Jaye Hooper

The Estate Trustee sought directions from the court regarding the interpretation and distribution of two estates following the murder of the testators by their adopted son.

The central issue was the application of the criminal forfeiture rule (slayer rule) and whether the estates should be held in trust for the murderer's potential unborn children or accelerated to alternate beneficiaries.

The court applied the implied intention approach, ruling that the murderer was disentitled from any benefit.

It further determined that the gifts to the murderer's unborn issue should also fail due to public policy and the absence of living issue at the time of disentitlement, thereby accelerating the distribution of the estates to the next lineal beneficiaries (the testatrix's brothers), subject to specific annuity provisions.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her Superior Court action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant's original Small Claims Court action had been dismissed after a seven-day trial.

She sought to appeal to the Divisional Court but was out of time, and her motion for an extension of time was refused.

The Court of Appeal found that the new Superior Court action was an attempt to relitigate the same issues previously determined and that the respondent had standing to bring the Rule 2.1 motion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal a Small Claims Court judgment dismissing her defamation claim.

The motion was brought 14 months after the merits decision was released, following a separate costs decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the moving party failed to establish a bona fide intention to appeal within the relevant time period and that the proposed appeal lacked merit, amounting to a collateral attack on the trial judge's findings.

The moving party, a defendant in multiple actions arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claims against him.

The collision occurred when the respondent lost control of his vehicle while attempting to pass and crossed into the moving party's lane.

The moving party relied on expert evidence suggesting his reaction time was within normal limits, while the respondents relied on expert evidence arguing he braked late.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the conflicting expert evidence and its admissibility required a full trial with viva voce evidence and cross-examination to justly determine liability.

The applicant Employer sought judicial review of an arbitration award that reclassified the Employment Relations Officer position to a higher level.

The Employer argued it was denied procedural fairness because the arbitrator failed to bifurcate the hearing, depriving it of the opportunity to lead evidence on the proper classification level.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Employer should have known classification was in issue given the evidence and submissions presented at the hearing without objection.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory order dismissing his motion for partial summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's decision involved questions of mixed fact and law and was entitled to deference.

The court held that the motion judge appropriately considered the factual disputes and the necessity of a trial for other issues, such as mental distress and defamation, and found no palpable and overriding error.

The plaintiff brought a motion for partial summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action seeking findings that he was wrongfully dismissed, the determination of a reasonable notice period, and damages for pay in lieu of notice.

The defendant employer argued that the dismissal was for just cause and that multiple factual disputes required a trial.

The court reviewed the summary judgment framework under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the guidance from Hryniak v. Mauldin regarding fair and proportionate adjudication.

The court held that genuine issues requiring trial existed, including disputes regarding workplace misconduct, warnings, after-acquired cause, and mitigation.

Because resolution would require credibility findings and testimony from multiple witnesses, summary judgment was inappropriate.

The Member pleaded guilty to professional misconduct stemming from a 1984 criminal conviction for the sexual assault of a student.

The Discipline Committee accepted the guilty plea and the joint submission on penalty, ordering the immediate revocation of the Member's Certificate of Qualification and Registration.

The parties disputed whether the Member's name should be published in the College's official publication.

The Committee ordered publication with the Member's name, emphasizing the College's public interest mandate, transparency, and the need for general deterrence, despite the misconduct having occurred over 30 years prior and the Member having retired in 2003.

The Appellant appealed a proposal by the Registrar to revoke his registration as a real estate salesperson.

The Registrar cited the Appellant's history of bankruptcy, outstanding judgments, multiple disciplinary findings by RECO for unethical conduct, criminal convictions for violating the Act, and providing false information on renewal applications.

The Tribunal found the Appellant's conduct demonstrated a shocking lack of integrity and financial responsibility.

Applying the Tulloch factors, the Tribunal concluded that conditional registration would not adequately protect the public and directed the Registrar to carry out the proposal to revoke the registration.

The Appellant brought a motion for the reinstatement of his real estate salesperson registration pending his appeal of a licence revocation, and for full disclosure of documents by the Registrar.

The Tribunal dismissed the reinstatement request, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the issue had already been decided by another Vice-Chair.

However, applying the principles of procedural fairness from Stinchcombe, the Tribunal ordered the Registrar to provide full disclosure of all communications with complainants and clients, as well as the complete investigation file.

Following the dismissal of appeals and motions for leave to appeal regarding the appointment of a trustee for an inter vivos trust, the successful parties sought their costs.

The Court of Appeal determined that the normal loser-pays regime applied to the appeals, rather than costs being paid out of the estate, as the uncertainty regarding the trust's administration had been resolved by the application judge.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful beneficiaries and full indemnity costs to the trustee, payable jointly and severally by the appellants.

The insured applied for a declaration that his automobile insurer owed him a defence and indemnity after denying coverage on the basis that he permitted an unauthorized driver to operate his vehicle contrary to statutory condition 4(1) under O. Reg. 777/93 and the Ontario Automobile Policy.

The driver, the insured’s girlfriend, possessed only a G1 licence and was involved in a collision while driving alone on a 400‑series highway.

The court held that the proper test was whether the insured took reasonable and prudent precautions to ensure the statutory condition was not contravened.

Given that the insured had seen the driver produce a licence for identification and had previously ridden with her while she drove, and given the visual similarity between G1 and full licences, the insured acted reasonably and was not wilfully blind.

The insurer therefore remained obligated to provide defence and indemnity.

The Children's Lawyer and other appellants appealed a decision dismissing their application to appoint an independent trustee for an inter vivos spousal trust.

The appellants alleged that the respondents, who were directors of the corporation wholly owned by the trust, committed a breach of trust by declaring dividends in excess of net income.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondents' actions as directors were governed by the Business Corporations Act, not the trust agreement, and did not constitute a breach of trust.

The court also dismissed an application to admit fresh evidence and upheld the application judge's order that costs be paid out of the estate.

Following dismissal of a civil action arising from a business relationship dispute, the successful defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing that the plaintiff advanced shifting legal theories and made a late allegation of fraud that was not proven.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the consequences of a rejected Rule 49 offer to settle.

Although unfounded fraud allegations can justify substantial indemnity costs for the entire proceeding, the court found the late fraud allegation was more a misguided attempt than bad faith litigation conduct.

The court therefore declined to award substantial indemnity costs for the entire action but applied the usual Rule 49 consequences.

Costs were fixed as partial indemnity up to the offer date and substantial indemnity thereafter.

Following dismissal of a motion for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation over commercial property, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The responding party sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $28,900 after incurring roughly $40,000 responding to the motion.

The court held that interlocutory motion costs should compensate for work specifically related to the motion rather than all investigative or merits-based preparation that may also serve the underlying action.

Applying the factors in Rules 57.01 and 57.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court fixed costs at $20,000 on a partial indemnity scale.

The award was payable within 30 days.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking production of the Crown brief and police investigation file from a criminal prosecution arising from a motor vehicle accident that caused the death of the plaintiff’s father.

Liability for the accident had been admitted, but damages remained in dispute.

The plaintiff argued the materials were relevant to aggravating circumstances affecting psychological injury damages, including allegations the defendant was texting while driving.

Applying the third‑party production test and factors articulated by the Court of Appeal, the court held the requested materials were reasonably likely to contain information probative of damages and that it would be unfair to require the plaintiff to proceed without access to them.

Given the Crown’s consent and the potential evidentiary relevance, production was ordered.

The plaintiff purchaser brought a motion for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) under s. 103 of the Courts of Justice Act in an action seeking specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for four residential apartment buildings.

The court assessed whether the plaintiff had a reasonable claim to an interest in land and whether equitable considerations justified granting the CPL.

After reviewing extensive documentary evidence and cross‑examinations, the court found the plaintiff’s case for specific performance weak, particularly due to the failure to waive conditions within the contractual deadline and the absence of clear evidence that the conditional period had been extended.

The court also held that damages would likely be an adequate remedy because the transaction was a commercial investment acquisition rather than a uniquely valuable property.

Exercising its discretion, the court refused the CPL while granting leave to amend the claim to add damages and ordering notice of any sale, transfer, or refinancing of the property during the litigation.

The plaintiff alleged that he was induced to leave secure employment by fraudulent misrepresentations that he would become a partner in a siding installation business and share profits.

During trial the theory shifted to deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation, with the plaintiff claiming the defendants planned from the outset to terminate him after he secured new builder clients.

The court held the evidence did not support allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, or a partnership agreement.

The plaintiff was engaged as a commissioned salesperson entitled to a percentage of profits from business he personally generated.

Claims based on unjust enrichment also failed because obtaining new business was precisely the work for which the plaintiff was paid.

Following litigation concerning the resignation of a trustee and the mechanism for appointing replacement trustees under a family trust, the court determined the issue of costs.

Competing groups of beneficiaries had disputed whether the court should appoint an institutional trustee or whether the mechanism set out in the testator’s will should govern.

Although one group succeeded on the substantive issue, the court held the cross-application seeking an independent trustee was reasonably necessary to ensure proper administration of the estate.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles governing estate litigation costs, the court concluded that fairness and the importance of the issues justified payment of most parties’ costs from the estate.

The court fixed specific amounts payable to each party.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a registrar’s administrative dismissal of a personal injury action for delay.

The court reviewed the contextual factors governing reinstatement of dismissed actions, including promptness of the motion, explanation for delay, inadvertence, abandonment of the claim, and prejudice to the defendants.

Although the explanations for litigation delay were weak, the court found evidence that the plaintiff continued to pursue the action through efforts to answer undertakings and had not abandoned the claim.

The defendants’ evidence of prejudice, including alleged fading memories, was found to be vague and insufficient to outweigh the interests of justice in determining the matter on its merits.

The registrar’s dismissal order was therefore set aside and the action permitted to proceed subject to an expedited timetable.