Robert G. Selkirk

The accused was charged with having care or control of a vehicle while impaired by a drug (inhalant) on June 3, 2014.

The accused was found in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle in a Walmart parking lot, inhaling fumes from an aerosol duster.

The Crown alleged the accused had care or control of the vehicle while impaired.

The defence argued that the accused had no intention to drive and posed no realistic risk of danger.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's test from R. v. Boudreault and found that the accused did not have care or control of the vehicle because there was no realistic risk of danger given the short-lived nature of inhalant impairment, the accused's clear plan to remain parked until sober, and the absence of any realistic risk of unintentional vehicle operation.

The accused pleaded guilty to production of marijuana contrary to section 7 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

A sentencing hearing was held to determine the number of plants produced, as this affects the applicable minimum sentence.

The Crown sought a one-year minimum sentence based on production of more than 200 plants.

The central issue was whether cannabis clones (cuttings) without visible root systems constitute "plants" under the legislation.

The court adopted a definition based on cultivation or propagation activity rather than the presence of roots, finding that over 450 plants were being grown and imposing the mandatory minimum sentence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in blood following a motor vehicle stop.

The defence challenged the admissibility of breath test evidence, alleging violations of Charter rights to counsel under section 10(b).

The court rejected the defence argument that police failed to provide adequate information about accessing private counsel, finding that the accused made an informed waiver by twice choosing duty counsel over private counsel.

The court distinguished Ontario jurisprudence from recent western Canadian cases imposing broader informational duties on police.

The court convicted on the over 80 charge and stayed the impaired charge.

The appellants were charged with a hunting offence under the Provincial Offences Act for allegedly harvesting a moose out of season.

At trial, they brought a Charter application alleging a violation of section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and seeking advanced funding for defence witnesses and counsel fees under section 24(1).

The trial court dismissed the Charter application.

The appellants appealed the dismissal.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the dismissal of a pre-trial Charter motion is not a final order appealable under section 116 of the Provincial Offences Act, and that advanced funding does not constitute "costs" within the meaning of section 116(1)(e).

The accused was charged with Over 80 contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code arising from an incident on March 16, 2013 in Ottawa.

The sole issue was whether the Crown established that the accused understood the demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The defence argued that the officer's failure to record the accused's response to the demand in his notes meant the Crown failed to establish this pre-condition to admissibility of the breath sample evidence.

The court found that the officer's testimony that the accused indicated understanding, combined with the accused's compliance with the demand without confusion, was sufficient to establish understanding.

The court declined to follow R. v. Brown and found the demand was sufficiently expressed and understood.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with assault contrary to section 266 of the Criminal Code and with breaching a probation order by failing to keep the peace and be of good character.

The Crown alleged the accused assaulted the complainant on April 11, 2013.

The court found the accused's evidence credible and consistent, while the Crown's witnesses demonstrated signs of collusion in their statements to police.

The assault charge was dismissed due to reasonable doubt.

However, the court found the accused guilty of breaching his probation order by committing mischief under section 430 of the Criminal Code when he deliberately knocked the complainant's coffee out of her hand or off the armrest of the couch.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 ml following a traffic stop in Arnprior, Ontario on March 7, 2012.

The Crown relied on breath test results taken outside the two-hour window, requiring expert evidence from the Centre of Forensic Science to establish the blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The key issue was whether the accused engaged in bolus drinking (consumption of large quantities of alcohol immediately before driving) within fifteen minutes of being stopped.

The trial judge rejected the defence witness's testimony regarding shots of tequila consumed just before departure, finding her evidence fabricated and unreliable.

The court applied the common sense inference that normal people do not consume large quantities of alcohol immediately before driving and found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that no bolus drinking occurred.

The accused was convicted of Over 80 and the Impaired charge was stayed.

Three young men with no prior criminal records pleaded guilty to break, enter and commit assault causing bodily harm contrary to s. 348(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The offenders broke into the residence of a drug dealer who had previously beaten and left for dead a friend of theirs.

The break-in involved multiple attempts to gain entry and ultimately using a truck to destroy patio doors.

Once inside, the victim was assaulted, suffering minor injuries.

The Crown sought a five-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought twelve to eighteen months plus probation.

The court imposed ninety days in jail followed by two years of probation, with community service orders and a ten-year weapon prohibition.

The judge distinguished the case from typical home invasion cases, emphasizing the offenders' youth, lack of criminal records, genuine remorse, stable employment, family support, and the victim's criminal background.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The charge was laid on February 10, 2008, and the matter was scheduled for its second trial on April 29, 2013, resulting in a delay of over five years.

The court applied the Morin framework and found that although the total delay was substantial, the accused had effectively waived his section 11(b) rights by insisting on waiting for a Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Dineley before proceeding to trial.

The court found that the accused was the author of his own misfortune and dismissed the application.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL.

The Crown withdrew the impaired charge at trial.

The central issue was whether the Crown established that the arresting officer gave a demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code at the roadside.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that such a demand was made.

Without proof of the demand, the Crown could not rely on the statutory presumption in section 258(1)(c) to establish the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused were charged following an incident at a Shoppers Drug Mart in Toronto.

The accused were falsely accused of attempting to steal condoms by a loss prevention officer.

After being told to leave the premises, they attempted to do so but were physically detained by the loss prevention officer and store employees.

A struggle ensued outside the store.

The court found that the accused were not given a reasonable opportunity to leave as required by the Trespass to Property Act, making the arrest unlawful.

Consequently, the accused had the right to resist the unlawful detention using reasonable force.

The court found the force used was reasonable and not excessive.

All charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown conceded that the accused was both impaired and over 80 mg/100 ml of blood.

The sole issue was whether the accused was in care or control of the motor vehicle.

The accused was found in the driver's seat of his parked car at a military base.

The defence established that the accused had arranged for an alternative plan of transportation (a designated driver), had divested himself of the vehicle keys to a third party, and was merely waiting in the vehicle to shelter from the rain until the designated driver returned.

The court found that the accused had met his burden under s. 258 of the Criminal Code to establish that he did not occupy the driver's seat for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion.

The accused was charged with possession of Oxycodone following a vehicle stop.

The sole issue was whether the accused's Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) were violated and whether evidence should be excluded.

A detective stopped the vehicle based on surveillance of a suspected drug house.

The court found the detention was arbitrary and unlawful, lacking both statutory and common law authority.

The officer had no articulable cause to detain the accused.

The demand for identification constituted an unreasonable search.

The court excluded all evidence and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with breach of probation for consuming alcohol while prohibited from doing so.

The Crown conceded that the accused should be found guilty if the Charter application was unsuccessful.

The court found violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms arising from police conduct during a R.I.D.E. program stop.

The officer demanded identification from the accused as a passenger and ran it through CPIC to discover probation conditions, without lawful authority or consent.

The court excluded the evidence and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with Over 80 contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code arising from an incident on March 30, 2012.

The Crown conceded a section 10(b) Charter violation regarding the accused's right to counsel.

The sole issue was whether breath test evidence should be excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter and the Grant test.

The court found that the police officer demonstrated a cavalier attitude toward the accused's right to counsel despite being aware of his obligations under R. v. Prosper.

The officer failed to explain the accused's rights or ascertain whether the accused understood what he was giving up when waiving counsel.

Applying the three-part Grant analysis, the court found the violation serious, the impact on Charter-protected interests significant, and excluded the breath test evidence.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(a) and refusal to provide a sample on an approved screening device contrary to section 254(5), arising from an incident on October 10, 2011.

The Crown alleged the accused was swerving on Highway 17, displayed signs of impairment, and intentionally failed to provide an adequate breath sample despite multiple attempts and clear instructions.

The accused raised Charter violations regarding the timing of the approved screening device demand after the officer formed grounds to arrest, the denial of her right to call her husband to obtain legal counsel information, missing video evidence, privacy concerns in custody, and unlawful detention.

The court found the accused lacked credibility and rejected her evidence where it conflicted with police testimony.

The court convicted on both counts, finding the approved screening device demand was lawful despite the officer's subjective belief in grounds to arrest, as the suspension of section 10(b) rights was justified under section 1 of the Charter and the evidence obtained was non-incriminatory.