Gilles Renaud

The Town of Oakville appealed the dismissal of charges against a mobile sign company for violating the town's sign by-law.

The trial judge found section 39(3) of the by-law, which restricted third-party advertising signs to E1 and E2 industrial zones, violated freedom of expression under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and was not justified under section 1.

The appellate court reversed, finding the trial judge erred in failing to accord appropriate deference to municipal policy decisions, mischaracterizing the nature of commercial expression, and failing to properly apply the minimal impairment test under the Oakes framework.

The court upheld the by-law as rationally connected to legitimate municipal objectives and proportionate to those objectives.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon (cordless telephone) against his former intimate partner.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 120 days, citing the aggravating factors of domestic violence, prior assaults on the same victim, and breach of trust.

The defence sought an intermittent sentence of 30 days or house arrest of 60 days, emphasizing the guilty plea, pre-sentence custody, volunteer work, and community support.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of four months, finding that a conditional sentence was inconsistent with sentencing principles in domestic violence cases.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as paramount objectives.

The accused, R.G.1, was charged with sexual exploitation of a minor under section 153(1.1) of the Criminal Code.

The complainant, M. JCP, alleged sexual contact occurred between September 1, 2007 and March 31, 2008, when he was between 16 and 18 years old.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction.

The trial judge found the complainant's testimony credible despite significant credibility issues, including a history of lying, substance abuse, and violent behavior.

The court accepted that sexual contact occurred in a bathtub at the accused's residence on the military base in Rockliffe, Ottawa.

The accused was found to be in a position of trust or authority over the complainant based on their relationship history, age difference, financial control, and emotional dependency.

The court convicted the accused of one count of sexual exploitation.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, impaired operation, and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited concentration of blood alcohol following an incident on Highway 417 on April 9, 2011.

The defence challenged the admissibility of breath readings on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) regarding reasonable grounds for arrest, failure to facilitate access to counsel due to language barriers, and failure to follow R. v. Prosper procedures when the accused changed his mind about contacting counsel.

The court found the arrest was properly justified based on the totality of circumstances, that the accused understood his rights to counsel despite speaking broken English, and that no Prosper violation occurred as the accused made an informed decision to defer contacting counsel.

The breath readings were admitted as evidence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 263(1) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged whether the Crown had established that the breath samples were received directly into an approved instrument, as required by section 258(1)(c)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found that the Crown had satisfied this requirement through circumstantial evidence, including the officer's testimony regarding the Intoxilyzer 8000C, the mouthpiece mechanism, the two samples provided, and the resulting readings.

The accused was found guilty.

The applicants brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that their rights to trial within a reasonable time had been violated by delay exceeding 20 months between accusation and trial.

The applicants argued that Crown delay of approximately 7 months and institutional delay of approximately 8.5 months, combined with inherent and actual prejudice, rendered a fair trial impossible.

The Crown countered that much of the delay was neutral, resulting from mutual agreement of all counsel to delay trial pending exhaustive negotiations on resolution.

The court found that the bulk of the delay resulted from a mutual understanding among all counsel to postpone setting an early trial date to permit further investigation and reconsideration of reasonable prospect of conviction, particularly regarding identification evidence.

The court concluded that s. 11(b) was not breached, as the delay fell within Morin guidelines for a serious multi-accused prosecution, and any actual prejudice was attributable to the fact of the charges rather than the delay itself.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography and one count of accessing child pornography.

The offender obtained approximately 616 electronic files containing child pornography depicting children aged 6 to 12 years old engaged in various forms of sexual exploitation and abuse.

The court imposed a sentence of 9 months imprisonment followed by 24 months probation, considering the gravity of the offence, the mandatory minimum jail term, the offender's guilty plea, positive pre-sentence report, low risk of reoffending, and rehabilitative potential, while emphasizing the objectives of denunciation and deterrence under section 718.01 of the Criminal Code.

Following conviction on multiple firearm offences, the Crown applied for revocation of the accused's bail pending sentencing.

The court granted the application, ordering detention until sentencing.

The accused was convicted of six offences including possession of a loaded restricted handgun contrary to section 95 of the Criminal Code (mandatory minimum three years imprisonment), transportation of a firearm in a careless manner, and possession of a firearm while subject to a weapons prohibition.

The court found that the tertiary and secondary grounds under section 515(10) of the Criminal Code justified the exceptional order to revoke bail post-conviction.