Andrew Davidson

The plaintiff, an elderly passenger using a walker, brought a negligence action against the transit commission and its bus driver after she fell while exiting a bus.

She alleged the driver breached the standard of care by failing to deploy a ramp or move the bus closer to the curb.

The court reviewed video evidence and testimony, finding that the driver had stopped a normal distance from the curb and kneeled the bus according to standard practice.

The court concluded the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence, and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a former route supervisor for the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), sued for wrongful dismissal after being terminated for her alleged involvement in a group benefits fraud scheme involving a healthcare supplier.

The TTC counterclaimed for the amount of the fraudulent benefits paid.

The court found that the plaintiff knowingly participated in the fraud by submitting claims for unnecessary medical devices and splitting the reimbursement proceeds with the supplier.

The court held that the plaintiff's conduct constituted civil fraud and willful misconduct, justifying summary dismissal without notice or termination pay.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed, and the TTC's counterclaim for $15,815 was allowed.

The defendant Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) brought a motion to transfer a personal injury action from the Central South Region (Hamilton) to the Toronto Region, pursuant to Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the TTC failed to establish that the proposed Toronto venue was "significantly better" than the plaintiff's chosen Hamilton venue, or that the transfer was desirable in the interest of justice, especially given the late stage of the proceedings and potential prejudice to the plaintiff.

The moving party requested reconsideration of the court's order dismissing her motion for leave to appeal from a Divisional Court order.

The underlying claim involved a fall allegedly caused by a negligent transit driver, which was dismissed after trial.

The moving party argued that fresh evidence supported her appeal and alleged that the jury foreman was biased because he had previously testified for the transit commission.

The Court of Appeal found that the fresh evidence had already been addressed by the Divisional Court and that the jury bias allegation lacked evidentiary support.

Finding no exceptional circumstances under Rule 59.06(2), the court dismissed the motion.

The defendant Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) brought a motion to transfer the action from the Central West Region (Brampton) to the Toronto Region.

The plaintiff, Magdalene Coppin, opposed the transfer.

The court, applying Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found that the incident occurred in Toronto, the plaintiff resided and received treatment in Toronto, and examinations for discovery took place in Toronto.

The only connection to Brampton was the location of the plaintiff's counsel.

The court determined that the TTC met its onus to demonstrate that the interests of justice required the transfer to Toronto, considering a holistic application of the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b).

The self-represented appellant appealed a jury verdict dismissing her negligence claim against a public transit commission for injuries allegedly sustained when a bus door closed on her.

She raised numerous grounds of appeal, including alleged errors by the trial judge in quashing witness summonses, admitting pre-accident medical records, instructing the jury, and awarding costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and concluding that the jury's verdict of no negligence was supported by the evidence.

Following a jury trial where the defendant TTC was entirely successful, the TTC sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The self-represented plaintiff opposed the costs request, arguing that the TTC's in-house counsel did not keep time dockets and that she was impecunious.

The court held that time estimates were acceptable for in-house counsel and that the plaintiff provided no evidence to support her claim of impecuniosity.

The court awarded the TTC costs fixed at $34,383.40.

The appellant appealed a jury trial decision dismissing her personal injury claim against the Toronto Transit Commission for an alleged fall on a bus.

She argued the trial judge erred by refusing to instruct the jury on spoliation regarding overwritten video evidence, allowing cross-examination on her doctor's complete clinical notes, and permitting references to pre-existing injuries.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, as the appellant failed to prove intentional destruction of evidence and the medical records were relevant to her claims.

The appellant, a self-represented litigant, appealed an order dismissing his action against the transit commission under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The underlying claim related to the denial of accessible transit services.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action and was frivolous on its face.

The moving party, a declared vexatious litigant, brought a motion for an extension of time to file a supplementary notice of appeal and for case management directions.

The moving party had improperly combined appeals of three vexatious litigant declarations and a dismissed application into a single notice of appeal without obtaining the required leave for the application appeal.

The Court of Appeal struck the application appeal without prejudice for failing to obtain leave under section 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

However, recognizing the moving party's clear intention to appeal the vexatious litigant declarations, the Court granted an extension of time to file separate notices of appeal for those orders.

The request for case management was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought an action against the Toronto Transit Commission for improperly refusing to approve him for free passage on Wheel-Trans.

The defendant brought a motion to strike, and the court subsequently issued a notice under Rule 2.1 to determine if the action was frivolous.

The court held that a claim against a statutory body exercising a statutory power of decision must be brought by way of an application for judicial review.

As the action could not succeed as pleaded, it was dismissed as frivolous.

Corrigendum to a prior costs endorsement correcting arithmetic errors in the calculation of a costs award in a civil action.

The court adjusted the surveillance expense total and corrected the amount previously recorded in the endorsement.

The court also deducted a previously satisfied $1,000 costs order made by a Master.

As a result of these corrections, the supplementary costs endorsement amount was reduced.

Supplementary costs endorsement correcting disbursement and total costs figures in a prior costs decision.

The defendant advised that an expert invoice previously referenced should be replaced with a lower amount.

The court amended the disbursement total and the overall costs award accordingly to reflect the corrected invoice amount.

The decision adjusts the numerical totals in the earlier July 15, 2014 costs endorsement without altering the underlying entitlement to costs.

In a negligence jury trial arising from an alleged fall on a public transit bus, the plaintiffs sought to rely on the doctrine of spoliation after video footage from the bus surveillance system was overwritten pursuant to the transit authority’s standard 15‑hour retention policy.

The court considered whether the defendant intentionally destroyed relevant evidence in circumstances giving rise to a rebuttable presumption that the evidence would be unfavourable.

The evidence showed the footage was automatically overwritten under established policy before any notice of litigation and without authority for supervisors to download the footage absent police authorization.

The court held there was no factual foundation for intentional destruction of evidence related to contemplated litigation.

The issue of spoliation and any adverse inference was therefore removed from the jury.

The plaintiffs brought a motion shortly before trial alleging spoliation of video evidence by the defendant relating to a bus incident in which the plaintiff claimed injury due to driver negligence.

They sought to strike the defendant’s statement of defence, alternatively an adverse inference regarding the missing video, and exclusion of testimony from certain witnesses.

The court reviewed the governing principles of spoliation and emphasized that determinations regarding whether spoliation occurred and the appropriate remedy are generally best addressed by the trial judge.

Given the proximity of the trial and the intertwined nature of any potential remedy with the trial process, the motion was referred to the trial judge for determination.

Costs of the motion were reserved to the trial judge.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving and assault with a weapon (a motor vehicle) arising from an incident on December 15, 2010, in a Thornhill community centre parking lot.

During a physical altercation between two groups of youth, the defendant drove his red Mazda in a circular pattern toward the area where the fighting was occurring, allegedly to scare the combatants away from his employee who was being attacked.

While eyewitness accounts were inconsistent regarding whether the vehicle actually struck anyone, the court found the defendant guilty of dangerous driving based on his deliberate decision to drive toward the group despite having a direct exit available.

The court also found him guilty of assault with a weapon, as the defendant used his vehicle as a weapon by threatening force through his driving conduct.

One charge was stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The appellants, two insurance companies, appealed a declaration that the respondents were entitled to coverage under an automobile insurance policy.

The insurers argued that the application judge erred in her interpretation of a policy exclusion for a 'race' or 'speed test'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly applied the rule that insurance contracts are to be strictly and narrowly interpreted.

Furthermore, there was ample evidence to support the conclusion that the insured was participating in a driver education program to improve driving skills, rather than engaging in a speed test.