Abby Jaclyn Tenenbaum Brass

Abubakar Bukardikwa was convicted of 12 counts related to a shooting incident where he fired a semi-automatic handgun multiple times in a public parking lot, striking the victim, Jason Lamarche, three times in the leg.

The court considered sentencing principles including denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, balancing them with the offender's youth and first-offender status.

The decision applied the Kienapple principle for conditional stays and extensively discussed pre-sentence custody credits (Summers and Duncan).

The Crown sought a total of nine years, while the defence proposed five to six years.

The court imposed an effective total sentence of six years, eleven months, and twelve days, comprising a sentence of six years, five months, and twelve days on the charge of discharging a firearm with intent, and a consecutive six-month sentence for possessing a firearm while prohibited.

The accused was charged with six counts: possession of child pornography (s. 163.1(4)), accessing child pornography (s. 163.1(4.1)), breach of undertaking conditions, and voyeurism (s. 162(1)(c)).

The Crown proved that the accused possessed and accessed child pornography on two seized cellphones through forensic analysis demonstrating the accused's exclusive use of the devices, intentional downloading and accessing of images from a specific website, and knowledge of the material's nature.

The accused was also found guilty of surreptitiously recording a child at a shopping mall food court for a sexual purpose, breaching her reasonable expectation of privacy.

The court rejected the defence arguments regarding data integrity, accidental downloading, and the definition of child pornography.

The applicant was injured in two motor vehicle accidents and sought statutory accident benefits.

The parties entered into a settlement agreement, and the applicant signed a full and final release and a settlement disclosure notice.

The applicant subsequently filed a second application seeking payment of a disputed treatment plan, arguing it was not included in the settlement.

The respondent brought a motion to strike the application.

The Tribunal found that the settlement agreement was valid, full, and final, and explicitly included the disputed treatment plan amount.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought a medical benefit for a physiotherapy treatment plan in the amount of $1,501.04 following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent initially denied the benefit but later advised the Tribunal that it had approved the disputed treatment plan.

The adjudicator found that the respondent conceded the claim, resolving the dispute, and noted that the respondent is liable to pay interest on the overdue payment pursuant to s. 51 of the Schedule.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision determining whether there is sufficient evidence to commit seven accused persons to stand trial on charges of attempted murder, aggravated assault, unlawful confinement, and unlawful entry arising from a brutal attack on the victim in the early morning hours of November 17, 2013.

The Crown's theory is that the attack was undertaken in retaliation for an assault on the brother of one of the accused the previous day.

The court applies the prima facie case standard, examining whether there is evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on each element of each charge.

The decision addresses complex issues regarding the mens rea of attempted murder, the admissibility of hearsay statements, the evaluation of circumstantial identification evidence, and the requirements for party liability.

The Crown brought a bail review under ss. 520–521 of the Criminal Code seeking to overturn a justice of the peace’s order releasing the accused on numerous fraud-related charges.

The reviewing judge found legal errors in the justice’s application of the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c), including reliance on a purported prohibition against pre-trial punishment and the imposition of a “maximum force” threshold not found in the legislation or jurisprudence.

Considering the seriousness and escalating nature of the alleged offences, including robbery and possession of a loaded restricted firearm after repeated breaches of release conditions, the court concluded the earlier decision was both legally erroneous and clearly inappropriate.

The release order was set aside and detention ordered to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The Crown brought a section 540(7) application seeking to admit witness statements as evidence at a preliminary inquiry without requiring the witnesses to testify.

The application involved four key witnesses: Jessica Walker, Samantha Daoust, Mark Sudiacal, and Jason Klein.

The Crown sought to admit their statements under the Criminal Code provision that permits justices to receive evidence that would not otherwise be admissible if the justice considers it credible or trustworthy.

The court admitted the statements of Daoust, Sudiacal, and Klein, as well as the videotaped statements of Walker, but excluded Walker's off-camera statement recorded in police notes.

The decision provides comprehensive guidance on the interpretation and application of section 540(7).

The Crown sought reconsideration of a preliminary inquiry judge's ruling denying a section 540(7) application to file transcripts of witness statements.

The initial judge had rejected the application as inadequately presented and lacking sufficient grounding.

The Crown subsequently renewed the application with a fuller record.

The presiding judge ruled that reconsideration was permissible, finding that the initial ruling was not a final determination on the merits of section 540(7) admissibility but rather a rejection of the application as presented.

The judge held that interlocutory evidentiary rulings can be reconsidered where there is no prejudice to the defence and where the interests of justice support reconsideration, particularly in preliminary inquiries where evidentiary errors cannot be appealed.

The accused pleaded guilty to three charges: assaulting a bus driver contrary to section 266, committing that assault while bound by a probation order contrary to section 733.1, and theft of tip money from a restaurant contrary to section 334(b).

The Crown sought 18 months incarceration followed by one year probation.

Defence counsel sought one year custody.

The court rejected the Crown's submission as disproportionate, finding the assault itself was minor in nature despite aggravating circumstances including the reckless endangerment of bus passengers and psychological harm to the victim.

The court imposed a global sentence of 6 months and 9 days incarceration (after crediting 44 days pretrial custody at 1.5:1 ratio), plus 12 months probation.

The Crown applied to revoke the accused's bail after he was found guilty of multiple firearm offences, including possession of a loaded restricted handgun contrary to a weapons prohibition.

The offences carried a mandatory minimum sentence of three years.

The court reviewed the principles governing post-conviction bail revocation, noting the Crown bears a heavy onus.

Applying the secondary and tertiary grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code, the court found that the accused's continued release was contrary to public interest and public safety, given the gravity of the offences and his prior breach of a conditional sentence.

The application was granted and the accused was ordered detained pending sentencing.

Following conviction on multiple firearm offences, the Crown applied for revocation of the accused's bail pending sentencing.

The court granted the application, ordering detention until sentencing.

The accused was convicted of six offences including possession of a loaded restricted handgun contrary to section 95 of the Criminal Code (mandatory minimum three years imprisonment), transportation of a firearm in a careless manner, and possession of a firearm while subject to a weapons prohibition.

The court found that the tertiary and secondary grounds under section 515(10) of the Criminal Code justified the exceptional order to revoke bail post-conviction.