Michelle O’Doherty

The prosecution alleged a police sergeant unlawfully entered and searched a private apartment, directed arrests and detention, and later altered an official occurrence report to fabricate grounds for entry.

The court found no lawful grounds, no exigent circumstances, and no fresh-pursuit basis, and accepted evidence that the impugned narrative was inserted after the fact.

Applying the breach-of-trust framework, the court held the conduct was a marked departure from expected standards and was undertaken for personal, non-public purposes.

The court also found the report-editing and related falsehoods proved obstruct justice beyond a reasonable doubt.

Convictions were entered on both counts.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking in cocaine (55.29 grams) and failure to comply with a release order.

The Crown sought two years imprisonment while defence counsel sought six months less one day.

The court imposed a 12-month custodial sentence, considering the seriousness of cocaine trafficking, the offender's status as a mid-level trafficker motivated by financial gain, and significant mitigating factors including the offender's youth, genuine remorse, strong family support, reasonable prospects for rehabilitation, and social context evidence regarding systemic discrimination affecting the offender as a Black man.

The sentence was reduced from a proportionate 24 months due to the offender's existing significant penitentiary sentence and the mitigating circumstances presented.

This decision concerns the prosecution of Victor Perez for multiple sexual offences against a 12-year-old complainant, H.D. The court addresses the admissibility and credibility of evidence, the application of the defence of mistake of age, and the sufficiency of steps taken by the accused to ascertain the complainant’s age.

The court finds Perez guilty on six counts, including invitation to sexual touching, sexual assault, sexual interference, luring, and making child pornography, but not guilty on a count of breaching a prohibition order.

The judgment provides detailed analysis of the law on circumstantial evidence, credibility, child witness evidence, and the legal standards for mistake of age and sexual offences involving minors.

The court considers a second discreditable conduct application by the Crown in a sexual offences prosecution.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of the accused’s prior conviction for sexual interference and the circumstances of the prior complainant’s presentation, to undermine the accused’s claim of honest but mistaken belief in age and to show recklessness.

The court finds both groupings of evidence inadmissible, concluding that their probative value is limited and outweighed by the risk of distraction and prejudice, especially given the factual dissimilarities between the prior and current complainants.

The application is dismissed.

The accused, Anessa Katapatuk, pleaded guilty to simple assault and uttering threats.

The Crown sought 12 months jail, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court, applying Gladue and Ipeelee principles, found that a conditional discharge with 12 months probation was appropriate, emphasizing the accused's reduced moral blameworthiness due to her traumatic Indigenous background and systemic factors.

The judge concluded that incarceration would be contrary to the public interest and the rehabilitative goals of sentencing for an Indigenous offender.

The Crown brought an application to introduce prior discreditable conduct evidence against the accused, Victor Perez, who is charged with multiple sexual offences against a 12-year-old complainant (H.D.).

The Crown sought to admit the evidence for several purposes, including demonstrating the accused's awareness of legal requirements for ascertaining age, his awareness of legal jeopardy, to rebut innocent intent or mistake, and to explain his access to a park and communication breaks.

The court dismissed the application for all proposed purposes, finding that the evidence was either immaterial, lacked sufficient probative value, or that its prejudicial effect significantly outweighed any probative value.

The court emphasized that the accused's knowledge of the law on "reasonable steps" was not a material issue, and that similarities between prior and current conduct were not "striking" enough to establish identity or specific propensity, especially given the more serious nature of the prior conviction.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and extortion, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

However, the court deducted 73 days of defence delay attributed to the late notice of the s. 11(b) application, bringing the net delay below the ceiling.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments that a conflict in the Crown's office and a change in the assigned trial judge constituted exceptional circumstances.

The application was dismissed.

Mark Cameron was found guilty of break and enter with intent, robbery with a firearm, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and possession of cocaine.

This decision outlines the reasons for his sentence.

The court considered the circumstances of the home invasion-style robbery, the significant impact on the victims, Mr. Cameron's dated but extensive criminal record including prior robberies, and his personal circumstances.

The court applied sentencing principles, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, while also considering rehabilitation and the parity principle with co-accused.

The court granted a two-year credit for pre-sentence custody and onerous bail conditions.

A global sentence of 8 years imprisonment was imposed, reduced to 6 years after credits.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for violent offences, appealed the Ontario Review Board's (Board) decision to maintain a detention order, seeking a conditional or absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's finding that the appellant still posed a significant threat to public safety.

However, the Court found the Board's decision to impose a detention order, rather than a conditional discharge, unreasonable because it failed to adequately explain why the appellant's risk could not be managed under a conditional discharge, particularly given the Hospital's recommendation for a conditional discharge and expert evidence regarding medication compliance and monitoring.

The matter was remitted to the Board for a rehearing.

The accused, Jorden Larocque-Laplante, was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The court was tasked with determining the period of parole ineligibility, which could range from 10 to 25 years.

The judge considered the accused's character, the brutal nature and circumstances of the offence (including a hate-motivated element), the jury's recommendations, and the devastating impact on the victim's family.

Despite mitigating factors such as youth and remorse, the significant aggravating factors led the court to impose a parole ineligibility period of 13 years.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, sought to have the partial defence of provocation left to the jury.

The Crown argued there was no air of reality to the defence.

The court applied the five-component air of reality test for provocation under s. 232 of the Criminal Code, considering both objective and subjective elements.

The court found that there was sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to have a reasonable doubt regarding the Crown disproving the elements of provocation, particularly concerning whether the victim's conduct constituted an indictable offence and whether it would deprive an ordinary person of self-control, despite the accused initiating the confrontation.

The court ruled that the defence of provocation would be left with the jury.