 kilometers per hour in a 40 kilometer zone contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.
The central issue was whether the prosecution proved that the laser speed-measuring device was tested before and after the officer's shift, and whether the absence of specific testing times in the officer's notes invalidated the viva voce evidence provided at trial.
The court found that the officer's oral testimony regarding the testing of the device at the beginning and end of his shift (12 noon and 9 pm) was sufficient to establish the accuracy and reliability of the device, despite the lack of written notation of these times.
The defendant was found guilty.
Court refuses misnomer substitution after years of delay and lack of notice.
The plaintiff moved under Rules 5.04(2) and 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to amend a statement of claim to substitute identified drivers and an owner for previously named John Doe defendants following a multi‑vehicle collision.
The court accepted that the pleading satisfied the initial test for misnomer because the statement of claim clearly described the accident such that a reasonable person would recognize that it referred to them.
However, the court exercised its residual discretion under Rule 5.04(2) to refuse the amendment.
The proposed defendants had no notice of the claim until nearly five years after the accident and almost three years after the presumptive limitation period expired, creating potential non‑compensable prejudice.
The court also emphasized the plaintiff’s significant unexplained delay in pursuing the amendment and the policy rationale underlying limitation periods.
The defendant was convicted of a traffic violation after the court rejected his contradictory testimony.
The defendant was charged with contravening Section 154(1)(c) of the Highway Traffic Act for failing to obey a traffic sign designating a right turn lane.
A police constable testified that she observed the defendant's vehicle travelling eastbound in the designated right turn lane at St. Clair Avenue West and Keele Street, but instead of turning right, the vehicle continued straight through the intersection.
The defendant testified that he was travelling northbound on Keele Street and turned right onto St. Clair, contradicting the officer's account.
The court found the defendant guilty, accepting the officer's credible testimony and rejecting the defendant's contradictory statements.