Dawn Joy Dickinson

This decision concerns the prosecution of Victor Perez for multiple sexual offences against a 12-year-old complainant, H.D. The court addresses the admissibility and credibility of evidence, the application of the defence of mistake of age, and the sufficiency of steps taken by the accused to ascertain the complainant’s age.

The court finds Perez guilty on six counts, including invitation to sexual touching, sexual assault, sexual interference, luring, and making child pornography, but not guilty on a count of breaching a prohibition order.

The judgment provides detailed analysis of the law on circumstantial evidence, credibility, child witness evidence, and the legal standards for mistake of age and sexual offences involving minors.

The court considers a second discreditable conduct application by the Crown in a sexual offences prosecution.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of the accused’s prior conviction for sexual interference and the circumstances of the prior complainant’s presentation, to undermine the accused’s claim of honest but mistaken belief in age and to show recklessness.

The court finds both groupings of evidence inadmissible, concluding that their probative value is limited and outweighed by the risk of distraction and prejudice, especially given the factual dissimilarities between the prior and current complainants.

The application is dismissed.

This decision addresses the propriety and timing of a post-verdict section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay in trial.

The accused, B.S., was convicted of multiple sexual offences after a lengthy trial involving multiple sets of charges.

The application was brought months after conviction, despite the trial dates being set well in advance and no prior complaints about delay.

The court emphasized the duty of the accused to act proactively and raise delay concerns in a timely manner, referencing the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in R. v. Jordan and R. v. J.F. The court found that much of the delay was caused or implicitly waived by the defence, and that the late application deprived the Crown and court of the opportunity to address delay.

The application was summarily dismissed, with the court underscoring that post-trial 11(b) applications should only be brought in rare and exceptional circumstances.

The Crown brought an application to introduce prior discreditable conduct evidence against the accused, Victor Perez, who is charged with multiple sexual offences against a 12-year-old complainant (H.D.).

The Crown sought to admit the evidence for several purposes, including demonstrating the accused's awareness of legal requirements for ascertaining age, his awareness of legal jeopardy, to rebut innocent intent or mistake, and to explain his access to a park and communication breaks.

The court dismissed the application for all proposed purposes, finding that the evidence was either immaterial, lacked sufficient probative value, or that its prejudicial effect significantly outweighed any probative value.

The court emphasized that the accused's knowledge of the law on "reasonable steps" was not a material issue, and that similarities between prior and current conduct were not "striking" enough to establish identity or specific propensity, especially given the more serious nature of the prior conviction.