James Douglas Foord

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit, asserting misapprehension of evidence on identity, error in finding reasonable suspicion for an ASD demand, and invalid issuance of a production order for hospital records.

The appeal court held the trial record supported the inference that the appellant was the driver and found no reversible error on that issue.

Applying the totality-of-circumstances approach, the court upheld the finding of reasonable suspicion under the Criminal Code for the roadside screening demand.

Although the court accepted a limited misapprehension regarding a hospital-staff statement, it held the production order nonetheless validly issued on the ITO and permissible inferences, and declined exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal was dismissed and the prior stay of the driving prohibition was rescinded.

This is an appeal from a trial decision that found a s.10(b) Charter breach and excluded evidence, leading to an acquittal on an '80+' offence.

Counsel agreed the trial judge erred in finding the s.10(b) breach and vacating the acquittal.

The Crown sought a conviction, while the respondent requested a new trial due to an insufficient record for a fresh s.24(2) analysis.

The appeal court set aside the acquittal but declined to register a conviction, remanding the case for a new trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, citing the lower court's expertise in such matters and concerns about the sufficiency of the record for appellate review.

The appellant, W.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge misapprehended the appellant's evidence regarding the complainant's state of consciousness at the start of the sexual contact.

The trial judge had found the appellant's evidence on this "crucial detail" to be "internally incompatible and exaggerated" and inconsistent with prior statements.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge, concluding that it was open to the trial judge to reject the appellant's evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on an "over 80" charge, following a trial judge's finding of a s. 10(b) Charter breach and exclusion of breath results.

The trial judge had accepted the respondent's testimony that her request to call her mother was "obvious" in its purpose to facilitate finding a lawyer.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred by failing to make a critical factual finding: whether the police officer knew or assumed the respondent's request to call a third party was for the purpose of facilitating her right to counsel.

Precedent requires the detainee to articulate this purpose, or for the officer to have such knowledge/assumption.

Without this finding, the s. 10(b) breach could not be established.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered for the "over 80" charge.

The defendant, Alain Godard, was charged with assault, sexual assault, and forcible confinement.

The trial focused on the complainant's testimony, which the court found to have significant reliability and credibility issues due to memory gaps, demonstrably inaccurate recollections, and admitted lies under oath in prior proceedings.

The court also ruled on the Crown's application to lift a publication ban, granting it at the complainant's request.

The defendant was found not guilty on all three charges due to reasonable doubt regarding the complainant's evidence.

The defendants, Michael Buckley and Dwayne Young, were charged with first-degree murder in the death of Jonathan Wite.

They pleaded not guilty to murder but guilty to manslaughter, which the Crown did not accept.

The trial proceeded to determine guilt for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, or manslaughter.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove first-degree or second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, concluding that the incident was a "robbery gone wrong" rather than a planned murder.

Both defendants were found guilty of manslaughter based on common unlawful purpose and objective foreseeability of harm.

The accused, Tyler Moore and Rhonda Moore, brought a Charter application alleging violations of their section 7 and 11(d) rights due to the unacceptable loss of crucial pole camera surveillance footage.

This footage was used by the police to obtain search warrants for their residence in a drug trafficking investigation.

The court found that while police were not required to obtain a general warrant for the pole camera (as it captured publicly viewable areas), the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) were unacceptably negligent in failing to preserve the raw video data.

The officers' notes were deemed an inadequate substitute for the original footage.

As a remedy, the court denied the request for a stay of proceedings, finding it was not one of the "clearest of cases" where a fair trial was impossible.

Instead, the court ordered the excision of all paragraphs referring to the covert surveillance video from the Informations to Obtain (ITOs) sworn to obtain the search warrants.

This is an appeal from convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation, and from the imposed sentence.

The convictions stemmed from the appellant's prolonged sexual abuse of his stepdaughter.

The conviction appeal, based on the trial judge's credibility assessments, was dismissed as the appellate court found no error in the trial judge's reasoning regarding the appellant's evidence.

The sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge applied incorrect sentencing legislation that was not in force at the time of the offences.

The Court of Appeal re-sentenced the appellant, substituting a global sentence of nine years for the sexual offences, running concurrently, with a 90-day consecutive sentence for a breach of conditions offence.

Danielle Leblanc, initially charged with first-degree murder, pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice after providing a statement that led to her common-law spouse's second-degree murder plea.

The court considered the unique circumstances of Leblanc being a victim of severe and prolonged domestic violence by the murderer, which significantly reduced her moral blameworthiness.

Despite the seriousness of obstructing justice in a murder investigation, the court granted a conditional discharge with 12 months probation, emphasizing proportionality and the limited application of general deterrence in cases involving battered women.

This consolidated appeal addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained through a wiretap authorization granted in 2016 for a 2009 murder investigation.

The Court of Appeal found that the authorization was improperly granted due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds, as the affidavit failed to establish a credible-based probability that interceptions would yield evidence of the long-dormant homicide or that other investigative procedures were unlikely to succeed.

The court emphasized that a generic investigative plan and unsupported inferences of continued association among targets after several years were insufficient.

Consequently, the interceptions constituted a serious breach of Charter s. 8 rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court upheld the exclusion of the evidence under Charter s. 24(2) due to the seriousness of the state conduct and the significant impact on privacy interests.

The appeals from conviction were allowed, and acquittals were entered, while the appeals from acquittal were dismissed.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge imposed under section 737 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violates sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellants were impoverished offenders with mental and physical disabilities, unemployment, and substance abuse issues.

The trial judges had refused to impose the surcharge, finding it unconstitutional.

The Crown appealed and the Superior Court judges overturned these decisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge, finding that while it engages the appellants' liberty interests, it does not violate section 7 because impoverished offenders cannot be imprisoned for non-payment (inability to pay is a reasonable excuse), extensions of time to pay are available, and the deprivation is not grossly disproportionate to the important objectives of the surcharge regime.

The court also found the surcharge does not violate section 12 of the Charter as it is not cruel and unusual treatment, being disproportionate but not grossly disproportionate.

The appellant, Dennis Piamonte, appealed his conviction for driving while impaired, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to conduct a voir dire regarding statements he made to paramedics.

The appellant contended that paramedics were "persons in authority" and his statements should have been subject to a voluntariness inquiry.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no clear evidence in the record that objectively should have alerted the trial judge to the need for a voir dire, as paramedics were not conventional persons in authority and the appellant's interaction with police had concluded before his statements to medical personnel.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired, driving with a blood alcohol concentration over .80, failing to stop for police, and resisting arrest.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings based on allegations of excessive force used by police during arrest, claiming violations of sections 7, 8, and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the accused's section 7 rights were breached through the unnecessary and unreasonable use of force in extracting him from his vehicle, resulting in significant physical and psychological injuries.

The court excluded all breath test evidence as a remedy to disassociate the justice system from the unlawful conduct.

The accused was convicted of impaired driving and sentenced to a conditional discharge with conditions including completion of a driver rehabilitation program and a prohibition on driving with any alcohol in his system.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence for assault contrary to s. 266 of the Criminal Code following a physical confrontation arising from an attempt to remove a disputed vehicle from the complainant’s possession.

The appellant argued the trial judge’s reasons were insufficient and unclear as to whether the conviction relied on the “deemed assault” provision in s. 38(2) or on findings arising from a physical struggle.

The appeal court held the reasons were adequate and demonstrated that the conviction rested on findings that the accused intentionally applied force without consent after deliberately provoking a confrontation.

The court further confirmed that even a person claiming property rights cannot use force to recover chattels where doing so breaches the peace.

The sentence of a suspended sentence with 18 months’ probation was also upheld as not demonstrably unfit.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 ml following a traffic stop in Arnprior, Ontario on March 7, 2012.

The Crown relied on breath test results taken outside the two-hour window, requiring expert evidence from the Centre of Forensic Science to establish the blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The key issue was whether the accused engaged in bolus drinking (consumption of large quantities of alcohol immediately before driving) within fifteen minutes of being stopped.

The trial judge rejected the defence witness's testimony regarding shots of tequila consumed just before departure, finding her evidence fabricated and unreliable.

The court applied the common sense inference that normal people do not consume large quantities of alcohol immediately before driving and found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that no bolus drinking occurred.

The accused was convicted of Over 80 and the Impaired charge was stayed.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which set aside the respondent's conviction for possessing marijuana and cocaine for the purposes of trafficking and ordered a new trial.

The central issue was whether a drug purchase call intercepted by police on the accused's cell phone constituted admissible evidence or inadmissible hearsay.

The Court held that implied assertions tendered for the truth of their contents are subject to the hearsay rule, just as express assertions are.

On a principled analysis, the single drug purchase call failed to meet the requirements of necessity and reliability, as no effort was made to locate the caller despite having his address, and the call lacked sufficient indicia of reliability.

The appeal was dismissed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death after turning left across the path of an oncoming motorcycle at a controlled intersection, resulting in the motorcyclist’s death.

The Crown argued that the accused’s failure to enter the designated left-turn lane, failure to signal, and unsafe left turn constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The defence conceded the actus reus but argued that the evidence did not establish the fault element required for criminal liability and that the incident reflected, at most, momentary negligence.

The court applied the modified objective test for penal negligence as articulated in leading Supreme Court jurisprudence.

Finding insufficient evidence regarding the motorcycle’s speed, position, braking, and the accused’s awareness of risk, the court concluded the Crown had not proven a marked departure beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application and in finding that breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The Superior Court reviewed the delay analysis under the framework in R. v. Morin and found no error in the trial judge’s characterization of certain periods of delay as neutral rather than institutional.

The court held that the findings of minimal prejudice to the accused and the balancing of societal interests against the delay were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The court also upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that the breath samples were taken within a reasonably prompt timeframe under the circumstances.

The conviction was therefore affirmed.

Sentencing decision following a guilty plea to unlawful act manslaughter and failing to attend court.

The accused struck a stranger without provocation, knocking the victim from a bicycle and subsequently kicking and stomping him while he lay on the ground, resulting in fatal head injuries.

Aggravating factors included the vulnerability of the victim, gratuitous post‑assault violence, the offender’s conduct after the offence, and breaches of bail culminating in a failure to attend court.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s youth at the time of the offence, lack of prior record, and guilty plea.

The court imposed a custodial sentence emphasizing denunciation and deterrence while acknowledging the offender’s youth.