Jamie Bocking

This judgment concerns a murder trial where the accused, Brandon Lamoureux, was charged with the fatal stabbing of Gilbert Rumleskie.

The central issue was the identification of the stabber, with conflicting and unreliable witness testimonies from Jordan Plumb and Ashley Dombroskie, and circumstantial evidence including grainy surveillance video and DNA analysis.

The court meticulously assessed the credibility of all witnesses, noting significant inconsistencies and admitted lies from the Crown's key witnesses.

Despite evidence of animus and prior threats by the accused towards the victim, the court found a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused or Jordan Plumb, whose knife was the murder weapon and bore his DNA, inflicted the fatal wound.

The court emphasized that circumstantial evidence must be rationally inconsistent with any other conclusion than guilt, and that reasonable inferences consistent with innocence can arise from a lack of evidence.

Ultimately, the court found the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Rudi Sawatzky brought an application seeking dismissal of criminal charges and various injunctive orders against unspecified individuals or organizations.

The court found that the application was not supported by admissible evidence, the procedure for seeking injunctive relief was improper as parties were not served, and the arguments presented were pseudolegal.

The court summarily dismissed all requested relief, emphasizing that such arguments waste judicial resources and should be summarily rejected.

Mohamad Sleiman ("Moe") pleaded guilty to sexual interference and sexual assault of a 15-year-old complainant (T.P.) due to her age, and two probation breaches.

He pleaded not guilty to forcible confinement, threat to cause death, and threat to cause bodily harm to T.P.'s family.

A Gardiner hearing was also held to determine aggravating facts for sentencing on the guilty pleas.

The court assessed T.P.'s credibility, which was central to the Crown's case, and found her evidence to be thoroughly undermined by contradictions, implausibilities, and selective memory, particularly when confronted with other evidence like video surveillance and text messages.

The testimony of other witnesses (S.M.D. and S.S.) further contradicted T.P.'s account of her relationship with Moe and the events of the incident.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that T.P. was forcibly confined, threatened, or that the sexual intercourse was involuntary.

The applicant sought a review of his detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, proposing a new surety and GPS ankle monitoring as new evidence.

The court found the proposed surety lacked credibility and that GPS monitoring was insufficient to mitigate the substantial likelihood of the applicant reoffending.

The application was dismissed as the new evidence did not meet the Palmer test to justify a review of the initial detention order.

The applicants brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that their rights to trial within a reasonable time had been violated by delay exceeding 20 months between accusation and trial.

The applicants argued that Crown delay of approximately 7 months and institutional delay of approximately 8.5 months, combined with inherent and actual prejudice, rendered a fair trial impossible.

The Crown countered that much of the delay was neutral, resulting from mutual agreement of all counsel to delay trial pending exhaustive negotiations on resolution.

The court found that the bulk of the delay resulted from a mutual understanding among all counsel to postpone setting an early trial date to permit further investigation and reconsideration of reasonable prospect of conviction, particularly regarding identification evidence.

The court concluded that s. 11(b) was not breached, as the delay fell within Morin guidelines for a serious multi-accused prosecution, and any actual prejudice was attributable to the fact of the charges rather than the delay itself.