Ninetta Caparelli

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual touching of two young sisters (ages 6-10 and 3-4 at the time of the alleged incidents) between 2015 and 2018.

The Crown sought to admit similar fact evidence regarding the testimony of both complainants.

The court rejected the similar fact evidence application due to concerns about unconscious collusion between the sisters, finding that the Crown failed to rebut collusion on a balance of probabilities.

At trial, the court found both complainants credible but unreliable due to significant inconsistencies in their testimony, recovered memories through flashbacks and dreams, and lack of independent corroborating evidence.

The court acquitted the accused on all counts, finding a reasonable doubt existed regarding guilt.

The applicant, charged with numerous sexual offences involving child complainants, brought a motion for directions to determine whether police notes and a psychotherapist's statement, which contained information from therapy sessions, constituted Stinchcombe disclosure or were subject to the Mills regime under the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued for the Mills regime.

The court found that the psychotherapist's statement, despite being in police possession, retained its character as a "record" under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code due to the complainant's reasonable expectation of privacy.

Consequently, the court ruled that the production of the statement is governed by the Mills regime, requiring the applicant to follow that specific application process.

The accused was charged with 19 offences including sexual assault with a weapon, assault, uttering death threats, criminal harassment, unlawful confinement, and causing the complainant to take a noxious thing.

The Crown sought to admit expert evidence from Dr. Deborah Sinclair regarding the dynamics of domestic violence, traumatic bonding, coercive control, and victim behaviour.

The defence opposed admission on grounds of relevance, necessity, expert qualification, and impartiality.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility of the expert evidence.

This is a voir dire decision determining the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual activity between the complainant and the accused, led by the Crown during trial.

The court considered whether evidence of consensual sexual conduct on other occasions, including details of BDSM activities and statements made by the accused on multiple occasions, should be admitted.

The court applied the principles established in R. v. Seaboyer and the statutory framework of section 276 of the Criminal Code, balancing the probative value of the evidence against potential prejudice to the complainant's privacy rights and the interests of justice.

The court admitted the evidence, finding it relevant to issues beyond the "twin myths" and that any interference with the complainant's privacy was justified by the interests of justice.

The court ruled on whether a complainant implicitly waived solicitor-client privilege by testifying in cross-examination that she had sought legal advice from her lawyers before giving media interviews while subject to a witness exclusion order.

The court held that the complainant did not implicitly waive her privilege.

The court applied a principled approach considering the fundamental nature of solicitor-client privilege, the requirement of voluntary action by the privilege holder, and the significance of the evidence arising during compelled cross-examination.

The court concluded that fairness and consistency did not require waiver in these circumstances.

The accused was charged with 19 offences including sexual assault with a weapon, assault, uttering death threats, criminal harassment, unlawful confinement, and related offences.

During trial, the defence sought to introduce excerpts from the complainant's psychologist records under section 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

The court ruled on the admissibility of two excerpts: the first, a prior inconsistent statement regarding the timing of assaults, was admitted as it had significant probative value for impeaching credibility; the second, regarding the absence of mention of a specific assault, was excluded as the defence failed to establish a rational basis for the inference that the omission was relevant to whether the assault occurred.

The accused brought an application under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code seeking to adduce evidence of other sexual activity of the complainant.

The complainant sought to cross-examine the accused on his affidavit in support of the application.

The court determined whether the complainant's statutory right to "appear and make submissions" under s. 278.94(2) and (3) includes the right to cross-examine the accused.

The court held that the right to appear and make submissions must be meaningful and includes the right to cross-examine the accused on issues relevant to the application.

The court considered whether section 278.92 of the Criminal Code prohibits defence counsel from putting the contents of a private record to a complainant during cross-examination without first obtaining a court order.

The accused was charged with 19 offences including sexual assault with a weapon, assault, uttering threats, criminal harassment, unlawful confinement, and public mischief.

Defence counsel sought to cross-examine the complainant regarding statements she allegedly made to a health care provider that appeared inconsistent with her trial testimony regarding the timing of alleged incidents.

The Crown objected, arguing that section 278.92 required a court order before any contents of the private record could be put to the complainant.

The court held that an order under section 278.92 is required before defence counsel may put to a witness the contents of a record in the possession of the defendant in which the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The accused, a financial advisor, was charged with multiple counts of fraud, theft, misappropriation, and forgery relating to his handling of funds for 10 clients.

The Crown alleged that the accused received funds from clients to invest, but instead deposited them into his own accounts, retained them for extended periods, and provided forged documents to conceal his actions.

The court found the accused guilty on 33 of the 34 remaining counts, concluding that he intentionally retained client funds contrary to their directions, placing their financial interests at risk, and used forged documents to deceive them.

The offender was convicted after trial of robbery of a gas bar.

He entered the store, approached the cashier with his hand in his pocket as if he had a gun, and demanded money.

He obtained over $100 and left.

There was no actual weapon, no violence, and no physical injury to the victim, though the victim was anxious.

The offender is 44 years old, employed as a journeyman refrigeration and air conditioning mechanic, and has a dated criminal record from 2007-2008.

He has a significant alcohol addiction that motivated the offence, which occurred during a three-day drinking bender.

He has a 13-year-old son whom he supports and sees on weekends.

The Crown sought one year incarceration followed by probation; the defence sought 90 days served on weekends followed by probation.

The accused, a financial advisor, brought an application for a directed verdict following the close of the Crown's case, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on 30 of 37 counts of fraud, theft, misappropriation, and forgery.

The accused argued that the rule in Hodge's Case should apply to the circumstantial evidence, requiring the evidence to be consistent only with guilt.

The court rejected this argument, applying the test from Arcuri that requires only limited weighing to determine if the evidence is reasonably capable of supporting an inference of guilt.

After reviewing the evidence of multiple former clients whose funds were allegedly withheld, misdirected, or returned from unidentifiable sources, the court found sufficient evidence on all essential elements of the offences and dismissed the application.

During a fraud trial involving a financial advisor, the Crown brought an application to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct across counts as similar fact evidence.

The Crown alleged the accused misappropriated funds from ten clients using a similar modus operandi.

The court applied the Handy framework and found the evidence highly probative to the issues of actus reus and mens rea, with minimal risk of prejudice in a judge-alone trial.

The application to admit the similar fact evidence was allowed.

The applicants, owners of a restaurant offering shisha, sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the City of Ottawa from enforcing a bylaw prohibiting the use of water pipes in indoor public places, pending their Charter challenge.

Applying the RJR MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried and irreparable harm due to the corporate applicant's potential lack of standing for Charter damages.

However, the balance of convenience favoured the City, as the public interest in protecting health from second-hand smoke outweighed the applicants' financial losses and temporary limits on cultural traditions.

The motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the City.