Bianca La Neve

In the context of complex estate litigation, the applicant sought to withdraw two affidavits previously filed in support of a motion for the appointment of an Estate Trustee During Litigation and for documentary production.

The applicant argued the affidavits were no longer necessary due to a subsequent consent order that streamlined the proceedings and provided for documentary discovery.

The respondent opposed the withdrawal, arguing it was a tactic to shield the affiants from cross-examination.

The court held that leave is required to withdraw an affidavit filed in support of a motion.

Applying the Gill factors, the court granted leave, finding that the affidavits had not yet been used by the court, the respondents would not be prejudiced, and the withdrawal was a legitimate response to the evolving litigation landscape rather than an improper tactic to avoid cross-examination.

An appeal from a motion judge's order rectifying a will to correct a drafting error.

The estate trustee sought to correct the will to reflect the deceased's intention to liquidate sufficient shares to provide two children with $1 million each.

The widow, who did not challenge the will and elected to take under it, appealed the rectification order and sought leave to appeal the costs disposition.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in principle and that the factual findings were amply supported by evidence.

Leave to appeal costs was denied.

The Estate Trustee applied to rectify a drafting error in the deceased's Secondary Will.

The will mistakenly directed the redemption of 150 Class D shares to fund a $2 million bequest, but the deceased owned Class E shares, and 300 shares were required to generate the necessary after-tax proceeds.

The drafting solicitor admitted the error.

The deceased's widow opposed the rectification, arguing it should await the trial of her separate negligence claim against the solicitor.

The court applied the Robinson test, found the solicitor misunderstood or failed to carry out the testator's instructions, and granted the rectification to reflect the deceased's true intentions.

Following a successful motion by certain beneficiaries to strike a will challenge on the basis of estoppel, the court determined costs arising from the motion.

The unsuccessful parties argued that costs should be paid from the estate due to the alleged novelty of applying estoppel to bar a will challenge within the limitation period and contended the claimed costs were excessive.

The court rejected that position, emphasizing the modern principle that estate litigation costs are not automatically payable from the estate.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 and the Courts of Justice Act, the court fixed partial indemnity costs for the successful moving parties and reduced certain billed amounts for duplication and excess.

Costs were ordered payable personally by the unsuccessful challengers rather than from estate assets.

The moving parties sought to strike a will challenge brought by an estate trustee and her son concerning the validity of the deceased’s 2010 primary and secondary wills.

The estate trustee had administered aspects of the estate for over a year, including paying significant estate taxes, relying on the wills in dealings with third parties, and exercising authority as estate trustee.

The court held that her conduct created an assumption among the parties that the wills were valid and that others relied on that assumption to their detriment, particularly in relation to complex estate planning transactions and tax consequences arising from an estate freeze.

Applying the doctrines of estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention, the court concluded that the estate trustee was barred from challenging the wills.

The son’s parallel challenge was also struck because he lacked independent knowledge of the estate and acted as a proxy for the trustee.

The moving parties sought dismissal of a will challenge brought by a beneficiary alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence in relation to two wills.

The court held that the claim was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 because the claimant knew or ought to have known of the material facts shortly after the testator’s death yet commenced proceedings more than two years later.

The claimant had received substantial benefits under the wills and actively participated in estate administration, including sale of assets and receipt of distributions.

The court further held that the doctrines of estoppel by convention and estoppel by representation independently barred the challenge because the parties had proceeded on the shared assumption that the wills were valid and the estate trustees relied on that assumption in administering the estate.

The will challenge was therefore dismissed.

Following litigation concerning the resignation of a trustee and the mechanism for appointing replacement trustees under a family trust, the court determined the issue of costs.

Competing groups of beneficiaries had disputed whether the court should appoint an institutional trustee or whether the mechanism set out in the testator’s will should govern.

Although one group succeeded on the substantive issue, the court held the cross-application seeking an independent trustee was reasonably necessary to ensure proper administration of the estate.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles governing estate litigation costs, the court concluded that fairness and the importance of the issues justified payment of most parties’ costs from the estate.

The court fixed specific amounts payable to each party.

The applicant sought to resign as trustee of a family trust.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a cross-application to appoint a new independent trustee, arguing that the settlor's children, who intended to appoint themselves as trustees pursuant to the trust agreement, had abused their discretion as directors of the trust's holding company.

The court found no evidence of abuse of discretion that would justify interfering under s. 5(1) of the Trustee Act, and held that the executors could appoint the next trustees pursuant to the trust agreement.