James McGillivary

The accused was found in the driver's seat of a disabled vehicle and subsequently failed a roadside screening device test.

He was arrested and provided breath samples at the police station that were over the legal limit.

At trial, the accused challenged the admissibility of the breath readings, arguing they were not taken 'as soon as practicable'.

The court found 23 minutes of unexplained delay by police, which compromised the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

Without the breath readings, the Crown could not prove the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the offence.

The accused was found not guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The police observed the accused driving erratically and running red lights.

After failing a roadside screening device, the accused provided breath samples at the police station, but the first sample was taken outside the two-hour presumption period.

The Crown relied on expert toxicologist evidence to extrapolate the blood alcohol concentration back to the time of driving.

The court accepted the expert evidence, finding no evidence of bolus drinking, and convicted the accused of the over 80 charge.

However, the court acquitted the accused of impaired driving, finding the physical indicia of impairment insufficient to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a vehicle while impaired by a drug (inhalant) on June 3, 2016.

The Crown alleged the accused was in the driver's seat of a running vehicle while under the influence of aerosol inhalants.

The defence argued the accused did not have care or control as defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Boudreault.

The court found that although the accused was impaired and in the driver's seat, there was no realistic risk of danger because the accused had a clear plan to remain parked until the effects wore off, the vehicle had a standard transmission with an engaged parking brake requiring multiple discrete acts to set in motion, and the accused's impairment was short-lived with rapid recovery.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a traffic stop on October 23, 2016, in Perth, Ontario.

An approved screening device (ASD) test resulted in a fail reading.

The defence argued that the officer failed to follow a November 26, 2013 memorandum from the Ontario Provincial Police Deputy Commissioner regarding the potential effects of food, drink, and hand sanitizer on ASD readings, which required a 15-minute waiting period before testing.

The court rejected the defence argument and distinguished the case from R v. Wong, finding that the memorandum lacked proper evidentiary foundation and that an officer cannot be bound to follow a directive of which they were unaware.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and dangerous driving.

The Crown did not proceed with an impaired driving charge.

The accused admitted to driving with a blood alcohol level of 130 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood but raised the defence of necessity, claiming he was forced to drive to escape an imminent threat of physical harm in a parking lot confrontation.

The court found the defence of necessity did not apply and convicted the accused of the over 80 charge while acquitting on the dangerous driving charge.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a vehicle while impaired by a drug (inhalant) on June 3, 2014.

The accused was found in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle in a Walmart parking lot, inhaling fumes from an aerosol duster.

The Crown alleged the accused had care or control of the vehicle while impaired.

The defence argued that the accused had no intention to drive and posed no realistic risk of danger.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's test from R. v. Boudreault and found that the accused did not have care or control of the vehicle because there was no realistic risk of danger given the short-lived nature of inhalant impairment, the accused's clear plan to remain parked until sober, and the absence of any realistic risk of unintentional vehicle operation.