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The accused was acquitted of assaulting her children due to reasonable doubt stemming from witness collusion and parental animus.
N.K. was charged with nine counts of assault, including assault with a weapon, against her four children.
The trial involved testimony from the children and their father.
The court found significant evidence of collusion between the children and their father, and concerns that the allegations were exaggerated or part of a family law dispute strategy.
The youngest child's testimony revealed discussions among the children and father prior to and during the trial, including coaching and expressions of animus towards the mother.
The court found the father's testimony self-serving and unreliable.
Due to the combined effect of collusion and animus, the court was left with reasonable doubt regarding the children's evidence and found N.K. not guilty on all charges.
Retrospective faint hope screening amendments did not increase punishment.
The applicant challenged the retrospective application of the 1997 and 2011 amendments to the faint hope provisions governing reduction of parole ineligibility for murder.
The court held that the proper analytical framework was the retrospective punishment analysis from Whaling, not the Rodgers test for discrete sanctions.
It concluded that the amendments did not increase punishment, did not thwart any settled expectation of liberty, and merely altered the procedure by which the applicant could seek a chance at earlier parole.
The constitutional application was dismissed, and the parole ineligibility reduction application was directed to proceed under s. 745.61 as amended in 2011.
Conviction for aggravated assault upheld; trial judge implicitly found wounds caused during parking lot swarming.
The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge failed to make a finding of causation regarding whether the complainant's wounds were caused during a swarming in a parking lot or by flying glass.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the inescapable inference from the trial judge's reasons was that the wounds were caused during the parking lot assault, consistent with the Crown's theory and the complainant's accepted testimony.
