G. Faulkner

The defendant brought a preliminary motion objecting to the officer's reliance on his notes to refresh his memory, arguing that the notes were created from a template in advance of the incident and could have been altered.

The court considered whether the officer met the three conditions precedent for using notes to refresh memory: (1) notes made at or shortly after the incident; (2) no changes, additions, alterations, or deletions since creation; and (3) independent recollection with need to refresh memory.

The court found that the officer satisfied all three conditions and permitted the use of the notes as an aid to refresh memory, while clarifying that the notes themselves are not evidence and that contemporaneity now goes to weight rather than admissibility.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act and failing to surrender a motor vehicle permit contrary to section 7(5)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The incident occurred at a four-way stop intersection on August 9, 2012.

The Crown presented evidence from two civilian witnesses and a police officer establishing that the defendant entered the intersection at high speed and struck the victim's vehicle on the passenger side.

The defendant claimed the victim was travelling in a different direction and failed to stop.

The court rejected the defendant's evidence as inconsistent and implausible, finding it contradicted by independent witness testimony and physical evidence including tire scuff marks.

The court convicted the defendant on both counts, finding the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant drove without due care and attention and failed to produce her vehicle permit.

The defendant was charged with contravening Section 154(1)(c) of the Highway Traffic Act for failing to obey a traffic sign designating a right turn lane.

A police constable testified that she observed the defendant's vehicle travelling eastbound in the designated right turn lane at St. Clair Avenue West and Keele Street, but instead of turning right, the vehicle continued straight through the intersection.

The defendant testified that he was travelling northbound on Keele Street and turned right onto St. Clair, contradicting the officer's account.

The court found the defendant guilty, accepting the officer's credible testimony and rejecting the defendant's contradictory statements.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while holding a hand-held wireless communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police officer observed the defendant stopped at a red light holding a black BlackBerry device in his right hand with his thumb moving in a texting motion, while holding a dog in his left hand.

The officer continued to observe the defendant driving southbound while holding and using the device.

The defendant's agent argued that the prosecution failed to prove the device was a wireless device capable of texting.

The court found the defendant guilty, holding that the prosecution proved all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, including that the device was a hand-held wireless communication device capable of receiving or transmitting communications.

The defendant was charged with speeding 95 kilometers per hour in a 60 kilometer zone contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant pleaded not guilty.

The court heard evidence only from the police officer who conducted the speed enforcement.

The key issues were whether the officer tested the laser device at the end of his shift and whether the officer was qualified to operate the device.

The court found that the officer's viva voce evidence established that the device was tested at the end of his shift and that the officer was trained and qualified to use the device.

The court convicted the defendant.

The defendant was charged with permitting a motor vehicle to be operated without insurance contrary to section 2(1)(b) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The Crown alleged that the defendant permitted his son to drive an uninsured BMW on September 5, 2011.

The defendant testified that he did not give his son permission to drive the vehicle and was unaware that his son had taken it until police informed him five weeks later.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant permitted the vehicle to be operated, accepting the defendant's credible and uncontradicted evidence that no permission was granted.