Moiz Murtaza Karimjee

The offender, a lawyer, pleaded guilty to mischief for defacing the National Holocaust Monument with red paint and the words 'FEED ME' to protest the war in Gaza.

The Crown argued the offence was motivated by hate, but the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of a hateful motive, finding instead that the offender acted despite knowing his actions would cause fear and trauma to the Jewish community.

The court considered the offender's first-time status, mental health issues, and the severe collateral consequences to his career, balancing these against the significant harm caused and the need for denunciation.

The offender was sentenced to 5 months in custody (credited as time served) and 24 months of probation.

This is a first-stage ruling on a habeas corpus application brought by Andre Ducic, who asserts that his recent confinement at the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre was inconsistent with a disposition order of the Ontario Review Board.

The court finds that there is sufficient concern to warrant a full inquiry into the lawfulness of Mr. Ducic’s imprisonment and orders the matter to proceed to the second stage, requiring the responsible authorities to explain the legal basis for his detention.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder and facing a joint judge-and-jury trial with a co-accused, sought a Rowbotham order after legal aid funding had been denied.

The court held that the applicant failed to establish the second precondition because proceeds from the sale of her home had not been pursued to fund the defence.

The application for state-funded counsel was therefore denied.

However, given the complexity of the anticipated trial, the accused's language and mobility limitations, the presence of a co-accused, and expected voluntariness and Charter motions, the court appointed amicus with an expanded adversarial mandate in the interests of justice.

The accused, Patrick King, was sentenced for offences including mischief, counselling mischief, counselling obstruction of police, and disobeying a court order arising from his leadership role in the 2022 "Freedom Convoy" protest in Ottawa.

The Crown sought a ten-year prison sentence, arguing the protest constituted an unprecedented occupation of the nation's capital, while the defence argued for time served and probation.

Justice Hackland rejected the Crown's position, noting that while the protest caused significant community harm, a ten-year sentence was disproportionate and lacked precedent.

The court sentenced the accused to a total of 12 months, consisting of nine months of pre-sentence credit and a three-month conditional sentence, followed by 12 months of probation.

The appellant appealed a lower court decision upholding a firearms officer's refusal to issue him a firearms licence.

The refusal was based on the appellant's history of mental health issues, including a diagnosis of schizophrenia and past psychotic episodes, as well as police reports of family conflict.

The appellant introduced fresh evidence of his current stability, employment, and discipline.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the lower court did not err in concluding the firearms officer's decision was reasonable given the legitimate concerns regarding public safety and the appellant's denial of his mental health history.

Criminal trial arising from the accused’s role in the downtown Ottawa convoy occupation in early 2022.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was an organizer, leader, and online influencer who counselled and participated in mischief by encouraging blockades, horn honking, resistance to police efforts to clear the area, and later breaches of an injunction prohibiting the use of air horns and train horns.

The court acquitted on intimidation counts, holding the specific intent required by s. 423 of the Criminal Code was not established because the pressure tactics were directed at changing government policy rather than intimidating identified persons within the meaning of the provision.

The accused was convicted of counselling obstruction of police but acquitted of personal obstruction, and the defence of officially induced error was rejected for lack of an air of reality.

The appellant appealed a sentencing decision for carrying a concealed weapon, arguing the trial judge erred by sentencing him as if he committed a "use" offence rather than a "possession" offence, and by overstating the seriousness of the offence.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge.

The appeal court found no error in principle, stating the trial judge properly considered all circumstances, including the potential for harm, and that a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, B.S., appealed her conviction for criminal harassment under section 264(3) of the Criminal Code.

The conviction stemmed from repeated unannounced visits to the former matrimonial home, where her estranged husband (the complainant) and their children resided, in violation of a Family Court Restraining Order.

The appellant argued that there was insufficient evidentiary basis and that her conduct, being non-threatening, would not cause a reasonable person to fear for personal safety.

The trial judge found the complainant credible, accepting that the appellant's conduct caused him significant anxiety, stress, and mental health trauma, which constituted fear for personal safety.

The appeal court upheld the conviction, affirming that "fear for personal safety" in harassment cases can include psychological well-being, even in the absence of physical threats, and that the trial judge's factual findings were reasonable.

The appellant, Ahmad Hasan, appealed his conviction for criminal harassment, contrary to s. 264(3) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was based on two grounds: ineffective representation by counsel (specifically, amicus curiae) and an unreasonable verdict.

The court dismissed the ineffective counsel claim, finding that the amicus's actions were within acceptable professional judgment and that the proposed lines of questioning regarding the initial date were irrelevant to the harassment charge.

Regarding the unreasonable verdict claim, the court found no significant discrepancies in the complainant's testimony and upheld the trial judge's findings that the complainant genuinely feared for her safety, and that this fear was reasonable given the appellant's persistent and escalating communications after being told to stop, even after police intervention.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was affirmed.

The court set aside its previous decision summarily dismissing the applicant's change of venue application.

The original dismissal was based on judicial comity and an assessment of the merits, which the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Haevischer (2023 SCC 11) now prohibits at the summary dismissal stage.

The court found that the application's factual basis required a hearing to determine if the threshold for a change of venue was met, as it was not "manifestly frivolous." The applicant is permitted to bring his application afresh.

Patrick King, charged in connection with the "Freedom Convoy" applied for a change of venue from Ottawa, arguing he could not receive a fair trial due to local prejudice and extensive prejudicial media coverage.

The court dismissed the application, citing the principle of judicial comity and deferring to a prior decision in R v. Bauder, 2023 ONSC 996, which addressed similar concerns regarding pretrial publicity and local bias for "Freedom Convoy" cases.

The court affirmed that standard procedural safeguards during jury selection are sufficient to ensure a fair trial.

The accused brought a Charter motion alleging breaches of Sections 8 and 9 due to an unlawful warrantless arrest and an unlawful search incident to arrest, including the observation of a phone notification.

The court found that the arrest was lawful, based on reasonable and probable grounds derived from police surveillance and communication with the accused, who was believed to have sexually assaulted the complainant.

The court also ruled that observing a plain-view phone notification on a lawfully seized phone did not constitute a search engaging Section 8 Charter rights, as there was no reasonable expectation of privacy.

Consequently, the accused's application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter claims under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b), specifically challenging the reliability of the arresting officer's evidence, the validity of a delayed breath demand, and whether his right to counsel was provided without delay.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law or palpable and overriding errors of fact in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and application of the law.

The applicant, an alleged leader of the Freedom Convoy 2022, sought a bail review after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds.

He argued a material change in circumstances based on his five months in custody, health issues, and a new bail plan with four proposed sureties.

The court found a material change in circumstances and conducted a fresh review.

Despite the serious nature of the mischief and counselling charges, and new perjury charges arising from his first bail hearing, the court concluded that the proposed strict bail plan, which included relocating to Alberta and strong supervision by new sureties, adequately addressed the secondary and tertiary ground concerns.

The applicant was granted release on bail.

The applicant, a key organizer of the Freedom Convoy, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after a Justice of the Peace ordered her detention on secondary and tertiary grounds following an alleged breach of her release conditions.

The reviewing judge found that the Justice of the Peace erred in law by conflating the reverse onus at a bail hearing with the onus at trial, misinterpreting the release condition, and failing to consider material changes in circumstances.

Conducting a hearing de novo, the court concluded that the applicant did not pose a substantial risk to public safety and that her detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The bail review application was granted and judicial interim release was ordered.

The Crown and the accused both sought a review of the accused's bail conditions related to charges arising from the Freedom Convoy.

The Crown alleged the accused breached her conditions by agreeing to accept an award, while the accused sought to vary her conditions to allow travel to Ontario and use of social media.

The court found no breach of conditions and determined that a material change in circumstances warranted a de novo review.

The court ordered the accused's continued release with varied conditions, maintaining the social media ban but modifying the geographic restriction to allow her to visit Ottawa outside the downtown core.

The appellant, Mohamed Faisal, appealed his conviction for driving over 0.80, arguing a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The trial judge found a s. 10(b) breach but admitted the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, applying the Grant factors.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, specifically regarding the consideration of the police officer's problematic testimony and the overall assessment of whether admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's holistic consideration of the evidence and the Grant factors, and affirming the deference owed to the trial judge's discretion in s. 24(2) assessments.

The applicant, Tamara Lich, sought to review a bail review decision, alleging errors of law in the imposed release conditions.

The Crown argued the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction to review a decision of another SCJ judge.

The court examined the interpretation of sections 520 and 521 of the Criminal Code, distinguishing between reviews based on material change in circumstances and those based on errors of law.

Relying on Ontario precedent (R. v. Saracino and R. v. Durrani) over Saskatchewan precedent (R. v. Smith), the court found that the Superior Court of Justice does have jurisdiction to review a bail decision made by another judge of the same court, regardless of whether the previous decision affirmed or vacated the justice's order, and whether the grounds for review are a change in circumstances or an error of law.

Brigitte Cleroux pleaded guilty to seven offences, including personation, fraud, assault, and assault with a weapon, stemming from her fraudulent impersonation of a nurse at two medical clinics.

She performed medical procedures on patients without proper qualifications.

The court considered her extensive criminal record, which included prior convictions for impersonating a nurse.

The Crown sought a 10-year sentence, while the defence sought 4-5 years.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, particularly given the breach of public trust in the healthcare system and the offender's history of similar crimes.

The court imposed a total sentence equivalent to seven years' imprisonment, with credit for pre-sentence custody, including enhanced credit for difficult COVID-19 conditions.

Byron Carr, charged with mischief, obstructing police, and failure to obey a court order related to the "freedom convoy" occupation, brought a s. 520 bail review.

The Crown conceded a material change in circumstances.

The court granted bail, finding that the tertiary ground for detention was inapplicable given the mass nature of the alleged crimes and varying degrees of culpability.

The applicant satisfied the primary and secondary grounds for release with a new, robust plan, including two sureties (one a retired police officer), a $3500 bond, and strict conditions on social media, communication with organizers, and travel to Ottawa.