Paul Rouleau

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous operation of a conveyance causing bodily harm arising from a collision with an electric scooter rider on a residential street.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence concerning his emotional state, improperly relied on demeanour evidence, and erred in rejecting his position that the incident reflected only a momentary lapse of attention.

The court held that the characterization of the appellant's emotional condition was supported by the record, that any demeanour-based inference was invited by defence counsel, and that the trial judge committed no reversible error in treating the conduct as a marked departure from the reasonable standard of care.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The moving party sought review of a single-judge order dismissing its motion for an extension of time to appeal an order made in a receivership matter.

The court held that no error in principle, legal error, misapprehension of the evidence, or unreasonable result had been shown, and accepted that the motion judge properly considered all relevant circumstances, including prejudice and the conduct of the receivership.

The court also refused to admit proposed fresh evidence because it was not shown to have been unavailable through due diligence and would not have affected the result.

The review motion was dismissed with costs payable to the receiver.

The appellants appealed an order striking their pleadings for failure to pay an outstanding costs award of $260,500.

They also sought to file fresh evidence and adjourn the appeal to advance an allegation that the underlying debt resulted from a fraudulent signature.

The court held that the order under appeal was a discretionary decision and found no basis to interfere, particularly given the motion judge's history with the matter.

It further held that the alleged fraud issue was not properly before the court because judgment had already been granted on that issue in an unappealed decision.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant challenged a summary judgment granting the respondent bank possession of the appellant's residence and monetary relief arising from mortgage default.

The Court of Appeal held there was no merit to the appeal because the evidence was undisputed, the appellant admitted non-payment even after adjustments and an extension, and the mortgage contract authorized possession upon default after required notice.

The court also rejected reliance on the Charte hypothécaire canadienne, holding that it formed part of a federal economic statement and had no force of law.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

The appellant was convicted of robbery following a home invasion and sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by relying on the rejected testimony of a co-accused and failing to caution himself about unsavoury witness evidence.

He also sought to introduce fresh DNA evidence and appealed his sentence based on the parity principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and the fresh evidence motion, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the circumstantial evidence or the differing sentences imposed on the co-accused based on their respective moral culpability.

The appellant purchased a commercial condominium unit under power of sale proceedings.

The respondents, who operated a Hindu temple in the unit, sought to enforce an unregistered option to purchase contained in their lease with the previous mortgagee in possession.

The motion judge granted specific performance, allowing the respondents to purchase the unit for $350,000.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider whether the appellant was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice under the Land Titles Act.

The matter was remitted for a trial on this issue.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 2 years and 11 months' imprisonment for firearms and drug trafficking offences, arguing he should have received additional credit for lockdowns and triple bunking during presentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge was aware of the difficult circumstances and that the few additional days of lockdown and triple bunking shown in newly filed records would not impact the sentence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and other offences, receiving a net sentence of four years and seven months.

On appeal, he sought to introduce fresh evidence and argued the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider his drug addiction and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions as mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly elicited information from the self-represented appellant, who had stated his addiction did not motivate the offence.

The court also held the sentencing judge appropriately weighed the harsh pre-sentence conditions against the seriousness of the offence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for production and possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant claimed his ss. 10(a) and 10(b) rights were breached due to a delay in providing a Vietnamese interpreter upon his arrest.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the Grant factors, noting the delay was an isolated mistake, the appellant was not mistreated, and the evidence was obtained pursuant to a valid search warrant issued prior to the arrest.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed her convictions for fraudulent personation and offences related to a forged certificate of stay of probation.

She argued the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove she prepared and sent the documents, and that the trial should have been heard in Superior Court because a testifying lawyer allegedly acted as a second prosecutor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded guilt was the only logical inference, and rejected the jurisdictional argument as meritless.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant pleaded guilty to several offences, including possession for the purpose of trafficking in fentanyl and cocaine, and was sentenced to a global term of nine years.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it was excessive and seeking a reduction based on fresh evidence of lockdown conditions and triple bunking.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's reasons, noting the aggravating factors such as the nature and quantity of the drugs and the appellant's criminal record.

The court admitted the fresh evidence but declined to reduce the sentence, concluding it remained fit.

The insured property owner appealed the dismissal of its claim for coverage following a wall collapse, while the insurer appealed the finding of coverage for a subsequent arson fire at the same vacant building.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The wall collapse was not proven to be a fortuitous event.

For the fire loss, the insurer was bound by promissory estoppel preventing reliance on a vacancy exclusion, and its unilateral attempt to amend the policy to exclude arson was invalid under s. 124 of the Insurance Act for lack of written consent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for five counts of attempted murder and arson, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

He claimed his counsel failed to challenge the voluntariness of his police statement and failed to prepare him for trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no factual basis for the claims and concluding that, even if there were, the appellant suffered no prejudice given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the trial judge's detailed reasons for rejecting his testimony.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He abandoned the conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to apply the usual 1.5 to 1 credit rate for the appellant's 152 days of pretrial custody.

The sentence appeal was granted and the sentence was reduced by 76 days.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred in not declaring a mistrial after a juror brought internet articles into the jury room.

She also argued her s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated by post-conviction delay and her right to make full answer and defence was compromised by lost airport surveillance video.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inquiry into the jury issue was sufficient, the post-conviction delay was justified by a Gardiner hearing which constituted an exceptional circumstance, and the jury instructions regarding the lost video were fair.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded restricted firearm and possession of a restricted firearm knowing possession is unauthorized.

He appealed his four-year sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in assessing an expert report regarding his post-traumatic stress disorder and in applying Gladue factors.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in assessing the expert's report, which was relevant to the circumstances of the offences and rehabilitation prospects.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to three and a half years.

The appellant appealed a 24-month conditional sentence.

Based on unusual circumstances, significant pre-sentence custody, fresh evidence, and a Crown concession, the Court of Appeal found the original sentence unreasonable.

The court accepted a joint submission and varied the sentence to 12 months' incarceration, less 5 months' credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a net sentence of 7 months.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for a fuel oil spill at the respondents' home.

The trial judge found that the appellants negligently failed to identify that the respondents' fuel oil tank, which was labelled for indoor use, was installed outdoors, and failed to tag it as non-compliant.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by applying the 'material contribution' test for causation instead of the 'but for' test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the trial judge articulated the wrong test, she effectively applied the 'but for' test by finding the spill would not have occurred if the appellants had fulfilled their regulatory obligations.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's apportionment of liability, finding of contributory negligence, and damages assessment.

The moving party requested reconsideration of the court's order dismissing her motion for leave to appeal from a Divisional Court order.

The underlying claim involved a fall allegedly caused by a negligent transit driver, which was dismissed after trial.

The moving party argued that fresh evidence supported her appeal and alleged that the jury foreman was biased because he had previously testified for the transit commission.

The Court of Appeal found that the fresh evidence had already been addressed by the Divisional Court and that the jury bias allegation lacked evidentiary support.

Finding no exceptional circumstances under Rule 59.06(2), the court dismissed the motion.

The moving party sought review of a single judge’s refusal to extend the time to file a notice of motion for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court’s dismissal of an application for judicial review of a social benefits tribunal decision.

The Court of Appeal applied the leave to appeal framework from Sault Dock Co. v. Sault St. Marie (City).

It held that the proposed appeal did not raise a question of law or an issue of public importance and was of interest only to the parties.

Because the proposed appeal lacked merit, the interests of justice did not support granting an extension of time.

The motion was dismissed without costs.