Tracy Stapleton

The offender was convicted of aggravated sexual assault, wearing a disguise with intent, and uttering threats.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation.

The trial judge instead designated the offender as a long-term offender and imposed a 15-year sentence consecutive to his current sentence, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

Both the Crown and the offender appealed.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in relying on statistical evidence of age-related decline in risk to find a reasonable possibility of eventual control in the community.

The offender argued the 15-year sentence violated the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the trial judge properly weighed the expert evidence and that the totality principle does not require a shorter sentence if it would preclude a long-term offender designation in favour of an indeterminate dangerous offender sentence.

The offender was convicted of aggravated sexual assault, wearing a disguise with intent, and uttering threats.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation.

The trial judge instead designated the offender as a long-term offender and imposed a 15-year sentence consecutive to his current sentence, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

Both the Crown and the offender appealed.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in relying on statistical evidence of age-related decline in risk to find a reasonable possibility of eventual control in the community.

The offender argued the 15-year sentence violated the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the trial judge properly weighed the expert evidence and that the totality principle does not require a shorter sentence if it would preclude a long-term offender designation in favour of an indeterminate dangerous offender sentence.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after the deceased was found in a submerged vehicle.

At trial, the Crown relied on unchallenged toxicology evidence suggesting the deceased died within 15 to 20 minutes of his last drink, supporting the theory of a planned murder.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh toxicology evidence, conceded as correct by the Crown, showing the trial expert's time estimate was scientifically unsound.

The Court of Appeal applied the Palmer test and admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could reasonably be expected to have affected the jury's verdict.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence of one year imprisonment, two years probation, and a $199,083 restitution order for three counts of obtaining credit cards by fraud.

The Court of Appeal upheld the custodial sentence, finding it fit for a large-scale commercial fraud.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part regarding the restitution order, reducing it to $35,000 based on the appellant's ability to pay.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the reasons of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge, noting that he considered the same issues raised on appeal and committed no error in law.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an order quashing a subpoena that required the respondent to testify at the preliminary inquiry of his brother and another co-accused, who were charged with first-degree murder.

The respondent, who was separately charged with the same murder, had given a video-taped statement implicating the co-accused but later backed away from it during his testimony.

The application judge quashed the subpoena, finding the Crown's predominant purpose was to obtain incriminating evidence against the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Crown had a legitimate purpose in examining the respondent to potentially admit his out-of-court statement under the KGB framework and to probe the co-accused's involvement.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's decision to designate the respondent as a long-term offender rather than a dangerous offender.

The respondent, a diagnosed psychopath with a history of severe domestic violence, was found to pose an extremely high risk of violent recidivism.

The trial judge imposed a ten-year sentence followed by a ten-year supervision order with strict conditions, hoping his risk would 'burn out' by age 45.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by relying on strict community supervision conditions that were practically impossible to implement due to a lack of resources.

The Court substituted a dangerous offender designation, emphasizing that public protection is paramount and cannot be compromised by assuming unavailable resources will materialize.

The respondent was convicted of sexual assault against a child and received a conditional sentence.

The trial judge refused the Crown's request for a DNA databank order and a sex offender registry order, reasoning that the respondent did not present an ongoing risk to the community.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to apply the 'grossly disproportionate' test required by the Criminal Code and by minimizing the public interest in registration.

The Court set aside the trial judge's refusal and made the requested orders.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the respondent's conviction for care and control while impaired and substituted an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal held that the summary conviction appeal judge overstepped her appellate jurisdiction by effectively retrying the case, as there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's finding of impairment.

However, because the trial judge failed to address the respondent's exculpatory evidence and improperly relied on an inculpatory statement, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge lacked jurisdiction because he failed to put the appellant to his election under s. 536(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the record did not show substantial compliance with the section or an effective waiver by the unrepresented appellant.

As a result, the trial was a nullity.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury.

The principal defence was that the appellant accidentally hit the victim, relying on his almost complete blindness.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that blindness was only relevant to the foreseeability of bodily harm and not to the issue of accident.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.