Moiz Murtaza Karimjee

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing to stop a vehicle as soon as reasonable while being pursued by a peace officer in order to evade police, contrary to s. 249.1 of the Criminal Code.

He argued the initial roadside detention was unconstitutional, that the police were not in “pursuit” within the meaning of the offence, that derivative evidence should have been excluded, and that the trial judge misapprehended the elements of the offence.

The court held the traffic stop had a valid dual purpose, found no breaches of ss. 9, 10(a), or 10(b) of the Charter, and concluded that “pursuit” should be given its ordinary meaning rather than a police policy definition.

The evidence supported the finding that the appellant knew police were pursuing him and drove away to evade them.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from a police pursuit on the basis that identity was proved only through weak eyewitness evidence.

The appeal court held that the trial judge failed to apply the careful scrutiny required for stranger identification made during a brief and dynamic encounter, followed by a single-photograph identification process.

The officer's contemporaneous description was generic, the later in-court description was materially augmented, and there was no confirmatory circumstantial evidence linking the appellant to the vehicle or plate.

The convictions were set aside and acquittals entered.

On a summary conviction sentence appeal by a young person who pleaded guilty to sexual assault, the court considered whether the Youth Criminal Justice Act requires a sentencing judge to ask the young person if he has anything to say before sentence is imposed.

The court held that, unlike s. 726 of the Criminal Code for adult offenders, the YCJA does not impose such a duty, and that the legislative scheme instead leaves the decision to speak to the young person, counsel, and parents.

The court also refused to admit the appellant's proposed statement as fresh evidence, applying the Levesque criteria and finding it was not fresh and would not reasonably have affected the sentence.

The probation sentence was upheld as fit and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an impaired driving conviction arising from a rear-end collision on Highway 417.

He argued that the trial judge gave inadequate reasons on alleged Charter breaches and failed to connect impairment observed at the police station back to the time of driving.

The appeal court held that no Grant analysis under s. 24(2) was required because no evidence was obtained as a result of the Charter breaches, and no basis existed for a stay.

The court further held that the trial judge reasonably relied on significant physical indicia of impairment observed within 45 to 60 minutes of driving, together with the totality of the evidence, to find at least slight impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml under the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s finding that the first breath sample was taken within two hours of the alleged offence, which permitted reliance on the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(c).

The appellant argued that discrepancies between officers’ recorded times created a reasonable doubt about whether the sample was taken within the required period and that the trial judge failed to apply the proper burden of proof or provide sufficient reasons.

The court held that the reliable evidence, including video and intoxilyzer timestamps, established that the sample was taken within two hours.

The alleged evidentiary “stream” of timing discrepancies lacked evidentiary support, and the trial judge’s reasons were adequate for appellate review.

The accused applied for judicial interim release after a justice of the peace had denied bail under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued that the detention order contained an error of law and that a material change in circumstances existed due to the availability of additional sureties.

The court reviewed the strength of the Crown’s case, the gravity and circumstances of the alleged offences, and the potential for lengthy imprisonment if convicted.

The court found that the initial decision properly applied the tertiary ground analysis and that strong evidence, including DNA linking two violent sexual assaults and eyewitness accounts, supported detention.

The court concluded that releasing the accused would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice and dismissed the application.

The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal criminal convictions entered following guilty pleas, arguing he was unaware that the convictions would trigger deportation proceedings under immigration law.

Applying the factors governing extensions of time for criminal appeals, the court considered whether the applicant had a bona fide intention to appeal, whether the delay was adequately explained, and whether the proposed appeal had merit.

The court found that the applicant only became aware of the immigration consequences months after the conviction and reasonably formed an intention to appeal once informed of the risk of deportation.

Although the applicant initially benefited from the plea and some factors weighed against relief, the court concluded that the potential deportation consequences and possible issues with the voluntariness and unequivocal nature of the plea raised an arguable appeal.

The extension of time to file a notice of appeal was granted.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and refusal to provide a breath sample following a trial in which he was acquitted of leaving the scene of an accident.

He argued that the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) credibility test, provided insufficient reasons, misapprehended evidence, and demonstrated bias.

The court held that the trial judge was entitled to reject the appellant’s testimony as unreliable and that ample evidence supported findings of impairment and refusal.

Minor misapprehensions of evidence were found to be immaterial and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellate court concluded that the verdicts were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed a criminal conviction alleging that the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact, misapplied the credibility framework from R. v. W. (D.), and failed to consider inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended his videotaped police statement regarding whether he had been making out with the complainant.

The court held that the trial judge accurately reflected the appellant’s evidence as clarified during cross-examination and therefore did not misapprehend the evidence.

The court further held that there was no meaningful inconsistency in the complainant’s testimony and that the trial judge properly applied the R. v. W. (D.) framework.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s finding that breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable” as required for the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c).

The appellant argued that the trial judge relied on inadmissible hearsay and improperly reversed the burden of proof.

The court held that the trial judge reasonably concluded that police acted promptly in the circumstances, including delays caused by right-to-counsel consultations and the breath technician processing another detainee.

The appeal court found no error of law and upheld the application of the presumption of identity.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assault contrary to s. 266 of the Criminal Code arising from allegations that he struck his spouse while driving.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable, that the trial judge improperly dismissed defence evidence, misapprehended evidence, and failed to provide coherent reasons.

The court held that credibility determinations are primarily matters for the trier of fact and found no error in law or manifest error in the appreciation of the evidence.

Independent eyewitness testimony and corroborative observations by police supported the conviction.

The court concluded that the verdict was reasonably supported by the evidence and that the trial judge’s reasons were sufficient for appellate review.

The appellant appealed a firearms prohibition and forfeiture order made under section 117.05(4) of the Criminal Code.

The order was initially granted after the appellant, a university student, wrote disturbing comments on an exam, prompting police to seize his lawfully owned firearms.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the hearing judge erred in law by shifting the burden of proof from the Crown to the appellant and by relying on irrelevant considerations such as the number of firearms owned.

The order was set aside and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The appellant appealed convictions for breaching a recognizance contrary to s. 145 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the identification evidence was unreliable and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The convictions arose after police officers arrested an individual outside an apartment and later discovered he had provided a false identity.

The trial judge relied primarily on the arresting officer’s observations and subsequent recognition of the accused from a photograph, with limited confirmatory evidence from another officer.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge properly applied the governing principles regarding eyewitness identification and the standard for unreasonable verdicts.

The appellate court concluded that the evidence was reasonably capable of supporting the convictions and that no reversible error occurred.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault with a weapon and mischief under the Criminal Code following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appeal argued that the trial judge improperly rejected the appellant’s evidence and misapplied the rule in Browne v. Dunn when assessing credibility.

The Crown conceded that the rule had been misapplied and that the error likely affected the credibility assessment of both the complainant and the accused.

The court held that the misapplication could have affected the outcome because the accused needed only to raise a reasonable doubt.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered, after which the Crown directed that the charges be stayed under s. 579.1 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assault, arguing that the trial judge improperly limited cross-examination of the complainant regarding a reconciliation letter, thereby denying the right to make full answer and defence.

The appellant submitted that the proposed questioning was relevant to credibility and supported by the principles governing cross-examination and the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The respondent argued the questioning concerned a collateral issue and that the trial judge properly exercised discretion to limit it.

The court held the proposed line of questioning was collateral and that, even if limiting it was erroneous, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexually assaulting two minor complainants.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility under the W.(D.) framework and in refusing to allow his counsel to cross-examine the complainants on their victim impact statements at sentencing.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility findings were supported by the evidence and his reasons were sufficient for appellate review.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by effectively denying defence counsel the opportunity to establish an 'air of reality' to justify cross-examining the complainants on their victim impact statements.

The matter was remitted for a fresh sentencing hearing.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for impaired driving and failing to provide a breath sample.

The convictions arose from a motor vehicle collision where the appellant was found in the passenger seat of a vehicle, and there was conflicting evidence regarding whether he was the driver.

The appellant also argued his failure to provide a breath sample was not voluntary due to extreme intoxication.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to reconcile conflicting evidence on critical issues and failed to provide sufficient reasons to allow for meaningful appellate review.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed after a guilty plea to sexual assault in which the trial judge granted the accused an absolute discharge.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge erred by emphasizing rehabilitation and failing to properly consider denunciation and deterrence, and sought to introduce fresh evidence consisting of a victim impact statement and regional sexual assault statistics.

The court applied the Palmer criteria for fresh evidence and denied the application, finding the material was available at the time of sentencing and unlikely to affect the outcome.

On the merits, the court held the sentencing judge had considered the relevant principles and that the sentence, though unusual, was not demonstrably unfit.

Deference to the sentencing judge was warranted.

The appellant appealed a conviction for breach of probation under s. 733.1 of the Criminal Code for failing to attend and actively participate in counselling as directed by a probation officer.

The appellant argued that the evidence did not establish the requisite mens rea because he never expressly refused to attend counselling and was advised he could apply to vary the probation condition.

The court reviewed the standard of appellate intervention and found the trial judge’s findings were supported by the evidence.

The trial judge reasonably inferred intent from the appellant’s repeated failure to take any steps to attend the required program despite multiple reminders and written instructions.

The conviction was upheld.

The applicant, self-represented, sought public funding for the cost of trial transcripts required to perfect a pending summary conviction appeal from convictions for assault.

The court considered the principles analogous to Criminal Code s. 684 governing publicly funded assistance for appeals, including whether the interests of justice required funding and whether the applicant had insufficient means.

The court found the evidentiary record did not establish financial inability, as the applicant provided no detailed evidence of assets or liabilities.

The court also concluded the appeal lacked merit and that the interests of justice did not require public funding, particularly given the conditional discharge sentence and the absence of liberty interests at stake.

The application for transcript funding was dismissed.