Julie Scott

The defendant, F.E., was charged with sexual assault and sexual exploitation of C.K., a person with a mental disability in a relationship of dependency.

The Crown presented evidence including C.K.'s videotaped statements, medical findings of sexual activity and a sexually transmitted disease, and DNA evidence of F.E.'s semen and C.K.'s DNA on a towel.

The defence argued inconsistencies in C.K.'s statements and presented testimony from F.E.'s wife (A.C.) and son (L.C.) denying the incidents.

The court found C.K.'s testimony credible, explaining inconsistencies due to fear and dependency, and found the DNA evidence to be powerful corroboration.

The court rejected the defence witnesses' credibility, finding them motivated by shame and a desire to protect F.E. F.E. was found guilty on both counts.

During pre-trial motions for a first-degree murder trial, the court addressed the accused's refusal to participate, the role of amicus curiae, and the admissibility of a police statement.

The court expanded the role of amicus curiae beyond making legal submissions to ensure a fair trial, given the accused's complete non-participation.

The court also ruled that the accused's statement to police was voluntary.

Although the court found a technical breach of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights due to a five-hour delay in facilitating access to counsel, the statement was not excluded under s. 24(2) because the police acted in good faith and the accused ultimately exercised his right to counsel before giving the statement.

The offender was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of second-degree murder following a violent rampage against three women.

The court considered the principles of sentencing, emphasizing denunciation and retribution given the horrific and cold-blooded nature of the crimes.

The court ordered a 20-year period of parole ineligibility for the second-degree murder and directed that the periods of parole ineligibility for all three murders be served consecutively, resulting in a total period of 70 years without parole eligibility.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years, applied for a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under the 'faint hope' clause.

The court conducted an initial judicial screening to determine if there was a substantial likelihood that a jury would grant the application.

Considering the applicant's positive institutional record, successful completion of rehabilitative programs, expressions of remorse, and family support, the court found that the applicant met the threshold.

The application was allowed to proceed, and a jury was ordered to be empanelled.

During a murder retrial, the defence sought a jury instruction alleging the Crown breached the rule in Browne v. Dunn by failing to cross‑examine the accused on several key aspects of his testimony.

The court reviewed the rule governing fairness in cross‑examination and the circumstances in which a failure to challenge a witness’s evidence may require remedial instructions.

Considering the trial context, the prior disclosure of the Crown’s theory, and the cross‑examination that did occur, the court held that no significant Browne v. Dunn breach by the Crown had occurred.

The accused had full opportunity to address the Crown’s theory during testimony and was not ambushed.

The requested jury instruction was therefore refused.

The accused pleaded guilty to instructing Gary Saikaley to commit an indictable offence under section 202(1) of the Criminal Code for the benefit of a criminal organization contrary to section 467.13(1).

The accused was the head of an organized bookmaking operation in Ottawa that operated illegal sports gambling websites.

The operation involved three individuals and three websites through which bettors placed wagers on sporting events.

The accused voluntarily withdrew from the enterprise in early 2012.

The court sentenced the accused to 26 months imprisonment and determined that parole eligibility would be determined in accordance with the Corrections and Conditional Release Act rather than imposing the mandatory 50% parole ineligibility threshold.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, dangerous driving, and refusing to provide a breath sample following a serious driving incident on July 18, 2012.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence based on alleged violations of sections 7, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found breaches of the Charter regarding the timing of the breath demand and the provision of rights to counsel, but declined to exclude any evidence.

The court found that the accused's extreme intoxication rendered any Charter breaches of negligible effect on his actual interests, and that the police acted in good faith throughout.

At a preliminary inquiry, the defendant, a police officer, was charged with 46 counts relating to insurance fraud through staged motor vehicle accidents.

The Crown sought committal on counts relating to a fake accident on August 24, 2010, and on counts of attempt to obstruct justice.

The court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to commit the defendant to trial on the fraud counts based on the defendant's creation of a forged accident report that contained personal details of the fraudulent claimants and was circulated in a manner consistent with facilitating their insurance claims.

The court also found sufficient evidence to commit on attempt to obstruct justice counts, holding that the insertion of false provincial offense ticket information into accident reports constituted an attempt to pervert the course of justice by misleading police superiors.

The accused, a 20-year-old first-time offender, pleaded guilty to one count of Attempt to Obstruct Justice contrary to section 139(2) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was observed cleaning the interior of a vehicle that had been used in a homicide, removing evidence including blood and other forensic material.

The Crown sought a 12-month jail sentence plus probation, while the defence sought a suspended sentence or conditional sentence.

The court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence to be served in the community with strict conditions, followed by 2 years probation, along with a 5-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The Crown brought an application under section 680 of the Criminal Code seeking a review of an order granting judicial interim release to the respondent pending his retrial for murder.

The respondent had been in custody since 1990 and was granted bail on strict terms following a successful appeal that ordered a new trial.

The Chief Justice found that the Crown's motion had arguable merit given the unique combination of factors and directed that a panel of the Court of Appeal review the bail decision.

The complainant alleged that she was sexually harassed and solicited by her supervisor, who subsequently terminated her employment.

The Board of Inquiry found that the supervisor engaged in a course of vexatious sexual comments and conduct, including an unwanted kiss and a threat of reprisal.

This conduct constituted sexual harassment, sexual solicitation, and discrimination on the basis of sex by creating a poisoned work environment.

The corporate employer was held liable because the supervisor was part of the directing mind of the corporation.

The respondents were ordered to pay damages for lost wages, loss of dignity, and mental anguish.

The respondent brought a preliminary motion arguing that the 31-month delay in proceeding with a sexual harassment complaint violated his rights under ss. 7 and 11 of the Charter.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, holding that s. 11 does not apply because human rights proceedings are not criminal in nature.

The Board also held that s. 7 does not apply to remedial proceedings under the Human Rights Code, as they do not involve the potential for incarceration or criminal sanction and do not affect security of the person.

Following a preliminary decision that the Board of Inquiry lacked jurisdiction to hear the human rights complaints due to the Commission's failure to fulfill a condition precedent, the respondent Four Star Variety brought a motion for costs under s. 41(4) of the Human Rights Code.

The majority of the Board held that it lacked jurisdiction to award costs because the complaints were not 'dismissed' within the strict meaning of the Code.

The motion for costs was denied.

A dissenting member would have found jurisdiction to award costs but denied them on the basis that the respondent suffered no undue hardship, as its legal fees were paid by a third party.