Susanne M. Sviergula

The plaintiffs moved to set aside a registrar's order dismissing their motor vehicle accident action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The court applied the Reid factors, finding the plaintiffs provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay, which was caused by medical issues and production difficulties rather than inadvertence.

The plaintiffs moved promptly to set aside the order, and the defendants failed to demonstrate significant prejudice.

The motion was granted, the action was reinstated, and a new timetable was imposed.

This order grants the motion of the defendants, Carehaus Properties Inc. and Darren Voros, allowing their crossclaim to proceed and confirming it was never deemed dismissed.

The court also orders the responding parties, IHA Canada Inc., Louise Desjardins, and William Kerr, to pay the moving parties $6,500.00 in costs within 30 days, with interest accruing at four percent per year from February 8, 2025.

The Corporation of the City of Ottawa moved to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing its action for delay and to reinstate the action.

The motion was opposed by some third parties.

The court applied the test for setting aside a dismissal order for delay, finding that the City provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay, consistently intended to prosecute the action, and acted promptly to address the dismissal.

The court also determined that the opposing parties would not suffer significant prejudice from the reinstatement.

The motion was granted, reinstating the main action and automatically reviving derivative third-party claims.

The Brisson defendants brought a motion seeking to reinstate Christian Pilon and Charron Langlois S.R.L. as defendants to their counterclaim, to determine costs thrown away for amendments, and to compel disclosure of certain unredacted documents.

The court granted leave to amend the defence and counterclaim, ordered the reinstatement of both Christian Pilon and Charron Langlois S.R.L. as defendants to the counterclaim, and ordered the production of unredacted partnership agreements, a share purchase agreement, and Christian Pilon's 2015 T4/income tax return/notice of assessment.

Banking records were ordered with appropriate redactions.

The court declined to order costs thrown away, finding it unnecessary at this stage, and awarded partial indemnity costs of $14,000 all-inclusive to the Brisson defendants, noting the moving parties' excessive motion record and unnecessary cross-examination.

This motion addressed whether a main action and a third-party action, stemming from a property dispute involving an encroaching structure, should be heard concurrently or sequentially.

The Plaintiffs sought a combined hearing, while the Defendants and Third Parties preferred separate proceedings.

The court, emphasizing judicial efficiency and fairness, determined that the intertwined factual and legal issues, particularly concerning the appropriate equitable remedy for the admitted trespass and the allocation of financial responsibility among all parties, necessitated a single, consolidated trial.

The motion for concurrent hearings was granted to avoid multiplicity of actions and the risk of inconsistent findings.

The third parties brought a motion to compel the plaintiffs to disclose their real estate lawyer's files relating to the purchase of their property.

The plaintiffs opposed, claiming solicitor-client privilege.

The court found that the plaintiffs' former counsel had previously undertaken to produce the files and had thereby waived any claim to privilege.

The motion was granted and the plaintiffs were ordered to produce the files.

The defendant law firm, Victor Vallance Blais LLP, brought a motion to dismiss or stay an action by its former client, Deirdre Moore, alleging professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

The court found that Moore's statement of claim failed to establish a causal link between the alleged breaches and the claimed damages, thus disclosing no reasonable cause of action for negligence or breach of fiduciary duty.

The claim for negligent infliction of mental distress was also found to be unpleaded.

While the action exhibited some characteristics of vexatious litigation due to Moore's multiple prior lawsuits against the firm, it was not dismissed on that ground.

The court struck the statement of claim but granted Moore leave to amend her claims for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, and stayed the action pending the resolution of Moore's ongoing matrimonial litigation, as the outcome of that litigation would inform the viability of her claims against the law firm.

The applicant sought costs of $34,160 on a full recovery basis against a third-party witness who unsuccessfully opposed a motion to be questioned prior to trial.

The third party argued he was a non-party and sought his own costs.

The court found the third party was a party for the purposes of the motion under the Family Law Rules and that the applicant was the successful party.

Applying principles of proportionality and considering the respective offers to settle, the court awarded the applicant costs fixed at $10,000.

The appellant brought a motion on the day of the appeal hearing to remove counsel for the respondent from the record and to strike a paragraph from an affidavit dated January 9, 2017.

The appellant also requested an adjournment of the appeal to permit cross-examination of the respondent on his affidavit.

The court rejected the adjournment request and declined to hear the motion due to insufficient notice, having been filed on the same day as the appeal hearing.

The appeal proceeded as scheduled and the appellant's motion was dismissed with costs awarded to counsel for the respondent.

The plaintiffs loaned money secured by a mortgage, allegedly relying on a property appraisal prepared by the defendant.

The borrower defaulted immediately, and the property was eventually sold at a loss.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant appraiser for negligence and breach of contract.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the action was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding the plaintiffs knew they would suffer a loss and had sufficient facts to sue more than two years before commencing the claim.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment, the moving party sought costs on a full indemnity basis.

The responding parties had attempted to resile from Minutes of Settlement and made unproven allegations of fraud and breach of trust against the moving party.

The court found that the responding parties' conduct unnecessarily lengthened the proceedings and that their unproven allegations of dishonesty warranted an exception to the usual costs rules.

The court awarded full indemnity costs to the moving party, excluding the costs of preparing the costs submissions.

The plaintiff real estate brokerage and its agent brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce Minutes of Settlement signed by all parties at a pre-trial conference.

The defendant vendors opposed the motion, arguing they did not understand the English proceedings or the settlement document due to a language barrier, and did not intend to release their counterclaim.

The court rejected the language barrier argument, noting the defendants had retained unilingual English professionals for the underlying transaction, conducted prior pleadings in English, and were represented by bilingual counsel at the pre-trial conference.

The court found a clear meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the settlement and granted summary judgment enforcing the agreement.

The plaintiff's action was administratively dismissed for delay after missing the deadline to set the matter down for trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside the dismissal and reinstate the action, while the defendants brought a cross-motion to reinstate their counterclaim if the plaintiff was successful.

Applying the Reid factors, the court found that the plaintiff adequately explained the litigation delay and that the defendants would not suffer actual prejudice if the action proceeded.

The court set aside the dismissal, reinstated both the action and the counterclaim, and ordered the matter to be set down for trial.

The applicant filed a human rights application against several respondents, including the law firm representing the condominium corporation.

The law firm requested to be removed as a respondent, arguing there was no service relationship between it and the applicant.

The Tribunal agreed, finding that a lawyer representing an opposing party does not provide a service to the applicant within the meaning of the Human Rights Code.

The application was dismissed as against the law firm.

The applicants filed human rights applications alleging discrimination in housing based on disability against a condominium corporation, its management, and its legal counsel.

The respondent law firm brought a request for an order during proceedings to dismiss the applications against it, arguing it was retained by the condominium corporation and had no service relationship with the applicants.

The Tribunal agreed, finding that a condominium corporation is a distinct legal entity from its unit owners, and the law firm was in an adversarial relationship with the applicants.

The request to dismiss the applications against the law firm was granted.

The appellant dentist appealed an order dismissing his motion for summary judgment, which argued that the respondent patient's dental malpractice action was statute-barred.

The respondent commenced her action within two years of her last appointment, but the appellant argued the limitation period began earlier when she first complained and threatened legal action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the claim was not discovered until after the treatment and dentist-patient relationship ended, as the appellant had advised the respondent the issue was not his fault and he would try to repair it.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant dentist brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a dental negligence action as statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The defendant argued that the claim was discoverable when the plaintiff complained about failed bridgework and threatened legal action during treatment.

The court held that the limitation period did not begin at that time because the plaintiff reasonably relied on the dentist’s explanations and continued remedial treatment.

Evidence showed the dentist’s negligent treatment continued throughout the remaining course of care and lacked informed consent.

The court concluded that the claim was not discoverable until the dentist‑patient relationship ended and that commencing litigation earlier would not have been an appropriate means of remedy while treatment was ongoing.

The plaintiff moved to set aside an administrative dismissal of a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident and to extend the time to set the action down for trial.

The proceeding had been dismissed after repeated failures to meet trial‑setting deadlines under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Applying the established factors for setting aside an administrative dismissal—including explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice—the court found the delay largely attributable to counsel error and that the defendant had not demonstrated actual prejudice.

The complexity of parallel accident litigation and prior defence consents to extensions rebutted any presumption of prejudice.

The dismissal order was set aside, but costs of the motion were awarded to the defendant and made payable by the plaintiff’s counsel.

The defendant sought leave to appeal a decision that set aside the administrative dismissal of the plaintiff's action.

The court applied the two-part test for leave to appeal under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's application of the Reid principles.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought summary judgment motions seeking dismissal of a personal injury claim arising from a teeth whitening procedure performed by a dental hygienist.

The court held that allegations concerning negligent performance of the procedure required expert evidence regarding the applicable standard of care.

Because the plaintiff failed to provide admissible expert evidence meeting the requirements of Rule 53.03, the claims for negligent performance and breach of contract were dismissed.

However, the court found a genuine issue requiring a trial on whether the plaintiff gave informed consent, as the parties presented conflicting evidence regarding disclosure of the risk of burns.

The court also held that expert evidence was not required to determine whether the material risk of burns had been disclosed, and that the issue of potential vicarious liability of the dentists for any breach of disclosure duty remained for trial.