Michael G. March

Two accused persons were jointly charged with dangerous driving while racing contrary to section 249.4(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged they were operating motor vehicles in a race on Forrest Lea Road.

The trial judge found that while both accused were driving at excessive speeds on an unfamiliar rural road without paying attention to traffic signs, they were not engaged in racing as contemplated by the statute.

The judge found the accused were driving one behind the other, not side by side in competitive fashion.

The judge convicted both accused of the lesser included offence of dangerous driving contrary to section 249(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown conceded that the accused was both impaired and over 80 mg/100 ml of blood.

The sole issue was whether the accused was in care or control of the motor vehicle.

The accused was found in the driver's seat of his parked car at a military base.

The defence established that the accused had arranged for an alternative plan of transportation (a designated driver), had divested himself of the vehicle keys to a third party, and was merely waiting in the vehicle to shelter from the rain until the designated driver returned.

The court found that the accused had met his burden under s. 258 of the Criminal Code to establish that he did not occupy the driver's seat for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion.

The accused was charged with Over 80 contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code arising from an incident on March 30, 2012.

The Crown conceded a section 10(b) Charter violation regarding the accused's right to counsel.

The sole issue was whether breath test evidence should be excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter and the Grant test.

The court found that the police officer demonstrated a cavalier attitude toward the accused's right to counsel despite being aware of his obligations under R. v. Prosper.

The officer failed to explain the accused's rights or ascertain whether the accused understood what he was giving up when waiving counsel.

Applying the three-part Grant analysis, the court found the violation serious, the impact on Charter-protected interests significant, and excluded the breath test evidence.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(a) and refusal to provide a sample on an approved screening device contrary to section 254(5), arising from an incident on October 10, 2011.

The Crown alleged the accused was swerving on Highway 17, displayed signs of impairment, and intentionally failed to provide an adequate breath sample despite multiple attempts and clear instructions.

The accused raised Charter violations regarding the timing of the approved screening device demand after the officer formed grounds to arrest, the denial of her right to call her husband to obtain legal counsel information, missing video evidence, privacy concerns in custody, and unlawful detention.

The court found the accused lacked credibility and rejected her evidence where it conflicted with police testimony.

The court convicted on both counts, finding the approved screening device demand was lawful despite the officer's subjective belief in grounds to arrest, as the suspension of section 10(b) rights was justified under section 1 of the Charter and the evidence obtained was non-incriminatory.