Michael A. Smith

The accused, Nehemiah S. Campbell, was charged on a seven-count indictment arising from a shooting incident in downtown Ottawa.

The Crown alleged the accused was the individual who returned fire with a 9mm handgun after being shot by occupants of a white sedan.

The court found the accused guilty on five counts: reckless discharge of a firearm, possessing a firearm while prohibited, possessing a loaded prohibited firearm without a license, possession of a prohibited firearm, and breach of recognizance.

The court dismissed charges of unlawfully causing bodily harm and using a firearm while committing that offence, finding the innocent bystander was wounded by the initial shooter, not the accused.

The judgment relied heavily on video surveillance, forensic evidence (blood spatter matching the accused), and the recovery of the 9mm handgun with the accused's blood-stained wallet.

The court rejected the defence's theory as speculative, concluding the circumstantial evidence proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused, K.G.A. and A.S.A., were charged with human trafficking, receiving a material benefit from human trafficking, advertising sexual services, and K.G.A. was also charged with criminal harassment.

The charges stemmed from allegations by P.J., who claimed she was exploited in the sex trade in Ottawa.

The court conducted a thorough assessment of P.J.'s credibility and reliability, finding significant inconsistencies, memory issues due to intoxication and drug use, and evasiveness in her testimony.

The court concluded that it would be dangerous to convict the accused based on P.J.'s evidence.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the conduct or purpose elements for human trafficking, the material benefit, or the advertising charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

For criminal harassment, the alleged words were not found to be threatening or intimidating to a reasonable person in the circumstances.

All charges against K.G.A. and A.S.A. were dismissed, and acquittals were entered.

Gino Langevin pleaded guilty to manslaughter for killing his partner during a cocaine-induced psychotic episode.

The court considered sentencing principles, mitigating factors (pro-social life, remorse, guilty plea, limited impact of self-induced psychosis), and aggravating factors (deliberate long-term cocaine use, domestic context, use of a weapon against two people, limited insight).

The court rejected characterizing the offence as "near murder" or "near accident" and imposed an 8-year incarceration sentence, less 1787 days for presentence custody, along with a mandatory DNA order and a lifetime firearms prohibition.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexually assaulting two minor complainants.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility under the W.(D.) framework and in refusing to allow his counsel to cross-examine the complainants on their victim impact statements at sentencing.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility findings were supported by the evidence and his reasons were sufficient for appellate review.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by effectively denying defence counsel the opportunity to establish an 'air of reality' to justify cross-examining the complainants on their victim impact statements.

The matter was remitted for a fresh sentencing hearing.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari and mandamus to overturn a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the respondents on charges of first degree murder and commit them on second degree murder.

The Crown argued the judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences, usurping the role of the trier of fact, and failing to consider the whole of the evidence regarding planning and deliberation and unlawful confinement.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding the preliminary inquiry judge correctly applied the test for committal and did not commit any jurisdictional error in concluding there was insufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to return a verdict of first degree murder.