Mark Moors

The accused, Jorden Larocque-Laplante, was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The court was tasked with determining the period of parole ineligibility, which could range from 10 to 25 years.

The judge considered the accused's character, the brutal nature and circumstances of the offence (including a hate-motivated element), the jury's recommendations, and the devastating impact on the victim's family.

Despite mitigating factors such as youth and remorse, the significant aggravating factors led the court to impose a parole ineligibility period of 13 years.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, sought to have the partial defence of provocation left to the jury.

The Crown argued there was no air of reality to the defence.

The court applied the five-component air of reality test for provocation under s. 232 of the Criminal Code, considering both objective and subjective elements.

The court found that there was sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to have a reasonable doubt regarding the Crown disproving the elements of provocation, particularly concerning whether the victim's conduct constituted an indictable offence and whether it would deprive an ordinary person of self-control, despite the accused initiating the confrontation.

The court ruled that the defence of provocation would be left with the jury.

The applicant, who was convicted of manslaughter, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, arguing that the delay of approximately six years and seven months from the date of charge to the anticipated end of his trial was unreasonable under s. 11(b).

The court applied the Jordan framework and determined that the delay attributable to certiorari proceedings and appeals therefrom should be excluded from the calculation.

The court found that the net delay was well below the 30-month ceiling.

Alternatively, even if the appellate delay was included, deductions for defence delay and exceptional circumstances (including discrete events and case complexity) brought the delay below the ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of manslaughter for his role in a home invasion and robbery that resulted in the shooting death of a 19-year-old victim.

The accused provided information and assistance to the perpetrators but was not present during the home invasion and did not have subjective foresight of death.

The court weighed the serious aggravating factors of a planned home invasion for greed against mitigating factors including the accused's youth, lack of criminal record, and adherence to bail conditions over five years.

The accused was sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment, less 17 months' credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, sought release from custody pending trial.

The court assessed the proposed release plan, which included a surety (the accused's mother) and electronic monitoring, against the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention under the Criminal Code.

The court found the surety to be unreliable due to past inability to control the accused and a lack of understanding regarding previous bail conditions.

The electronic monitoring was deemed insufficient given the weak surety.

The court concluded that the accused failed to demonstrate that his detention was not necessary for public protection or to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, particularly given the serious and violent nature of the alleged offence and the apparent strength of the prosecution's case.

Bail was denied.

The Crown sought to admit certain text messages for the truth of their contents in a criminal trial.

The Defence objected, citing concerns about necessity and reliability under the principled approach to hearsay.

The court ruled that two of the four contested text messages were admissible for the truth of their contents under the present intentions and co-conspirators’ exceptions to the hearsay rule, finding that they met the necessity and reliability requirements despite the declarant's availability.

The other two messages were deemed to lack probative value for their truth.

During a trial, the Crown sought to introduce intercepted telephone conversations to show the state of mind of the witnesses, rather than for the truth of their contents.

The defence objected, arguing the Crown must first attempt to refresh the witnesses' memories or establish past recollection recorded.

The court ruled that the intercepted communications were admissible as real evidence without a preliminary voir dire or the need to exhaust the witnesses' memories, allowing the Crown to play the recordings and ask the witnesses to comment.

Sam Tsega was charged with second-degree murder.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of Tsega's marijuana use and dealing to establish opportunity, motive, context, and witness credibility.

The defense argued inadmissibility due to lack of support for inferences and prejudicial effect outweighing probative value.

The court applied the Handy/L.B. framework, finding the evidence relevant and material to central issues, and while discreditable, its probative value significantly outweighed any minimal prejudice, especially in a judge-alone trial.

The evidence was deemed admissible.

The Crown sought to admit out-of-court statements made by two accomplices who refused to testify at the accused's trial for second degree murder.

The accomplices had previously given statements to police and one had testified at his own trial.

Applying the principled approach to hearsay, the court found that the police statements met the test for threshold reliability due to corroborating evidence and circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.

However, the court excluded the prior trial testimony of one accomplice, finding that the leading cross-examination by the Crown at that trial undermined its reliability and admission would negatively impact trial fairness.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari and mandamus to overturn a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the respondents on charges of first degree murder and commit them on second degree murder.

The Crown argued the judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences, usurping the role of the trier of fact, and failing to consider the whole of the evidence regarding planning and deliberation and unlawful confinement.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding the preliminary inquiry judge correctly applied the test for committal and did not commit any jurisdictional error in concluding there was insufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to return a verdict of first degree murder.