Will Murray

The accused was sentenced for intimidating a justice system participant (a provincial prosecutor) under section 423.1 of the Criminal Code.

The accused sent threatening emails and made phone calls to the prosecutor and his wife at their home address in the early morning hours after the prosecutor declined to resolve the accused's Highway Traffic Act charges on favorable terms.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day with 12 months of house arrest and GPS monitoring, followed by three years of probation.

The court found that while the offence was serious and pre-meditated, the accused's untreated schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and related mental health issues materially contributed to the commission of the offence and warranted a reduction from the baseline custodial sentence of 18 months.

This is a first-stage ruling on a habeas corpus application brought by Andre Ducic, who asserts that his recent confinement at the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre was inconsistent with a disposition order of the Ontario Review Board.

The court finds that there is sufficient concern to warrant a full inquiry into the lawfulness of Mr. Ducic’s imprisonment and orders the matter to proceed to the second stage, requiring the responsible authorities to explain the legal basis for his detention.

The applicant, charged with numerous sexual offences involving child complainants, brought a motion for directions to determine whether police notes and a psychotherapist's statement, which contained information from therapy sessions, constituted Stinchcombe disclosure or were subject to the Mills regime under the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued for the Mills regime.

The court found that the psychotherapist's statement, despite being in police possession, retained its character as a "record" under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code due to the complainant's reasonable expectation of privacy.

Consequently, the court ruled that the production of the statement is governed by the Mills regime, requiring the applicant to follow that specific application process.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

At the police station, the appellant expressed confusion about her right to counsel, and the police officer offered her a binary choice of calling a free lawyer immediately or waiting until after she was released.

The appeal court found that this created a trap, as the appellant was not informed she would lose her 'hold-off' protection if she waited.

This constituted a breach of her s. 10(b) Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) and entered an acquittal.

The offender was convicted of sexual assault and voyeurism against an intoxicated sleeping victim.

The Crown sought 18 months incarceration plus 2 years probation.

The defence sought 9 months incarceration.

The sentencing judge imposed 12 months incarceration followed by 2 years probation, with the voyeurism count running concurrently due to COVID-19 pandemic considerations.

The judge emphasized denunciation and deterrence as paramount sentencing principles given the offender's contemptuous disregard for the victim's lack of consent and the surreptitious recording of the assault.

The respondents brought a motion to stay the applicant's Charter challenge to the sex offender registry pending the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in a similar case, G. v. Attorney General for Ontario.

The applicant, who was found not criminally responsible and granted an absolute discharge, argued his case presented distinct legal arguments and a more compelling factual scenario.

The court granted the stay, finding that the two matters shared significant common questions of law and fact, and that a stay would prevent inconsistent dispositions, save judicial resources, and avoid a multiplicity of proceedings without causing undue prejudice to the applicant.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence, arguing the officer unlawfully entered private property to make the demand and that the accused's section 10(b) rights were infringed.

The court denied the Charter application, finding the officer had express consent to enter the building and that section 10(b) rights were not violated given the brief timeframe before the approved screening device would be available.

At trial, the court found the accused guilty of refusing to provide a sample but dismissed the impaired driving charge, finding reasonable doubt based on a possible medical explanation for balance issues and the unlikelihood the accused would have been sold alcohol if visibly intoxicated.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in blood following a motor vehicle stop.

The defence challenged the admissibility of breath test evidence, alleging violations of Charter rights to counsel under section 10(b).

The court rejected the defence argument that police failed to provide adequate information about accessing private counsel, finding that the accused made an informed waiver by twice choosing duty counsel over private counsel.

The court distinguished Ontario jurisprudence from recent western Canadian cases imposing broader informational duties on police.

The court convicted on the over 80 charge and stayed the impaired charge.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL.

The Crown withdrew the impaired charge at trial.

The central issue was whether the Crown established that the arresting officer gave a demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code at the roadside.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that such a demand was made.

Without proof of the demand, the Crown could not rely on the statutory presumption in section 258(1)(c) to establish the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The accused was acquitted.