Matthew B. Day

This is an appeal from a sexual assault conviction.

The appellant, C.L., argued that the trial judge erred in modifying the standard W.(D.) jury instruction on reasonable doubt and credibility by incorporating a "J.J.R.D. instruction." The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's modification was an error, as the "J.J.R.D." language was intended for sufficiency of reasons in judge-alone trials, not for jury instructions, and could confuse the standard of proof.

The court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, while dismissing the unreasonable verdict challenge.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision setting aside convictions for sexual assault and ordering a new trial.

The Court of Appeal majority had held that the trial judge erred by failing to engage in the second step of the admissibility inquiry and by giving inadequate jury instructions regarding post-offence conduct (the accused's failure to attend for his original trial date).

The Supreme Court held unanimously that failure to attend trial is not presumptively post-offence conduct and its admissibility must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

A majority allowed the appeal substantially for the reasons of Huscroft J.A. (dissenting in the Court of Appeal), restoring the convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for being in care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's testimony that he exited his vehicle to drink wine in his garage before police arrived.

The appeal argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence and failed to consider independent corroborative evidence.

The appellate court found that the trial judge was alive to the independent evidence and reasonably concluded it was insufficient to rebut the presumption of care and control, especially given the appellant's lack of credibility.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault following a jury trial.

On appeal, the court considered whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the appellant's failure to appear at his original trial date as post-offence conduct evidence, and whether the jury was properly instructed on the use of such evidence.

The majority found that the trial judge erred by refusing to allow the appellant to testify on the voir dire regarding his explanation for non-appearance, and by failing to properly instruct the jury on alternative explanations for the post-offence conduct.

The majority held that these errors undermined the fairness of the trial and ordered a new trial.

The dissent argued that the trial judge had sufficient information to make an informed decision on admissibility and that the jury instructions were adequate.

The defendant, F.E., was charged with sexual assault and sexual exploitation of C.K., a person with a mental disability in a relationship of dependency.

The Crown presented evidence including C.K.'s videotaped statements, medical findings of sexual activity and a sexually transmitted disease, and DNA evidence of F.E.'s semen and C.K.'s DNA on a towel.

The defence argued inconsistencies in C.K.'s statements and presented testimony from F.E.'s wife (A.C.) and son (L.C.) denying the incidents.

The court found C.K.'s testimony credible, explaining inconsistencies due to fear and dependency, and found the DNA evidence to be powerful corroboration.

The court rejected the defence witnesses' credibility, finding them motivated by shame and a desire to protect F.E. F.E. was found guilty on both counts.

The Crown brought an application under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code to admit a videotaped statement of the complainant, who was 17 at the time of the alleged sexual assault.

The defence opposed, arguing the statement was not made within a reasonable time due to delays by both the complainant and the police.

The court found the delays were adequately explained and did not significantly impact the complainant's ability to accurately recall events, particularly given her age.

The application was granted, allowing the videotaped statement to be admitted into evidence.

Marc Auguste pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing bodily harm after failing to stop at a stop sign, resulting in severe injuries to the victim.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the extent of injuries, speeding, and the nature of the vehicle, alongside mitigating factors including a guilty plea, lack of criminal record, remorse, and pro-social lifestyle.

The Crown sought a four-month jail sentence, while the defence requested a suspended sentence with probation and a one-year driving prohibition.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years' probation, 240 hours of community service, and a six-month curfew, declining a driving prohibition to allow the offender to maintain employment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit, arguing that the police officer's traffic stop constituted an arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter.

The trial judge found the stop was a lawful random compliance check under the Highway Traffic Act, despite the officer's attention being drawn to the vehicle by a lawful U-turn.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the trial judge's decision, confirming that random stops do not require pre-determined criteria and are lawful provided they are not pretense stops for unrelated or discriminatory purposes.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that a 19-minute delay between his detention by a transit officer and the administration of an approved screening device (ASD) test by a dispatched police officer violated the immediacy requirement of s. 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code and his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the delay was reasonably necessary given the unusual circumstance that transit officers do not carry ASDs.

The court also upheld the finding that the appellant had no realistic opportunity to consult counsel at the roadside and would not have done so even if properly advised.

The defendant appealed his conviction and sentence under the Lobbying Act, challenging the legislation on grounds related to the English Bill of Rights, freedom of expression under the Charter, and the interpretation of sections 5 and 7 of the Act.

He also appealed the $20,000 fine as unfit.

The Superior Court dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the Lobbying Act did not infringe the right to petition or freedom of expression, that section 5 correctly applied to the defendant as a consultant lobbyist, and that the sentence was fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving over 80, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence and engaged in speculative reasoning to reconcile conflicting timelines provided by police officers and a tow truck driver.

The appellant contended there was an unexplained 14-minute delay, rendering the breath samples not taken 'as soon as practicable'.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error, properly applied the law, and reasonably concluded that the discrepancies were due to asynchronous timepieces and that the police acted reasonably.