Goher Irfan

This decision addresses the sentencing of J.P., a 31-year-old man convicted of sexual interference with a vulnerable 14-year-old Indigenous, Autistic girl under the influence of alcohol, cannabis, and Xanax (which he supplied).

The court considered the offender's extensive criminal and substance abuse history, the victim's vulnerability, and relevant sentencing principles under the Criminal Code.

The judge imposed a five-year penitentiary sentence, a ten-year firearm prohibition, DNA order, and multiple lifetime prohibitions related to contact and employment involving minors.

The decision also discusses the application of the "mistake of age" defence and the importance of proportionality in sentencing sexual offences against children.

This decision involves the trial of C.L. charged with mischief, uttering threats, and aggravated assault against V.L. The accused pleaded guilty to uttering threats but denied the other charges.

The case centered on conflicting accounts regarding whether C.L. caused injuries to V.L. by kicking her down stairs and damaging her property.

The Court conducted a detailed credibility assessment, applying the W.(D.) test and principles from recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on reasonable doubt and witness reliability.

The judge found C.L.'s explanations inconsistent and untruthful, particularly regarding the cause of V.L.'s injuries and the damage to the bedroom wall.

The Court accepted V.L.'s testimony and concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that C.L. committed mischief and aggravated assault by causing V.L. to fall down the stairs, resulting in a spinal fracture.

This decision addresses whether a conditional discharge is appropriate for two counts of assault against a former intimate partner.

The accused, D.M., was found guilty of two assaults but acquitted of more serious charges involving weapons.

The Court carefully considered the facts, the accused’s background, completion of a Partner Assault Response Program, and the principles of sentencing under the Criminal Code, including denunciation and deterrence in intimate partner violence cases.

The Court concluded that a conditional discharge with two years probation and counselling was appropriate, emphasizing the individualized nature of sentencing and the importance of balancing public interest with rehabilitation.

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced J.S. for assault and sexual assault of his 14-year-old step-sister, JM.

The court considered the offender's extensive criminal record, Indigenous background, and the Gladue report, balancing aggravating factors such as abuse of trust and the nature of the sexual offence with mitigating factors including the offender's willingness to engage in treatment and community support.

The court imposed a two-year less one day conditional sentence with 12 months of house arrest and electronic monitoring, concurrent probation, and various ancillary orders, emphasizing rehabilitation and long-term supervision over incarceration.

The Ontario Court of Justice convicted J.P. of sexual assault and sexual interference involving a 14-year-old complainant, KJ.

The accused was found not guilty of administering a noxious substance.

The case involved complex issues of consent, intoxication, and mistake of age.

The court carefully assessed the credibility and reliability of witnesses, including the complainant, her mother, friends, and the accused.

Despite some inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, the judge found her credible on the key issue of non-consent.

The accused’s claim of honest but mistaken belief in consent and age was rejected due to recklessness in failing to take all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age.

The court also held that the complainant was not so intoxicated as to lack capacity to consent.

The accused’s failure to ensure explicit consent to sexual intercourse was critical to the conviction.

This decision addresses the propriety and timing of a post-verdict section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay in trial.

The accused, B.S., was convicted of multiple sexual offences after a lengthy trial involving multiple sets of charges.

The application was brought months after conviction, despite the trial dates being set well in advance and no prior complaints about delay.

The court emphasized the duty of the accused to act proactively and raise delay concerns in a timely manner, referencing the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in R. v. Jordan and R. v. J.F. The court found that much of the delay was caused or implicitly waived by the defence, and that the late application deprived the Crown and court of the opportunity to address delay.

The application was summarily dismissed, with the court underscoring that post-trial 11(b) applications should only be brought in rare and exceptional circumstances.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and assault arising from incidents during a deteriorating intimate relationship.

The complainant alleged non-consensual anal intercourse, choking during sexual activity, and several physical assaults during domestic disputes.

The accused denied the allegations and testified that the sexual acts were consensual and that any physical contact was defensive.

Applying the W.(D.) credibility framework, the court accepted the accused’s evidence and found significant inconsistencies and reliability concerns in the complainant’s testimony.

The Crown failed to prove the offences beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was acquitted on all remaining counts.

This judgment concerns a murder trial where the accused, Brandon Lamoureux, was charged with the fatal stabbing of Gilbert Rumleskie.

The central issue was the identification of the stabber, with conflicting and unreliable witness testimonies from Jordan Plumb and Ashley Dombroskie, and circumstantial evidence including grainy surveillance video and DNA analysis.

The court meticulously assessed the credibility of all witnesses, noting significant inconsistencies and admitted lies from the Crown's key witnesses.

Despite evidence of animus and prior threats by the accused towards the victim, the court found a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused or Jordan Plumb, whose knife was the murder weapon and bore his DNA, inflicted the fatal wound.

The court emphasized that circumstantial evidence must be rationally inconsistent with any other conclusion than guilt, and that reasonable inferences consistent with innocence can arise from a lack of evidence.

Ultimately, the court found the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with multiple offences, including sexual assault and assault, against his younger step-sister.

The trial turned on the assessment of credibility and reliability under the W.(D.) framework.

The court found the accused guilty of assault for a choking incident and guilty of sexual assault for coercing the complainant to strip, finding that such coercive, demeaning conduct without physical touching can constitute sexual assault.

The accused was acquitted of invitation to sexual touching as the Crown failed to prove the complainant's age at the time of the offence.

This is a sentencing decision for an individual (G.S.) who pleaded guilty to distributing an intimate image without consent and possession of a firearm without a licence.

The court considered the appropriate sentence, weighing aggravating factors (breach of trust, degrading nature of the offence) against significant mitigating factors, including the offender's lack of prior record, extremely deprived and abusive childhood, and diagnosed mental illnesses (PTSD and Major Depressive Disorder).

The court distinguished the case from others involving widespread public dissemination or lack of remorse.

Ultimately, the judge imposed a conditional sentence of ten months (with six months house arrest) followed by two years probation for the intimate image offence, and a suspended sentence with one year concurrent probation for the firearms offence, along with a weapons prohibition and forfeiture order.

The offender, Francois Gauthier, was found guilty of two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

This decision addresses the sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as high speed, prior speeding ticket, conscious decision to continue driving with a compromised vehicle, and significant impact on victims.

Mitigating factors included no prior driving offences and genuine remorse.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, rejecting a conditional sentence due to the seriousness of the offence and the offender's history of non-compliance with court orders.

A sentence of nine months imprisonment, followed by one year of probation with conditions addressing substance abuse and impulsive behaviour, and a three-year driving prohibition was imposed.

The victim fine surcharge was waived, and a transfer to Quebec for sentence service was recommended.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his intimate partner over several years by digitally penetrating her, engaging in intercourse, and performing oral sex while she was asleep.

The defence denied all allegations and argued fabrication motivated by relationship conflict and custody issues.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the complainant credible and rejected the accused’s denials.

The court accepted that repeated non‑consensual sexual touching occurred while the complainant was unconscious, which negated the possibility of lawful consent under the Criminal Code.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault.

This ruling addresses the Crown's application to admit evidence of discreditable conduct against the respondent, who is charged with second-degree murder.

The court admitted evidence of specific threats involving a knife made by the respondent to the deceased shortly before the killing, and a prior incident where the respondent brandished a knife and stabbed a motel room wall in the deceased's presence.

However, the court declined to admit evidence of the respondent's prior convictions for weapon possession, robbery (involving knife brandishing), and assault with a weapon, finding their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value, particularly on the central issue of who possessed the murder weapon.

This ruling addresses an application by the Crown to remove defence counsel due to an apparent conflict of interest.

Defence counsel represented the accused in a murder trial while also representing the mother of the Crown's key witness in an unrelated criminal matter.

The court found a significant appearance of divided loyalties, particularly concerning the cross-examination of the key witness whose credibility was central to the defence theory.

Despite the accused's desire to retain counsel and counsel's assertion of no actual conflict, the court prioritized public confidence in the administration of justice and ordered the removal of counsel.

The accused, François Gauthier, was charged with two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm following a multi-vehicle collision on Highway 17.

The court found Gauthier's testimony regarding mechanical issues and controlled maneuvers to be incredible, concluding that his driving was objectively dangerous and a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable driver, largely due to his excessive speed and unsafe lane changes.

However, the court acquitted Gauthier on the impaired driving charges, finding that the expert toxicological evidence, while showing the presence of drugs, could not definitively establish impairment at the time of driving due to individual variability and lack of specific testing.

This judgment addresses alleged breaches of the accused's Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) during an impaired driving investigation.

The court found a breach of the right against unreasonable search (s. 8) due to a warrantless vehicle search, a serious breach of the right not to be arbitrarily detained (s. 9) due to prolonged detention without considering release options, and a breach of the right to counsel (s. 10(b)) due to delayed notification and imposed duty counsel.

As a remedy under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the breath readings, finding that their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, particularly due to the arbitrary overholding.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a breath demand.

The defense argued for Charter breaches and that the Crown failed to prove an unequivocal refusal.

The court found that the police provided misleading information regarding the consequences of refusal, leading the accused to believe he would have another opportunity to provide a sample at the station.

The court also criticized the lack of detailed notes by the officer regarding the alleged refusal.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove the mens rea element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was found not guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and refusing to comply with a breath demand.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) rights.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused and that the police provided reasonable opportunities for the accused to contact counsel of choice, which he failed to diligently pursue.

The court found the accused guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample, as he intentionally placed an invalid condition on his compliance.

However, the court acquitted the accused of impaired driving, finding a reasonable doubt as to whether his ability to drive was impaired by alcohol.

The court addressed whether it lost jurisdiction over a trial when the accused was disconnected from a virtual hearing for 15 minutes during evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving.

The court considered the right to be present at trial, the less formal nature of summary conviction proceedings, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on court operations.

The judge ruled against declaring a mistrial, finding that alternative remedies, such as providing the accused with a transcript and recording of the missed evidence and resuming the trial in person, could cure any prejudice and ensure a fair trial.

C.C., a young person, was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, J.M., testified that C.C. touched her buttocks without consent after she verbally protested.

The court applied the principles of consent from R. v. Ewanchuk and R. v. Barton, finding that J.M.'s subsequent "freezing" or passivity did not constitute consent.

The court determined that C.C. did not take reasonable steps to ascertain consent and was reckless in continuing the sexual touching despite J.M.'s protests.

The Crown proved both the actus reus and mens rea of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

C.C. was found guilty.