Timothy D. Ray

The parties in a family law matter submitted costs submissions several months after the extended deadline ordered by the court, without providing any explanation for the delay.

The judge, who was in his final sitting week before retirement and had already disposed of his notes, refused to consider the late submissions.

The judge directed counsel to take the matter up with the Local Administrative Judge for Family or the Regional Senior Judge if they wished to pursue it further.

The applicant sought a declaration that the respondent, Mayor of Belleville, breached the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by participating in a council debate and voting on a highway improvement project in which he had a pecuniary interest.

The court found that the respondent did breach the Act by voting on the project, which involved the acquisition of property owned by a company in which he held shares.

However, the court applied the saving provision under section 10(2) of the Act, finding that the contravention was committed through an honest error in judgment, and therefore declined to remove the respondent from office.

These supplementary reasons address procedural matters following a prior decision (2017 ONSC 3134).

The court was asked for written submissions regarding the form of judgment.

Following the respondent's death, the applicant requested an extension of time for submissions to allow the respondent's estate to become involved and for an order to continue the proceeding against the estate.

The court granted a 45-day extension for submissions and clarified that it was not seized of the matter for settling the final judgment, allowing another judge or the Registrar to complete it if the reconstituted parties agree.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation for the defendant, A.A.G., who was convicted of multiple sexual assaults and other violent offences against his stepchildren and their mother.

The defence argued for a long-term supervision order.

The court, after considering expert psychiatric opinions and the defendant's extensive criminal history, found that the defendant met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation due to a pattern of repetitive violent and sexual behaviour, high risk of recidivism, and lack of genuine willingness for treatment.

The court declined to impose a long-term offender designation, concluding that there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community.

This decision addresses costs following an application where the applicant was granted a prescriptive easement, though in narrower terms than initially sought.

The applicant requested substantial indemnity costs of over $72,000, while the respondents sought partial indemnity costs of over $21,000, each claiming to be the successful party.

The court found the applicant's costs claim "breath-taking" and disproportionate to the modest value of the property and the limited scope of the argument.

Considering that the applicant sought an unlimited right-of-way but received an order reflecting only occasional use, and the respondents had not offered to formalize this occasional use, the court determined that neither party was entirely successful in their costs positions.

The applicant sought spousal support, equalization of net family property (NFP), security for NFP, transfer of a life insurance policy, and a restraining order.

The respondent disputed spousal support liability and asset valuations.

The court granted a divorce, cancelled spousal support arrears and found an overpayment by the respondent, continued a restraining order against the respondent, and ordered the respondent to pay the applicant $60,688.10 for NFP equalization after adjustments.

The parties were directed to provide submissions on the form of the final order for asset division.

The applicant sought a prescriptive easement over the respondents' property to access her landlocked property.

The court found that the applicant established the necessary elements for a prescriptive easement, specifically for pedestrian use, limited to a maximum of twice per year, for a 20-year period commencing in 1979.

The respondents were ordered to provide the applicant with a key or other means to open the gate to enjoy her access.

The defendant, facing drug trafficking and criminal organization charges, brought a mid-trial application for a stay of proceedings or exclusion of wiretap evidence, alleging a breach of Crown disclosure obligations under Stinchcombe and ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The issue concerned whether Monitor Post Reports (MPRs) alone constituted sufficient disclosure of wiretap intercepts, or if all audio recordings were required, and whether the disclosure method was misleading.

The court found that while the Crown did not wilfully breach its obligations, the disclosure method was insufficient due to a lack of clear explanation regarding the relationship between the MPRs and the disclosed audio recordings.

Despite some lack of diligence by defence counsel, the court determined that the defendant's trial fairness rights were compromised.

Given the extensive time required for the defence to review the newly disclosed audio recordings and the judge's impending compulsory retirement, an adjournment was deemed impractical.

The court granted a mistrial, allowing for a new trial where previous pretrial decisions and admitted evidence could be incorporated.

The defendant appealed his conviction and sentence under the Lobbying Act, challenging the legislation on grounds related to the English Bill of Rights, freedom of expression under the Charter, and the interpretation of sections 5 and 7 of the Act.

He also appealed the $20,000 fine as unfit.

The Superior Court dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the Lobbying Act did not infringe the right to petition or freedom of expression, that section 5 correctly applied to the defendant as a consultant lobbyist, and that the sentence was fit.

The defendants moved to quash the plaintiffs' appeal from a Master's decision, arguing that the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction and that the appeal should be heard by the Divisional Court.

The plaintiffs contended that the Courts of Justice Act was inapplicable due to their Indigenous status and sought an adjournment, which was denied.

The court granted the defendants' motion, quashing the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, and awarded full indemnity costs to the successful defendants due to the unmeritorious nature of the appeal route chosen by the plaintiffs.

The defendant was found guilty of ten counts of fraud and fraud-related offences involving approximately $8 million, the largest commercial fraud in Ottawa's history.

The defendant used his company as a vehicle to defraud subcontractors, creditors, and financial institutions before absconding to Lebanon.

The court found numerous aggravating factors, including the size of the fraud, the high degree of planning, and the profound impact on victims.

The defendant was sentenced to 7 years in penitentiary, ordered to pay a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $1.7 million, and ordered to pay restitution of $488,057.48.

The defendant brought an application to stay his convictions for fraud and related offences, arguing that the delay from the date of charge to sentencing violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court applied the transitional framework from Jordan and calculated the net delay to the end of trial, deducting periods of defence waiver and defence-caused delay.

The court found the net delay was below the 30-month ceiling, and even if it exceeded the ceiling, the delay was justified by the exceptional circumstances of a key Crown witness's illness and the particular complexity of the case.

The court also analyzed the delay during the sentencing phase, concluding it was primarily requested by the defence to obtain a mental health assessment and caused no prejudice.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The offender, a 26-year-old member of the Canadian Forces, pleaded guilty to possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and methamphetamine, and breach of recognizance.

Despite the usual range for such offences being a penitentiary term, the court emphasized the offender's severe lifelong addictions, his efforts at rehabilitation, and the potential loss of his military career.

The court imposed a sentence of 60 days intermittent custody followed by a 12-month conditional sentence to allow the offender to maintain his employment and continue treatment.

The applicant moved to strike the respondent's pleadings for non-payment of costs orders, and the respondent cross-moved to set aside previous orders regarding child support for their adult child.

The court found the respondent's conduct in repeatedly disobeying court orders and bringing meritless motions to be disgraceful.

The court dismissed the respondent's cross-motion, ordered child support to terminate on January 31, 2017 as agreed by the parties, and awarded the applicant $12,000 in costs on a full indemnity basis.

The court also ordered the respondent to post $5,000 as security for costs before bringing any further proceedings.

The appellant appealed a decision ordering the forfeiture of his shotgun and imposing a one-year firearms prohibition.

The police had seized the weapons after responding to a call about the appellant's suicidal Facebook posts, finding him intoxicated and combative.

The hearing judge found on a balance of probabilities that the appellant posed a risk to himself and the public.

On appeal, the court found that the hearing judge's decision was supported by the evidence of the appellant's ongoing depression, alcohol abuse, and chronic pain.

The appeal was dismissed on the merits, but because the one-year prohibition period had expired by the time of the appeal, the court ordered the firearm returned to the appellant or that he be given 60 days to sell it.

Following a summary judgment dismissing the claim against the individual defendants and a corporate defendant, and the dismissal of the defendants' motion for security for costs, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court found that the individual defendants defeated the claim by reviving a corporate defendant late in the proceedings, making them liable for the plaintiff's thrown-away costs.

However, the defendants were successful on their summary judgment motion.

Balancing the relative success and the respective costs incurred, the court ordered that the costs be set off against each other, resulting in no order as to costs.

The defendant brought a motion under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained from a one-party consent wiretap authorization that was previously found to violate s. 8.

The court first determined that viva voce evidence of the conversation between the police agent and the defendant was inextricably linked to the recording and must be considered in the s. 24(2) analysis.

Applying the Grant framework, the court found the breach was not at the higher end of the continuum, the defendant's expectation of privacy in a public restaurant was low, and the evidence was highly reliable.

The court concluded that excluding the evidence would undermine the truth-seeking function and bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore admitted the evidence.

The defendant brought a Garofoli application to exclude evidence obtained through a series of wiretap authorizations, arguing the initial Information to Obtain (ITO) was inadequate and misleading.

The court reviewed the ITO, noting material omissions regarding the police agent's criminal record and financial compensation agreement.

After editing and amplifying the ITO, the court found that while there were reasonable grounds to believe an offence had been or would be committed, there were no reasonable grounds to believe that information relating to the offences would be obtained through the interception sought.

The initial authorization was set aside, rendering the evidence obtained a presumptive violation of s. 8 of the Charter.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against the individual defendants and a related corporate entity, and sought security for costs.

The plaintiff's action sought to enforce an arbitral award against a corporation that was discovered to have been dissolved, prompting claims against its principals.

The court found no cause of action pleaded against the related corporate entity.

Because the primary corporate defendant was recently revived under the Canada Business Corporations Act, its acts during dissolution were cured, negating the basis for personal liability against the individual defendants.

The court dismissed the action against the individuals and the related corporation, but denied the defendants' request for security for costs as inequitable.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment to recover the balance owing on a loan agreement.

The defendants argued the agreement was unenforceable, claiming they lacked independent legal advice and that the arrangement was actually a partnership where losses should be shared.

The court found no evidence of a partnership and noted the loan agreement explicitly remained in force if no partnership agreement was executed.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiffs for the agreed outstanding amount.