Sean Joseph Maurice White May

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against the respondent for refusing an approved screening device sample.

The trial judge found a s. 9 Charter breach due to the respondent being arbitrarily detained for 74 minutes after arrest while the officer continued investigating Highway Traffic Act offences.

The appeal court upheld the finding of arbitrary detention, clarifying that placing a suspect in a police cruiser, of itself, requires reasonable necessity, and that the trial judge's reliance on *R. v. Aucoin* was correct.

However, the court remitted the matter to the trial judge to reconsider the appropriate remedy, as the Crown had not fully advanced arguments for alternative remedies at trial.

J.R. pleaded guilty to one count of indecent assault male, an offence committed approximately 40 years prior when the victim was 17 and J.R. was 28.

The incident involved attempted anal penetration and occurred while J.R. was in a position of trust as the victim's uncle and a Boy Scout leader.

The court considered aggravating factors including the severe abuse of trust, the victim's vulnerability, the profound psychological harm caused, and the attempted unprotected anal intercourse.

Mitigating factors included J.R.'s age, his guilty plea (though entered on the first day of trial), and his lack of prior criminal record.

Applying the principles from *R. v. Friesen*, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, acknowledging the historical nature of the offence and the limitations on applying modern sentencing ranges.

A sentence of four years imprisonment was imposed, along with ancillary orders for DNA, SOIRA registration, a no-contact order with the victim while in custody, and a weapons prohibition.

The defendant, Kyle Fisher, was charged with failing to provide a breath sample.

The trial proceeded in a blended fashion, addressing both the merits and alleged Charter breaches.

The court found the ASD demand proper and the refusal to comply established.

However, the court found a clear breach of the defendant's s. 9 Charter right against arbitrary detention due to an "overholding" period of 1 hour and 14 minutes, during which the police detained him solely to issue Highway Traffic Act tickets unrelated to the criminal investigation.

Despite the officer's good faith, this detention was deemed an unreasonable exercise of police authority.

The court determined that a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter was the appropriate remedy, as it was an exceptional case necessary to disassociate the justice system from the state's non-Charter compliant actions, given the lack of alternative remedies and the seriousness of the breach.

Her Majesty the Queen appealed the acquittals of the respondent on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the statutory prerequisite of "reasonable steps" in ascertaining consent, as required by s. 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code, when assessing the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittals, and ordered a new trial, as the trial judge's reasons lacked sufficient clarity on factual and credibility findings to permit entering convictions.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his wife in 2002, and with assaulting and threatening to kill his daughter R. The court found the accused not guilty on all three counts.

For the sexual assault charge, the Crown failed to prove mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the complainant's cultural beliefs about marital obligations and the significant delay in reporting.

For the assault and threatening charges against the daughter, inconsistencies and contradictions in the complainant's and other witnesses' testimonies prevented the Crown from meeting the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with impaired care and control of a motor vehicle and care and control with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, arising from a single-vehicle collision in Ottawa.

The Crown conducted a blended voir dire to address both substantive charges and alleged Charter breaches.

The court found that the evidential breath samples were obtained in violation of the "as soon as practicable" requirement under the Criminal Code, rendering them inadmissible and precluding reliance on the presumption of identity.

Consequently, the accused was acquitted of the over-80 charge.

However, the court found the accused guilty of impaired care and control based on admissions regarding alcohol consumption, physical signs of impairment, and the manner of driving that caused the accident.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 263(1) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged whether the Crown had established that the breath samples were received directly into an approved instrument, as required by section 258(1)(c)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found that the Crown had satisfied this requirement through circumstantial evidence, including the officer's testimony regarding the Intoxilyzer 8000C, the mouthpiece mechanism, the two samples provided, and the resulting readings.

The accused was found guilty.

Three young men with no prior criminal records pleaded guilty to break, enter and commit assault causing bodily harm contrary to s. 348(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The offenders broke into the residence of a drug dealer who had previously beaten and left for dead a friend of theirs.

The break-in involved multiple attempts to gain entry and ultimately using a truck to destroy patio doors.

Once inside, the victim was assaulted, suffering minor injuries.

The Crown sought a five-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought twelve to eighteen months plus probation.

The court imposed ninety days in jail followed by two years of probation, with community service orders and a ten-year weapon prohibition.

The judge distinguished the case from typical home invasion cases, emphasizing the offenders' youth, lack of criminal records, genuine remorse, stable employment, family support, and the victim's criminal background.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed after a guilty plea to sexual assault in which the trial judge granted the accused an absolute discharge.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge erred by emphasizing rehabilitation and failing to properly consider denunciation and deterrence, and sought to introduce fresh evidence consisting of a victim impact statement and regional sexual assault statistics.

The court applied the Palmer criteria for fresh evidence and denied the application, finding the material was available at the time of sentencing and unlikely to affect the outcome.

On the merits, the court held the sentencing judge had considered the relevant principles and that the sentence, though unusual, was not demonstrably unfit.

Deference to the sentencing judge was warranted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and having over 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood.

Following a trial with a blended voir dire, the court considered whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make a breath demand and whether the breath technician was required to have independent grounds.

The court found that the arresting officer had sufficient grounds based on observations of erratic driving, physical indicators of impairment, and odour of alcohol.

The court held that the breath demand was valid and that the breath technician need not have independent grounds, as the demand is a continuing one made by the arresting officer and administered by the technician in an agency capacity.