James Douglas Foord

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit, asserting misapprehension of evidence on identity, error in finding reasonable suspicion for an ASD demand, and invalid issuance of a production order for hospital records.

The appeal court held the trial record supported the inference that the appellant was the driver and found no reversible error on that issue.

Applying the totality-of-circumstances approach, the court upheld the finding of reasonable suspicion under the Criminal Code for the roadside screening demand.

Although the court accepted a limited misapprehension regarding a hospital-staff statement, it held the production order nonetheless validly issued on the ITO and permissible inferences, and declined exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal was dismissed and the prior stay of the driving prohibition was rescinded.

This is an appeal from a trial decision that found a s.10(b) Charter breach and excluded evidence, leading to an acquittal on an '80+' offence.

Counsel agreed the trial judge erred in finding the s.10(b) breach and vacating the acquittal.

The Crown sought a conviction, while the respondent requested a new trial due to an insufficient record for a fresh s.24(2) analysis.

The appeal court set aside the acquittal but declined to register a conviction, remanding the case for a new trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, citing the lower court's expertise in such matters and concerns about the sufficiency of the record for appellate review.

The appellant, W.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge misapprehended the appellant's evidence regarding the complainant's state of consciousness at the start of the sexual contact.

The trial judge had found the appellant's evidence on this "crucial detail" to be "internally incompatible and exaggerated" and inconsistent with prior statements.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge, concluding that it was open to the trial judge to reject the appellant's evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on an "over 80" charge, following a trial judge's finding of a s. 10(b) Charter breach and exclusion of breath results.

The trial judge had accepted the respondent's testimony that her request to call her mother was "obvious" in its purpose to facilitate finding a lawyer.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred by failing to make a critical factual finding: whether the police officer knew or assumed the respondent's request to call a third party was for the purpose of facilitating her right to counsel.

Precedent requires the detainee to articulate this purpose, or for the officer to have such knowledge/assumption.

Without this finding, the s. 10(b) breach could not be established.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered for the "over 80" charge.

The defendant, Alain Godard, was charged with assault, sexual assault, and forcible confinement.

The trial focused on the complainant's testimony, which the court found to have significant reliability and credibility issues due to memory gaps, demonstrably inaccurate recollections, and admitted lies under oath in prior proceedings.

The court also ruled on the Crown's application to lift a publication ban, granting it at the complainant's request.

The defendant was found not guilty on all three charges due to reasonable doubt regarding the complainant's evidence.

The defendants, Michael Buckley and Dwayne Young, were charged with first-degree murder in the death of Jonathan Wite.

They pleaded not guilty to murder but guilty to manslaughter, which the Crown did not accept.

The trial proceeded to determine guilt for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, or manslaughter.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove first-degree or second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, concluding that the incident was a "robbery gone wrong" rather than a planned murder.

Both defendants were found guilty of manslaughter based on common unlawful purpose and objective foreseeability of harm.

The accused, Tyler Moore and Rhonda Moore, brought a Charter application alleging violations of their section 7 and 11(d) rights due to the unacceptable loss of crucial pole camera surveillance footage.

This footage was used by the police to obtain search warrants for their residence in a drug trafficking investigation.

The court found that while police were not required to obtain a general warrant for the pole camera (as it captured publicly viewable areas), the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) were unacceptably negligent in failing to preserve the raw video data.

The officers' notes were deemed an inadequate substitute for the original footage.

As a remedy, the court denied the request for a stay of proceedings, finding it was not one of the "clearest of cases" where a fair trial was impossible.

Instead, the court ordered the excision of all paragraphs referring to the covert surveillance video from the Informations to Obtain (ITOs) sworn to obtain the search warrants.

This is an appeal from convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation, and from the imposed sentence.

The convictions stemmed from the appellant's prolonged sexual abuse of his stepdaughter.

The conviction appeal, based on the trial judge's credibility assessments, was dismissed as the appellate court found no error in the trial judge's reasoning regarding the appellant's evidence.

The sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge applied incorrect sentencing legislation that was not in force at the time of the offences.

The Court of Appeal re-sentenced the appellant, substituting a global sentence of nine years for the sexual offences, running concurrently, with a 90-day consecutive sentence for a breach of conditions offence.

Danielle Leblanc, initially charged with first-degree murder, pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice after providing a statement that led to her common-law spouse's second-degree murder plea.

The court considered the unique circumstances of Leblanc being a victim of severe and prolonged domestic violence by the murderer, which significantly reduced her moral blameworthiness.

Despite the seriousness of obstructing justice in a murder investigation, the court granted a conditional discharge with 12 months probation, emphasizing proportionality and the limited application of general deterrence in cases involving battered women.

The offender was designated a dangerous offender following convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault against a 10-year-old girl.

The Crown sought an indeterminate sentence, while the offender proposed a determinate sentence followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order (LTSO).

The court reviewed the offender's extensive history of refusing or unilaterally discontinuing treatment and medication for his pedophilic behaviour.

Finding that the offender lacked genuine insight and could not be trusted to manage his risk in the community, the court concluded there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public.

An indeterminate sentence was imposed.

This consolidated appeal addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained through a wiretap authorization granted in 2016 for a 2009 murder investigation.

The Court of Appeal found that the authorization was improperly granted due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds, as the affidavit failed to establish a credible-based probability that interceptions would yield evidence of the long-dormant homicide or that other investigative procedures were unlikely to succeed.

The court emphasized that a generic investigative plan and unsupported inferences of continued association among targets after several years were insufficient.

Consequently, the interceptions constituted a serious breach of Charter s. 8 rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court upheld the exclusion of the evidence under Charter s. 24(2) due to the seriousness of the state conduct and the significant impact on privacy interests.

The appeals from conviction were allowed, and acquittals were entered, while the appeals from acquittal were dismissed.

Following convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault against a child, the Crown sought a dangerous offender designation.

The court applied the statutory framework in s. 753(1), with particular focus on s. 753(1)(a)(ii), and found a virtually unabated pattern of sexually abusing children over decades, interrupted mainly by custody, psychiatric detention, or strict supervision.

The court held that the predicate offences formed part of persistent aggressive behaviour demonstrating a substantial degree of indifference to the reasonably foreseeable consequences to others.

A dangerous offender designation was therefore imposed, with sentencing to be scheduled separately.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault, incest, sexual assault with a weapon, and mischief against his sibling.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of a defence witness, failed to provide meaningful reasons, and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were sound, the reasons were sufficient for appellate review, and there was no uneven scrutiny of the evidence.

The three offenders were convicted of firearms trafficking and related offences.

Prior to sentencing, they applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unconstitutional post-verdict delay.

The court dismissed the applications, finding the delay fell below the 5-month presumptive ceiling established in Charley after deducting defence delay and the discrete event of a constitutional challenge.

On sentencing, the court found the mandatory minimum under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code had been struck down and was inapplicable.

Saberi and Montgiraud, both youthful first offenders with lower moral blameworthiness, received conditional sentences of 20 months.

Bruce, who facilitated three separate transactions and possessed drugs for trafficking, received a custodial sentence of 22 months.

The Crown applied to remove defence counsel from the record in a manslaughter retrial due to a potential conflict of interest.

Defence counsel had previously represented two key Crown witnesses, one of whom was convicted as the shooter in the underlying incident.

Despite the respondent's fundamental right to counsel of choice and proposed waivers, the court found that the potential need to cross-examine former clients created an appearance of unfairness.

The application was granted to protect public confidence in the administration of justice.

During a sentencing hearing for three offenders convicted of firearms offences, the Crown argued the court should conduct a fresh constitutional analysis of the mandatory minimum sentence under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code, despite previous Superior Court decisions declaring it unconstitutional.

The court held that, following the Supreme Court's decision in Ferguson, a declaration of invalidity under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act effectively removes the provision from the statute books.

Therefore, the previous declarations of invalidity are binding on courts of coordinate jurisdiction, and the mandatory minimum sentence is of no force and effect.

The accused pleaded guilty to theft of electricity under $5,000, admitting to stealing $4,999 worth of hydro by occasionally disconnecting the meter at his business.

The Crown sought to prove the theft exceeded $5,000 by relying on circumstantial evidence of average historical use compared to actual billings.

The court found that the variables involved in calculating the exact amount stolen were too numerous to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court accepted the guilty plea for theft under $5,000.

The Court allowed the appeals and held that the mandatory victim surcharge in section 737 of the Criminal Code violates section 12 of the Charter for impecunious offenders.

The provision was declared of no force and effect immediately.

During pre-trial motions for a first-degree murder trial, the court addressed the accused's refusal to participate, the role of amicus curiae, and the admissibility of a police statement.

The court expanded the role of amicus curiae beyond making legal submissions to ensure a fair trial, given the accused's complete non-participation.

The court also ruled that the accused's statement to police was voluntary.

Although the court found a technical breach of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights due to a five-hour delay in facilitating access to counsel, the statement was not excluded under s. 24(2) because the police acted in good faith and the accused ultimately exercised his right to counsel before giving the statement.

Following a judge-alone trial, the court convicted the accused of sexual assault arising from sexual activity with a trainee bartender in a workplace washroom.

The court held the complainant was so intoxicated that she lacked capacity to consent, and further found the accused could not rely on any defence of reasonable belief because he took no reasonable steps to ascertain informed and voluntary consent as required by the Criminal Code.

The reasons also addressed the power imbalance between a manager and a subordinate employee, observing that any apparent consent would in any event have been vulnerable to vitiation by abuse of authority.

Applying the W (D) framework, the court rejected the accused's version and accepted the complainant's evidence on the core issue of non-consent.