Peter Alan Barnes

The self-represented accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

He was charged with intimidation of a justice system participant, and the anticipated time from charge to trial was 33 months.

The court found that a four-month delay during the preliminary hearing was attributable to the accused, as he failed to complete his cross-examination in the allotted time and subsequently waived the remainder after an adjournment.

Deducting this defence delay brought the net delay below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The accused brought a defence application to sever counts on a multi-complainant indictment involving historical sexual allegations, a partner assault allegation, and more recent sexual allegations.

Applying the severance factors, the court held the applicant had established on a balance of probabilities that the interests of justice warranted severance.

The court found the factual nexus between the counts was not compelling at this stage, the risk of prejudice and cross-pollination on credibility assessments favoured severance, and similar fact admissibility was not sufficiently clear to outweigh those concerns.

The counts involving the historical allegations were severed from the counts involving the more recent allegations.

J.M. was found guilty on two counts of sexual assault against two child victims, T.L. and B.R., following a jury trial.

The sentencing judge accepted the complainants' evidence as substantially true, including the more egregious allegations.

Aggravating factors included the offender's position of trust, the young age of the victims, the lengthy period and invasive nature of the abuse, and the severe impact on the victims.

Mitigating factors included the absence of overt violence, no serious criminal record, and a history of employment.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing principles for child sexual abuse by a person in a position of trust.

J.M. was sentenced to 5 years and 6 months imprisonment for the sexual assault against T.L., and 15 months concurrent for the sexual assault against B.R., with credit for pretrial custody.

Various ancillary orders were also imposed.

The offender, a 26-year-old member of the Canadian Forces, pleaded guilty to possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and methamphetamine, and breach of recognizance.

Despite the usual range for such offences being a penitentiary term, the court emphasized the offender's severe lifelong addictions, his efforts at rehabilitation, and the potential loss of his military career.

The court imposed a sentence of 60 days intermittent custody followed by a 12-month conditional sentence to allow the offender to maintain his employment and continue treatment.

The accused was charged with multiple offences, including impaired driving causing death and dangerous driving causing death, following a single-vehicle collision that resulted in the death of one passenger and injuries to another.

The central issue at trial was the identity of the driver.

The court analyzed extensive civilian and expert evidence, including accident reconstruction, occupant kinematics, and medical records.

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver of the vehicle at the time of the collision and entered findings of guilt on all counts.

The 63-year-old accused, a first-time offender, was convicted of five counts of sexual assault against five female victims.

The accused held himself out as a healer and touched the victims inappropriately under the guise of providing treatment.

Psychiatric assessment revealed the accused suffered from a delusional disorder regarding his healing abilities and lacked insight or remorse.

The court emphasized the extreme breach of trust and the need for deterrence and rehabilitation, sentencing the accused to 14 months in a provincial reformatory followed by three years of probation to facilitate ongoing psychiatric treatment.

The Crown applied to admit similar fact evidence across multiple counts of sexual assault allegedly committed by an unlicensed therapist against several patients during treatment sessions.

The defence argued the alleged acts were insufficiently similar and raised the possibility of collusion among complainants.

Applying the governing principles from appellate jurisprudence on similar fact evidence, the court assessed the similarities, differences, and the risk of prejudice, as well as whether an air of reality existed regarding collusion.

The court found sufficient similarities among three complainants’ accounts involving inappropriate touching of breasts and vaginal areas during therapy sessions and unusual post‑contact behaviour to render coincidence improbable.

While an air of reality to possible collusion existed due to community connections, the Crown established on a balance of probabilities that no improper collusion occurred.

Similar fact evidence from three complainants was admitted, while the evidence of two others was excluded due to insufficient similarity.

The applicant challenged the retrospective application of the 1997 and 2011 amendments to the faint hope provisions governing reduction of parole ineligibility for murder.

The court held that the proper analytical framework was the retrospective punishment analysis from Whaling, not the Rodgers test for discrete sanctions.

It concluded that the amendments did not increase punishment, did not thwart any settled expectation of liberty, and merely altered the procedure by which the applicant could seek a chance at earlier parole.

The constitutional application was dismissed, and the parole ineligibility reduction application was directed to proceed under s. 745.61 as amended in 2011.

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking disclosure of an affiant police officer’s notes, leave to cross‑examine the affiant, and exclusion of evidence obtained under a general warrant.

The court ordered disclosure of the officer’s notes subject to redaction to protect the confidential informant and granted leave to cross‑examine the affiant on issues relating to the reliability of the informant and alleged omissions or misstatements in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

After cross‑examination, the court found the ITO fundamentally deficient, containing misrepresentations and lacking reliable evidence capable of establishing reasonable and probable grounds.

The general warrant was set aside and the search deemed warrantless, engaging the accused’s Charter rights.

The matter was adjourned for continuation of the application regarding exclusion of evidence.