Elizabeth Ives-Ruyter

Following a judge-alone criminal trial on historical intrafamilial sexual offence allegations involving three complainants, the court applied the W.(D.) framework to determine whether the Crown had proved individual counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found some allegations involving ambiguous lap contact and an alleged kiss lacked sufficient surrounding circumstances to establish the requisite sexual purpose or violation of sexual integrity.

By contrast, the court accepted the evidence of two complainants concerning breast touching, breast licking, and oral-sex-related conduct as credible and reliable, and found that evidence sufficient to overwhelm the accused's denials.

The accused was acquitted on several counts and convicted on selected counts of sexual assault and sexual exploitation, with the potential application of the Keinapple principle left for a later date.

The defendant was charged with five counts related to theft, breaking and entering, and possession of stolen property for trafficking.

The Crown presented circumstantial evidence, including cell phone records, financial difficulties of the defendant, and inconsistencies in his statements to police.

The defendant denied the charges, claiming the coins sold were his own and that he was unaware of the theft at the time of initial sales.

The court found the defendant's evidence not credible and concluded that the only rational conclusion was his guilt based on the totality of circumstantial evidence.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a vehicle while impaired by a drug (inhalant) on June 3, 2014.

The accused was found in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle in a Walmart parking lot, inhaling fumes from an aerosol duster.

The Crown alleged the accused had care or control of the vehicle while impaired.

The defence argued that the accused had no intention to drive and posed no realistic risk of danger.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's test from R. v. Boudreault and found that the accused did not have care or control of the vehicle because there was no realistic risk of danger given the short-lived nature of inhalant impairment, the accused's clear plan to remain parked until sober, and the absence of any realistic risk of unintentional vehicle operation.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The charge was laid on February 10, 2008, and the matter was scheduled for its second trial on April 29, 2013, resulting in a delay of over five years.

The court applied the Morin framework and found that although the total delay was substantial, the accused had effectively waived his section 11(b) rights by insisting on waiting for a Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Dineley before proceeding to trial.

The court found that the accused was the author of his own misfortune and dismissed the application.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL.

The Crown withdrew the impaired charge at trial.

The central issue was whether the Crown established that the arresting officer gave a demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code at the roadside.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that such a demand was made.

Without proof of the demand, the Crown could not rely on the statutory presumption in section 258(1)(c) to establish the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with driving while disqualified contrary to section 259(4)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was operating an electric bicycle (E-bike) while subject to a prohibition order against driving motor vehicles.

The central issue was whether an E-bike constitutes a motor vehicle under the Criminal Code definition.

The court found that the E-bike qualified as a motor vehicle because it was capable of being propelled by an electric motor.

However, the accused successfully raised the defence of officially induced error, having consulted with police officers who advised him that driving an E-bike would not violate his prohibition order.

A judicial stay of proceedings was entered.

The accused was charged with sexual assault arising from an alleged incident during a work-related overnight stay at a rural property.

The complainant testified she believed she had been drugged and sexually assaulted after consuming alcohol and losing memory of the evening, awakening naked in the accused’s bed the next day.

The accused denied drugging the complainant and maintained that any sexual contact was consensual and initiated by the complainant.

The court emphasized the presumption of innocence and the requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Given credibility concerns, the complainant’s lack of recollection, the absence of corroborating evidence of drugging, and post‑incident conduct inconsistent with the alleged assault, the court found that the evidence did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.